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ABSTRACT 
 
The issue of non-compliance with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) recommendations 
and rulings emerges when the violator state fails to bring its inconsistent measures into 
conformity with its WTO obligations within a reasonable period of time. Compensation and 
suspension of concessions or other obligations (retaliation) are the only remedies provided under 
WTO law for cases of non-compliance. Many academic writings, as well as statements from 
WTO Members, have demonstrated pessimism concerning the effectiveness of these remedies, 
particularly retaliation.  
 
The central point of this thesis concerns three main issues: the problems of WTO 
retaliation, the question of the effectiveness of retaliation, and the purposes of retaliation. This 
thesis aims to provide another perspective, besides the common “harm-resulted” perspective, for 
assessing the effectiveness of WTO retaliation. Accordingly, it provides several approaches: (1) 
identification of the purpose of retaliation in order to assess its effectiveness; (2) analysis of the 
enquiry whether there are in fact several purposes of WTO retaliation; (3) examination of the 
question whether the presence of retaliation purposes other than that inducing compliance is 
within the ambit of WTO law; (4) consideration of retaliation as a way of inducing a mutually 
agreeable solution; and (5) consideration of the question whether any deviation from strict 
compliance would undermine the WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
On the basis of extensive research on the purposes of WTO retaliation, namely through 
interpreting Article 22 of the DSU, examining the design of WTO treaty, assessing the academic 
writings/debates as well as the statements of arbitrators; several conclusions are made, of which 
the main one is that inducing compliance is not the sole purpose that WTO retaliation can 
pursue. Therefore compliance is not the only benchmark by which the effectiveness of WTO 
retaliation should be measured. 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO WTO REMEDIES IN THE CASE OF NON-
COMPLIANCE 
 
Consult before you legislate; Negotiate before you litigate; Compensate before you retaliate; And comply – at any 
rate (Hymn to Compliance).1 
 
Overview 
Pascal Lamy, the former EU Trade Commissioner and the current World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) Director-General, proposed this “Hymn to Compliance” in his speech to the 
United States Chamber of Commerce. It delineates the practical value of compliance amongst the 
WTO Members. Similarly, by establishing a dispute settlement scheme, WTO Members confirm 
that they are committed to their obligations under the WTO Agreement. 
 
The WTO dispute settlement system sets up several rules and procedures that have to be 
followed to secure compliance. Parties are required first to request consultation when a dispute 
arises (consultation stage). If the consultation fails, the complaining party may request the 
establishment of a panel (adjudication stage). During this stage, if one of the parties is 
dissatisfied with the panel‟s decision, it may appeal to the Appellate Body. The panel/Appellate 
Body will issue a report that the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will adopt. After the adoption 
of the report, the DSB, a body for supervising the implementation of the report(s), requests the 
losing party bring itself into prompt compliance with WTO law or find mutually satisfactory 
adjustments (implementation stage). If the losing party fails to bring its measure into conformity 
within a reasonable period of time, the complaining party is entitled to resort to a temporary 
measure, either compensation or the suspension of the WTO obligations (retaliation) as the last 
resort (non-implementation stage).  
 
                                                             
1 Pascal Lamy “Has International Capitalism Won the War and Lost the Peace?” (the US Chamber of Commerce, 
Washington DC, 8 March 2001). 
2 
 
The questions are what happens if, even after retaliation is imposed, the violator state 
continues its violation measure? What should parties do when compliance cannot be achieved? 
What if the violator state continues the violation but at the same time provides compensation to 
the injured state? Does WTO law allow a continued violation as long as the violator state wants 
to bear compensation or suffer retaliation? 
 
I Problem Presented 
The main problem of this thesis concentrates on the question of what the purpose(s) of 
retaliation is. The focus on this question aims to resolve the disagreements concerning the 
effectiveness of retaliation.  Retaliation is generally believed to be a tool that has the effect of 
inducing the recalcitrant state to comply; therefore it is considered ineffective when it does little 
or nothing to induce compliance. This thesis provides a different approach and argues that to 
respond to the question whether or not WTO retaliation is an effective instrument, it is 
significant at first to determine the meaning or definition of effectiveness. With this intention, 
this thesis demonstrates that a rule or standard is deemed effective when it can achieve its 
purpose or objective.  
 
The problem is that neither the DSU nor the WTO treaty provisions stipulate explicitly 
the purpose(s) of retaliation. Therefore, this thesis seeks to clarify this problem using methods 
such as interpreting Article 22 of the DSU, assessing the statements of Article 22.6 arbitrators as 
well as academic writings/debates.  
 
This thesis also provides the assessments with respect to the design or structure of WTO 
treaty to sustain the searching of the purpose(s) of retaliation. These assessments provide an 
analysis with the reference to public international law and domestic law contract models.
2
 The 
objective of referring to other disciplines outside WTO law is made in order to provide other 
sources of guidance in assessing the main problems. As long as it is relevant, the reference to 
                                                             
2 Because trade retaliation involves not only legal but also economic and politic aspects of the parties to the dispute; 
in this thesis, I do also make references to other related disciplines such as political science, political economy, 
international relations, and so forth.  
3 
 
other disciplines is useful to provide a fuller picture. In practice, the panel and/or the Appellate 
Body have cited the decisions of the International Court of Justice to support their own 
decisions,
3
 and this practice has never been opposed by WTO Members. Therefore, the reference 
to other disciplines in this thesis is still appropriate. Finally, this thesis examines the question of 
the effectiveness of WTO retaliation in light of the purposes of retaliation that is identified 
throughout this extensive research. 
 
II Introduction to WTO DSU Remedies: The Good Record of Compliance and 
the Temporary Remedies‟ Dilemma 
The WTO has its basis in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) 1947; and 
as the successor, it has established more comprehensive agreements and rules. One of these is the 
effective protection and enforcement system under dispute settlement. 
 
The provisions that have governed dispute settlement since GATT 1947 are Articles 
XXII and XXIII of GATT. Although neither provision refers to the term “dispute settlement” nor 
provides a detailed procedure for disputes, they are the primary articles for dispute settlement. 
Article XXII contains the “consultation” provision, and Article XXIII provides the “nullification 
or impairment” rule. From these two “simple” articles, the current WTO dispute settlement 
system, embodied in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (DSU), has created the principles for the management of disputes.
4
  
 
Irrespective of how innovative the system is, the central interest for parties to the dispute 
is whether the system provides finality and remedies under its regime. This perspective goes 
along with the Latin legal maxim, ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a 
                                                             
3 For instance, the Appellate Body referred to the International Court of Justice decisions to support its finding on 
the generic term “natural resources” in Article XX(g) of GATT in the US – Shrimp dispute. See United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WTO DOC WT/DS58/AB/R (1998) at [footnote 109] 
(Report of the Appellate Body) [US – Shrimp (AB)]. 
4
 World Trade Organization Secretariat A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System: A WTO Secretariat 
Publication prepared for publication by the Legal Affairs Division and the Appellate Body (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) at 12 [A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System]; the Dispute Settlement Understanding [the 
DSU], art 3.1. 
4 
 
remedy).
5
 Hence a good dispute resolution system is one that offers certainty of legal rule and 
prompt and equal dispute procedures, as well as reasonable remedies.  
 
The DSU provides two types of remedies for breaching WTO law: (a) final remedy 
(compliance by withdrawal or modification of measures that are inconsistent with WTO law);
6
 
and (b) temporary remedies (compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations, 
commonly referred as retaliation).
7
 The relationship existing between final and temporary 
remedies is hierarchical in nature,
8
 since Article 19 of the DSU clearly establishes the preference 
for prompt compliance with recommendations and rulings of the DSB (final remedy). Only when 
Members fail to withdraw or amend the WTO-inconsistent measures by the end of a reasonable 
period of time, does the DSU provide temporary remedies under Article 22. 
 
A Final Remedy’s Good Record versus Temporary Remedies’ Dilemmas   
As at April 2011, there have been 424 WTO complaints or consultation requests made 
pursuant to the DSU, including 248 disputes for which panels were established.
9
 Interestingly, to 
date there have been only nine disputes for which the arbitrations were established to assess the 
remedy for non-implementation.
10
 The few numbers of non-implementation disputes 
demonstrate that the respondent Members mostly comply with the recommendations and rulings 
adopted by the DSB. In other words, WTO final remedy (compliance) has a reasonably good 
record.
11
  
                                                             
5 Bryan A Garner (ed) Black‟s Law Dictionary (7th ed, West Group, 1999) at 1695. 
6 The DSU, arts 3.7 and 19.1. 
7 Ibid, art 22. 
8 John H Jackson “The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding – Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal 
Obligations (responding to Bello‟s article)” (1997) 91 Am J Int‟L L 60 at 60-64 [“Misunderstandings on the Nature 
of Legal Obligations”]; Steve Charnovitz “The WTO‟s Problematic “Last Resort” against Noncompliance” (2002) 
57(4) Aussenwirtschaft 409 at 411-412 [“Last Resort against Noncompliance”]; Allan Rosas “Implementation and 
Enforcement of WTO Dispute Settlement Findings: An EU Perspective” (2001) 4 JIEL 131 at 133-138. 
9 WTO Secretariat “Chronological List of Disputes Cases” 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm>. 
10 Similar to the panel reports, there are several cases in which multiple arbitrators reports have been issued with 
regard to the same subject matters but brought by different states. For example, the United States and Canada 
brought similar complaints before the Article 22.6 arbitration proceeding regarding the EC – Hormones dispute, 
consequently there were two arbitrator reports being issued. For the efficiency reason, the same subject matter 
cases/reports are counted as one dispute in this thesis. 
11 Wilson states that in nearly 90 per cent of the cases that the panel and/or Appellate Body found to be WTO 
violations, the Member found in violation of its WTO obligations has indicated its intention to bring itself into 
5 
 
 
In the non-compliance stage, the parties to a dispute have recourse to arbitration to 
resolve the disagreement between them. An arbitration body might be established under Articles 
21 and 22 of the DSU. The arbitration under Article 21.5 of the DSU, also known as the 
compliance panel, is intended to resolve the question of compliance with the ruling and 
recommendation of the DSB. Additionally, arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU attempts to 
settle the level of retaliation and the possibility of suspending obligations under a different sector 
or agreement.    
 
The DSB has authorised the request for retaliation in a number of disputes. Five disputes 
have been brought before the arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU;
12
 while the other four 
involve prohibited subsidies, therefore parties to the disputes have recourse to the arbitration 
under the DSU and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement.
13
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
compliance and in most cases has already done so. See Bruce Wilson “Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse 
WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date” (2007) 10(2) JIEL 397 at 398-399. 
12 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (United States) (Recourse 
to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU) WTO DOC WT/DS27/ARB (1999) 
(Decision by the Arbitrators) [EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC]; European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (Ecuador) (Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities 
under Article 22.6 of the DSU) WTO DOC WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (2000) (Decision by the Arbitrators) [EC – 
Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC]; European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones) (Canada)/(United States) (Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under 
Article 22.6 of the DSU) WTO DOC WT/DS48/ARB; WTO DOC WT/DS26/ARB (1999) (Decision by the 
Arbitrators) [EC – Hormones (Canada)/(US) (Article 22.6 – EC)]; United States – Anti Dumping Act of 1916 
(Original Complaint by the European Communities) (Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 
22.6 of the DSU) WTO DOC WT/DS136/ARB, 24 February 2004 (Decision by the Arbitrators) [US – 1916 Act 
(Article 22.6 – US)]; United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Recourse to Arbitration 
by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU) WTO DOC WT/DS217/ARB/BRA WT/DS234/ARB/CAN 
WT/DS217/ARB/CHL WT/DS217/ARB/EEC WT/DS217/ARB/IND WT/DS217/ARB/JAP, 
WT/DS217/ARB/KOR WT/DS234/ARB/MEX (2004) (Decision by the Arbitrator) [US – Byrd Amendment (Article 
22.6 – US)]; United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 
(Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of DSU) WTO DOC WT/DS285/ARB (2007) 
(Decision by the Arbitrator) [US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US)]. 
13 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the 
DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement) WTO DOC WT/DS46/ARB (2000) (Decision by the Arbitrators) 
[Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil)]; United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” 
(Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement) 
WTO DOC WT/DS108/ARB (2002) (Decision of the Arbitrator) [US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US)]; Canada – Export 
Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft (Recourse to Arbitration by Canada under Article 22.6 of the 
DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement) WTO DOC WT/DS222/ARB (2003) (Decision by the Arbitrator) 
[Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada)]; United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton (Recourse to 
Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement) WTO DOC 
WT/DS267/ARB/1 (2009) (Decision by the Arbitrator) [US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US)]. 
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The primary remedy is a general recommendation for the respondent party to comply; 
while compensation and retaliation are the remedies for eventual non-compliance.
14
 Instead of 
being praised, remedies under Article 22 (compensation and retaliation) are often criticised by 
various commentators and they are also viewed as ineffective by many Members, especially 
those from developing and least-developed countries. 
 
Compensation, usually in the form of trade compensation,
15
 has been agreed between 
disputing parties in relatively few cases.
16
 The rationale for this less attractive option lies in the 
words of “developing mutually acceptable compensation” and “shall be consistent with covered 
agreements”.17 Both of these phrases suggest that instead of being an automatic obligation of 
respondent states, compensation is voluntary and should be consistent with the principle of non-
discrimination obligations under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Moreover, from the 
complainant‟s point of view, particularly concerning industry, compensation (lower barriers in 
the other areas) does nothing to eliminate non-compliance in the area subjected to the dispute. 
On the contrary, the respondent faces a difficulty volunteering a sector of the economy for 
increased foreign competition to protect another sector that is benefiting from the violation.
18
 
Thus, parties in dispute often neglect compensation remedy and directly request authorisation to 
retaliate. 
 
                                                             
14 Robert E Hudec “Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement” in Friedl Weiss (ed) Improving 
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues and Lesson from the Practice of Other International Courts and 
Tribunals (Cameron May, 2000) 369 [“Broadening the Scope of Remedies”]. 
15 In the US – Copyright case, financial compensation, as another form of compensation, is granted on bilateral 
basis. 
16 For example, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – Mutually Acceptable Solution on Modalities for 
Implementation WTO DOC WT/DS8/20 WT/DS10/20 WT/DS11/18 (1998); Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of 
Textile and Clothing Products – Notification of Mutually Acceptable Solution WTO DOC WT/DS34/14 (2001); 
United Sates – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea 
– Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU WTO DOC WT/DS202/18 (2002); United States – Section 110(5) of 
the US Copyright Act – Notification of a Mutually Satisfactory Temporary Arrangement WTO DOC WT/DS160/23 
(2003). In the first three cases (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, Turkey – Textile, US – Line Pipe), both parties reached 
agreement concerning trade compensation; however, in the last dispute (US – Copyright), the compensation was 
agreed in the form of financial compensation. See also William J Davey “Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute 
Settlement” (2009) 42 Cornell Int‟l L J 119 at 122. 
17 The DSU, arts 22.1 and 22.2.  
18 David Palmeter and Petros C Mavroidis Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Practice and 
Procedure (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 266. 
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If, within 20 days after the expiry of the reasonable period of time, the parties fail to 
agree on satisfactory compensation, the complainant party may request permission to retaliate 
from the DSB.
19
 Retaliation under the DSU is in the form of suspension of concessions or other 
obligations.
20
 The DSU provides several requirements for retaliation. One of these requirements 
is that it should be imposed in the same sector as that in which the violation was found.
21
 
Nonetheless, the complainant may request the authorisation to retaliate in the other sectors or 
agreements (cross retaliation) if the complainant considers it impracticable or ineffective to 
retaliate in the same sector.
22
 Retaliation applies on a discriminatory basis against the Member 
that fails to implement the recommendations or rulings. It is applied selectively by one Member 
against another (bilateral basis), nevertheless it requires the DSB‟s approval (multilateral 
basis).
23
  
 
Many commentators perceive retaliation as having significant flaws. Bronckers and van 
den Broek, for instance, state that retaliation offers no relief to those actually damaged, puts 
inappropriate burden on innocent bystanders, and offers no appropriate relief to the injured party 
suffering as a result of the violator state‟s regime.24 Retaliation may also result in market 
distortion and welfare loss, which in the end may cultivate political resentment and provoke a 
political debacle.
25
 Moreover, this scheme allows Members to fight protectionism with 
protectionism
26
 and tends to punish consumers in the victim state and exporters in the violator 
state for the misdeeds of protectionists in the violator state, while leaving the protectionist that 
initiated the violation largely unaffected.
27
 Although the application of retaliation is under 
multilateral surveillance by the DSB, the tit-for-tat WTO retaliation tends to undermine cross-
                                                             
19 The DSU, art 22.2. 
20 Ibid, art 22. 
21 Ibid, art 22.3. 
22 Ibid. 
23 A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, above n 4, at 81. 
24 Marco Bronckers and Naboth van den Broek “Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving the Remedies of 
WTO Dispute Settlement” (2005) 8(1) JIEL 101 at 103. 
25 Sungjoon Cho “The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law” (2004) 65 U Pitt L Rev 763 at 785. 
26
 Steve Charnovitz “Should the Teeth be Pulled?: An Analysis of WTO Sanctions” in Daniel L M Kennedy and 
James D Southwick (eds) Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002) 602 at 622 [“Should the Teeth be Pulled?”]. 
27 Jide Nzelibe “The Case against Reforming the WTO Enforcement Mechanism” (2008) U Ill L R 319 at 325. 
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border economic integration as well as the security and predictability of the multilateral trading 
system of the WTO Agreement.
28
  
 
B Other Dilemmas Resulting from the Implementation of Retaliation: Lessons from the 
Disputes 
As pointed out by Malacrida, there have been 28 requests for authorisation to retaliate 
concerning 16 different disputes since the DSU entered into force in 1995 until January 2008.
29
 
These 28 requests were filed by 13 different Members, nine of which were developing country 
Members.
30
 The complaining states obtained an authorisation to impose retaliatory action from 
the DSB in nine different disputes.
31
 However, so far, retaliation measures have been imposed 
only in four different disputes: EC – Bananas III (the United States against the European 
Communities), EC – Hormones (the United States and Canada against the European 
Communities), US – FSC (the European Communities against the United States) and US – Byrd 
Amendment (the European Communities, Japan and Mexico against the United States).
32
 Even 
though the number of retaliation disputes is insubstantial, these disputes arguably raise several 
issues that might challenge the efficacy of WTO retaliation, as follows. 
 
1 The ability of developing countries to impose retaliatory measures 
The issue of the ability of developing countries to impose retaliatory measures emerged 
in EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) for the first time. The dispute stems from the European 
Communities banana regime that provided for duty-free importing of bananas originating from 
the European Communities former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) 
                                                             
28 Reto Malacrida “Toward Sounder and Fairer WTO Retaliation: Suggestions for Possible Additional Procedural 
Rules Governing Members‟ Preparation and Adoption of Retaliation Measures” (2008) 42(1) JWT 3 at 11-16. 
29 Ibid, at 6, 56-60. 
30 Ibid, at 7. 
31 EC – Bananas III (US and Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), above n 12; EC – Hormones (US and Canada) (Article 
22.6 – EC), above n 12; Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), above n 13; US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), above n 
13; Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada), above n 13; US – 1916 Act (Article 22.6 – US) above n 12; US – 
Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), above n 12; US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), above n 12; US – Upland 
Cotton (Article 22.6 – US), above n 13. 
32 Malacrida, above n 28, at 7. 
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regions.
33
 The WTO panel and Appellate Body concluded that the European Communities 
bananas regime was inconsistent with obligations under the GATT, GATS, and the Agreement 
on Import Licensing Procedures. The European Communities subsequently attempted to revise 
its regime;
34
 however, both the United States and Ecuador claimed that the revised regulation 
continued to violate WTO obligations.  
 
The United States directly requested for the suspension of concessions under Article 22.2 
of the DSU.
35
 Ecuador requested a compliance panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
36
 In the end, 
both the United States and Ecuador obtained authorisation to retaliate; in fact, only the United 
States enforced the retaliatory measures. Ecuador, considering the harm of retaliation under the 
same sector or agreement, requested and obtained authorisation to suspend TRIPS obligations 
(cross-retaliation).
37
 Nevertheless Ecuador did not implement this authorised retaliatory measure. 
The arbitration panel itself provided a lengthy note on the political, practical and legal problems 
that can emerge with regard to the imposition of cross-retaliation.
38
 In general for developing 
countries such as Ecuador utilising retaliation against more economically powerful states would 
impair their trade, or in other words, they would economically “shoot [themselves] in the foot”.39  
 
                                                             
33 Regulation 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the Common Organization of the Market in Bananas [1993] OJ L 047. 
34 For example by introducing Regulation 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Regulation 404/93 on the common 
organization of the market in bananas [1998] OJ L 210.  
35 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (Recourse by the United 
States to Article 22.2 of the DSU) WTO DOC WT/DS27/43 (1999) (Award of the Arbitrator).   
36 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (Recourse to Article 21.5 
of the DSU by Ecuador) WTO DOC WT/DS27/RW/ECU (1999) (Report of the Panel) [EC – Bananas III (Article 
21.5 – Ecuador) (panel)]. 
37 The complainant may request an authorisation to retaliate under other sectors or agreements (cross-retaliation) if 
the complainant finds that retaliation in the same sector is impracticable or ineffective. Article 22.3 of the DSU 
provides the procedures and principles regarding cross-retaliation. The principles of cross-retaliation will be 
explained further in chapter two. 
38 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) (panel), above n 36, at [130]-[165]. 
39 Nsongurua J Udombana “A Question of Justice: the WTO, Africa, and Countermeasures for Breaches of 
International Trade Obligations” (2005) 38 J Marshall L Rev 1153 at 1185-1186; Bryan Mercurio “Improving 
Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: The Dispute Settlement Understanding Review – Making It 
Work?” (2004) 38(5) JWT 795 at 840 [“Improving Dispute Settlement in the WTO”]; Bronckers and van den Broek, 
above n 24, at 104.  
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2 The possibility of trade wars 
The possibility of trade wars is evidenced from a case between two powerful developed 
states in the US – FSC dispute. In 1984, the United States Congress passed Foreign Sales 
Corporations (FSC) legislation to resolve the long-standing dispute under GATT over the 
predecessor legislation, which was the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC).
40
 Due 
to the fact that the European Communities had not complained about the FSC being inconsistent 
with the GATT law since 1985, it was surprising when the European Communities later 
challenged this legislation before a WTO panel.
41
 Based on the general assumption that it would 
be impossible for the United States to terminate the FSC subsidy because many important 
industries were benefiting from it, the most likely explanation for the European Communities‟ 
action was that they were using the FSC dispute to overcome the United States over-
aggressiveness (the adoption of carousel retaliation) in the EC – Hormones and EC – Bananas III 
disputes.
42
  
 
3 The issue of termination of retaliatory measures 
The issue of termination of retaliatory measures (post-retaliation) emerged in EC – 
Hormones. It is a long-disputed case between the European Communities, the United States and 
Canada concerning hormone-treated beef. Although the panel and Appellate Body have resolved 
this dispute, another disagreement emerged on how to implement and comply with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The European Communities claimed that they have 
already brought their inconsistent measures into compliance; however, the United States and 
Canada rejected this claim. The European Communities, infuriated with the continuance of the 
sanctions, have initiated another dispute settlement proceeding against Canada and the United 
                                                             
40 C O‟Neal Taylor “Impossible Cases: Lessons from the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement” (2007) 28 U Pa 
J Int‟l Econ L 309 at 405. 
41
 Robert E Hudec “Industrial Subsidies: Tax Treatment of „Foreign Sales Corporation‟” in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
and Mark A Pollack (eds) Transatlantic Economic Dispute: the EU, the US and the WTO (Oxford University Press, 
2003) 175 at 180. 
42 Ibid, at 181. 
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States seeking their removal.
43
 The EC – Hormones dispute is one good example of the post-
retaliation problem. Even though the arbitration imposes certain limitations and determines the 
level of retaliation, when complainant states impose retaliatory measures, there are no assurances 
as to when and how they should be terminated.  
 
4 Continued non-implementation or procedural delay 
The efficacy of WTO retaliation is questionable when the inconsistent measures interact 
with a domestic politically sensitive issue. The difficulty encountered by the United States 
administration in US – Byrd Amendment is a good example. The Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA), also known as the Byrd Amendment, named after Senator Robert 
Byrd of West Virginia who sponsored it, was enacted as a part of the Agricultural, Rural 
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act.
44
 The 
CDSOA mandates the distribution of the collected antidumping and countervailing duties to the 
United States affected producers that brought and supported complaints about foreign 
producers.
45
 Although the Clinton administration requested Congress to revisit and to repeal the 
CDSOA, Congress passed the legislation to neutralise actionable subsidies in order to preserve 
jobs that might otherwise be destroyed.
46
 Thus, despite its controversy, this legislation is popular 
in the United States senate and amongst domestic producers, especially the United States steel 
industry that has obtained benefits from it. It is unsurprising that it took many years for the 
United Stated to comply fully with the ruling, despite the fact that the European Communities 
and Mexico (the complainants in this case) imposed the retaliatory measures and indicated that 
their retaliatory measures will remain in place as long as the United States maintains the 
inconsistent measures.
47
 
 
                                                             
43 United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute WTO DOC 
WT/DS320/AB/R (2008) (Report of the Appellate Body); Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC 
– Hormones Dispute WTO DOC WT/DS321/AB/R (2008) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
44 Public Law 106-387, 19 CFR § 159.61 (2000) [US Public Law 106-387]. 
45
 Simone Hartmann-Tröger “Antidumping and Countervailing Duties: the Byrd Amendment” (2008) 11 Int‟l Trade 
& Bus L Rev 287 at 288. 
46 Ibid, at 289. 
47 Ibid, at 298.  
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In summary, although there is a positive record of Members complying with the adverse 
rulings, there are also a small number of non-implementation cases in WTO dispute settlement. 
In the cases of non-implementation, the DSU provides two remedies which are compensation 
and retaliation. Nonetheless these two remedies, particularly retaliation, have been perceived to 
suffer from several problems. This is why the study in this thesis is important. It does not look at 
the quantity of the disputes but the quality of these remedies, in particular retaliation, to sustain 
the WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
Part II of this chapter elaborated on these problems and dilemmas. The subsequent part 
provides the views from scholars, commentators, practitioners and WTO Members concerning 
some related issues which are the areas of discussion in this thesis.  
 
III Overview of Literature on the Effectiveness of WTO Remedies, the 
Purpose(s) of Retaliation, WTO Law in Relation to Other Regimes, and 
Option to Improve Remedies 
The purpose of this section is to describe the area of study or research in this thesis, as 
well as to outline several views and perspectives from scholars, practitioners, commentators and 
WTO Members with regard to the areas of study in this thesis. This section is divided into four 
main parts: (a) the effectiveness of WTO remedies; (b) the purpose(s) of retaliation; (c) WTO 
law in relation to other regimes; and (d) options to improve remedies. 
 
A The Effectiveness of WTO Remedies 
While some observers or commentators have a positive view of the effectiveness of WTO 
dispute settlement,
48
 they share a similar perspective that the effectiveness of the DSU temporary 
remedies, especially retaliation, is questionable.
49
 Debra Steger boldly states that reform in WTO 
                                                             
48 For example, Davey notes that since its establishment, the WTO dispute settlement system has worked reasonably 
well in providing an effective mechanism through which WTO Members are able to resolve disputes. See William J 
Davey “The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years” (2005) 8 JIEL 17 at 50.  
49 Nzelibe, above n 27, at 321, 327-328; Bronckers and van den Broek, above n 24; Cho, above n 25, at 785-790; 
Brendan P McGivern “Seeking Compliance with WTO Rulings: Theory, Practice and Alternative” (2002) 36(1) The 
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dispute settlement is not needed, since the system can be improved through practices; it is on the 
area of implementation that most of the Members‟ attention should be focused.50 Moreover, she 
states that retaliation is a blunt instrument that only powerful countries can use effectively.
51
 
Mercurio shares a similar view with Steger by providing three reasons why retaliation is an 
imperfect means of obtaining compliance. The first reason is that retaliation does nothing when 
the measure is too politically sensitive to be removed. The second reason is that a large 
suspension is self-destructive, and the last reason is that developing countries cannot utilise it 
against powerful developed countries.
52
  
 
Additionally, many Members seem to agree that the implementation phase of the dispute 
settlement system is relatively weak compared with other phases.
53
 Mexico, for example, 
observed that “the main weakness of the [DSU] was the excessive length of time that a Member 
could maintain a measure which had been found to be WTO-inconsistent without any 
consequences.”54 There are four main proposals put forward by Mexico to deal with the remedies 
problem: early determination of nullification or impairment, retroactive determination, 
preventive measures, and negotiable remedies.
55
 
 
My thesis takes a different approach in responding to the question of the effectiveness of 
WTO retaliation. It suggests identifying first what “effective” means. The definition of 
effectiveness is discussed in more detail in chapter three below. However, in short, something is 
effective if it can achieve its purpose or objective. Consequently, to respond to the question of 
whether retaliation is effective or not, it is significant to identify the purposes of retaliation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Int‟l Lawyer 141 at 152-153; Bernard O‟Connor “Remedies in the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
System – The Bananas and Hormones Cases” (2004) 38(2) JWT 245 at 257-260; Malacrida, above n 28, at 17-27. 
50 Debra P Steger “Commentary on the Doha Round: Institutional Issue” (2005) 5(4) Global Econ J 1 at 4-5. McRae 
also states that remedies and sanctions are the areas in WTO dispute settlement that need improvement. See Donald 
McRae “Measuring the Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement System” (2008) 3(1) AJWH 1 at 18. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Mercurio “Improving Dispute Settlement in the WTO”, above n 39, at 840. 
53 Edwini Kessie “The „Early Harvest Negotiation‟ in 2003” in Federico Ortino and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds) 
The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2005 (Kluwer Law International, 2004) 115 at 142.   
54 Dispute Settlement Body Special Session Minutes of Meeting - Held in the Centre William Rappard on 13 – 15 
November 2002 WTO DOC TN/DS/M/6 (31 March 2003) at 5. 
55 Dispute Settlement Body Special Session Amendments to the Understanding Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes Proposed Text by Mexico – Communication by Mexico WTO DOC TN/DS/W/40 (27 January 
2003). 
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B The Purpose(s) of Retaliation 
It is necessary to identify the purpose that retaliation might serve. The arbitrators in US – 
Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US) stated that “a large part of the conceptual debate 
[suspension of obligations in the DSU] that took place in these proceedings could have been 
avoided if a clear „object and purpose‟ were identified.”56 Put differently, regardless of any 
modifications or reform proposals proposed, without a clear objective or purpose the arbitrators 
and Members still have uncertain direction in resolving the retaliation problems. 
 
Furthermore this thesis argues that identifying the purpose is significant in determining or 
measuring the degree of the effectiveness. As a result, one should determine the purpose or the 
objective of a rule or standard first in order to determine the effectiveness of that rule or 
standard. The subsequent part elaborates on several issues with respect to the purpose(s) of WTO 
retaliation.  
 
1 The lack of clarity of article 22: various alleged purposes emerge 
While the DSU clearly specifies that the aim of WTO dispute settlement is to provide 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system,
57
 the purpose(s) of retaliation is 
unclear. The DSU does not stipulate explicitly the purpose(s) of retaliation under Article 22.
58
 
However by referring to arbitrators‟ findings59 and some academics‟ views,60 there are several 
purposes that retaliation may pursue. They are: (a) inducing compliance;
61
 (b) providing 
                                                             
56 US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), above n 12, at [6.4] (emphasis added). 
57 The DSU, art 3.2. See also John H Jackson “International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: 
Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”” (2004) 98 Am J Int‟l L 109 at 111-114 [“Obligation to Comply or to 
Buy Out”].  
58 Arbitrators in US – Byrd Amendment stated that “it is not completely clear what role is to be played by the 
suspension of obligations in the DSU…”. See US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), above n 12, at [6.4].  
59 For instance, EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), above n 12, at [6.3]; US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 
– US), above n 12, at [6.3].  
60 For instance, Joost Pauwelyn “Calculation and Design of Trade Retaliation in Context: What is the Goal of 
Suspending WTO Obligations?” in Chad P Bown and Joost Pauwelyn (eds) The Law, Economic and Politics of 
Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 34 at 36-38 (“Calculation and Design of 
Trade Retaliation”); Alan O Sykes “Comment on Chapter 2” in Chad P Bown and Joost Pauwelyn (eds) The Law, 
Economic and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 70 at 70-72.  
61 EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), above n 12, at [6.3]; US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), above n 12, 
at [4.112].  
15 
 
compensation;
62
 (c) rebalancing;
63
 and (d) “deterring inefficient breach but encouraging efficient 
breaches”.64 
  
(a) Inducing compliance 
Inducing compliance was stated as a purpose for the first time by the arbitrators in EC – 
Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) and it was reiterated in subsequent cases except in US – 
1916 Act (Article 22.6 – US) and US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US). In EC – Banana III 
(US) (Article 22.6 – EC), the arbitrators agreed with the United States argument that the 
temporary nature of compensation and suspension of concession indicates that the purpose of 
countermeasures is to induce compliance.
65
 In Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), the 
arbitrators explained the appropriateness of countermeasures “if it effectively induces 
compliance”.66 The arbitrators even authorised punitive suspension on the basis of inducing 
compliance in the US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) and Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – 
Canada) disputes.
67
 Finally in US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), the arbitrators interpreted the 
meaning of the criteria of effectiveness in order to authorise the right of cross-retaliation.
68
 They 
cited the conclusion of the arbitrator in EC – Banana III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) that “the 
effective criterion empowers the party seeking suspension to ensure that the impact of that 
suspension is strong and has the desired result, namely to induce compliance”.69  
 
                                                             
62 US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), above n 12, at [6.3].  
63 David Palmeter and Stanimir Alexandrov ““Inducing Compliance” in WTO Dispute Settlement” in Daniel L M 
Kennedy and James D Southwick (eds) The Political Economic of International Trade Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) 646 at 647. 
64 Warren F Schwartz and Alan O Sykes “The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the 
World Trade Organization” (2002) 31 J Legal Stud S179 at S183. 
65 EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), above n 12, at [6.3]. 
66 Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), above n 13, at [3.44].  
67
 Canada – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Canada), above n 13, at [3.121]; US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), above n 13, at 
[5.52]-[5.57], [6.2]. 
68 US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), above n 12, at [4.29]. 
69 Ibid, at [4.29] and [4. 84]. 
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(b) Compensation 
The arbitrators started to consider that WTO retaliation might also have other purposes in 
US – 1916 Act (Article 22.6 – US).70 Furthermore in US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), 
while noting that the concept of inducing compliance has been referred to in past arbitrations, the 
arbitrators stated that “it is not expressly referred to in any part of the DSU” and that they “are 
not persuaded that the object and purpose of the DSU would be exclusively to induce 
compliance.”71 While the arbitrators did not “exclude that inducing compliance is part of the 
objectives behind suspension,” they said that “at most it can be only one of a number of purposes 
in authorising the suspension of concession or other obligations.”72 Furthermore, the arbitrators 
concluded that “... [the requirement of equivalent levels] seems to imply that suspension of 
concessions or other obligations is only a means of obtaining some form of temporary 
compensation, even when the negotiation of compensations has failed.”73 In other words, the 
arbitrators implied that the purpose of retaliation is to provide compensation. 
 
(c) Rebalancing  
Sebastian writes that given that the WTO Agreements emerged from negotiations 
conducted under the basis of reciprocity, it is often argued that the purpose of retaliation is to 
rebalance this bargain.
74
 Commentators who support the purpose of rebalancing, for instance, are 
Palmeter and Alexandrov. They argue that:
75
 
[The inducing compliance] doctrine is legally in error and is unwise from a policy 
perspective. The purpose of countermeasures in the WTO is not to induce compliance, 
but to maintain the balance of reciprocal trade concessions negotiated in the WTO 
agreements. 
                                                             
70 US – 1916 Act (Article 22.6 – US), above n 12, at [5.3]. 
71 US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), above n 12, at [3.74]. 
72 Ibid, at [3.74]. 
73
 Ibid, at [6.3] (emphasis added). 
74 Thomas Sebastian “World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and 
Appropriateness” (2007) 48 Harv Int‟l L J 337 at 370. 
75 Palmeter and Alexandrov, above n 63, at 647 (emphasis added). 
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 Moreover, another commentator, Lawrence, does not argue against the purpose of 
inducing compliance directly. However, he admits that WTO remedies can achieve several 
purposes simultaneously; and “the goal achieved most precisely is maintaining reciprocity.”76 
 
(d) “To deter inefficient breach but to encourage efficient breach” 
Schwartz and Sykes also take part in the retaliation purpose debate by developing a 
theory from political (public choice) and economic contracts perspectives. They suggest that 
WTO agreements are incomplete contracts amongst political actors and the metric of welfare for 
each signatory will not be money but the political welfare of its political officials.
77
 Therefore, 
when the cost of political performance exceeds the benefit of performance (politically costly), 
the DSU allows a violator to continue a violation, as long as it compensates or is willing to bear 
the costs of the retaliation (“to encourage efficient breach”). In Schwartz and Sykes‟s view, 
formal sanction is not needed to induce a high level of compliance, owing to domestic pressures 
for compliance, reputational penalties, and unilateral sanctions that put pressure on parties to 
respect their commitments (to deter inefficient breach).
78
 Thus, they conclude, the function of 
retaliation is “to deter inefficient breaches but to encourage efficient breaches”. 
 
2 Two schools of thought disagreements 
The four arguable purposes, which are previously explained, can be categorised into two 
main schools of thought: inducing compliance and rebalancing.
79
 The battle between these 
schools of thought has a strong correlation with the previous debate between Judith Bello and 
John Jackson. In 1996, Bello wrote an article in the American Journal of International Law,
80
 
which stated that:
 81
  
                                                             
76 Robert Z Lawrence Crimes & Punishments? Retaliation under the WTO (Institute for International Economics, 
2003) at 47.  
77 Schwartz and Sykes, above n 64, at S184-S185. 
78 Ibid, at S204. 
79
 Both compensation and “to deter inefficient breach but to encourage efficient breach” arguments have the features 
of rebalancing. For efficiency reason, I put them together for the purpose of rebalancing. 
80 Judith Bello “The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More” (1996) 90 Am J Int‟l L 416. 
81 Ibid, at 416-417 (emphasis added).  
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Like the GATT rules...the WTO rules are simply not “binding” in the traditional 
sense…there is no prospect incarceration, injunctive relief, damages for harm inflicted or 
police enforcement. The WTO has no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no 
truncheons or tear gas. Rather, the WTO...relies upon voluntary compliance.  
 
She also suggested that compliance with the WTO remains optional; a Member has three 
choices when its measures are challenged. First, it may comply with the ruling. Second, it may 
maintain inconsistent measures but provide a compensatory benefit to restore the balance of 
negotiated concessions. Third, it may choose to maintain the inconsistent measure and suffer 
retaliation for the purpose of rebalancing. Thus, she concludes that the only truly binding WTO 
obligation is to maintain the balance of concessions negotiated amongst Members.
82
 
 
Jackson subsequently inserted a rebuttal in the same journal and argued that:
 83
  
...an adopted dispute settlement report establishes an international law obligation upon 
the member in question to change its practice to make it consistent with the rules of the 
WTO Agreement and its annexes…Thus, the DSU clearly establishes a preference for an 
obligation to perform…Certainly they [WTO rules] are binding in the traditional 
international law sense. 
 
Even though many legal scholars and commentators support Jackson‟s view on 
compliance,
84
 others, particularly economists, seem to disagree with a purpose of strict 
compliance and support Bello‟s arguments on a purpose of rebalancing.85 
 
                                                             
82 Ibid, at 417-418. 
83 Jackson “Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligations”, above n 8, at 60, 63 (emphasis added). 
84 For example Andrew Mitchell states that the suspension of concessions is indeed to induce compliance. See 
Andrew D Mitchell “Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes” (2006) 17 EJIL 985 at 999 [“Proportionality 
and Remedies in WTO Disputes”]; Charnovitz “Should the Teeth be Pulled?”, above n 26, at 603; Joost Pauwelyn 
“Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules – Toward a More Collective Approach” (2000) 94 
Am J Int‟l L 335 at 343 [“Enforcement and Countermeasures”]. 
85 Lawrence, above n 76, at 47; Schwartz and Sykes, above n 64; Kyle Bagwell “Remedies in the WTO: An 
Economic Perspective” Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper No: 0607-09, January 
2007 at 7-11. 
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Additionally, the doubt over the purposes of retaliation has been reflected in practice. 
This is confirmed by the changes of the United States view and arbitrators‟ decisions regarding 
the purposes of retaliation. The United States, at first in the EC – Bananas III dispute, strongly 
supported the purpose of inducing compliance by stating that:
86
  
The suspension of concessions under Article 22 was an essential element of an important 
objective of the DSU, namely compliance with the WTO rules. The arbitrators had 
recognised this and had agreed that the purpose of countermeasures was to induce 
compliance.  
 
However, afterwards in the US – Byrd Amendment dispute, the United States appeared to 
reverse its stand point by stating that “[t]he United States also welcomed the Arbitrators‟ 
rejection of the argument that the „ultimate goal‟ of the suspension of concessions or other 
obligations was to „induce compliance‟.”87 The uncertainty also appears in arbitrators‟ 
statements. Though at first in EC – Banana III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) they stated that the 
purpose of countermeasures is to induce compliance; in US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – 
US), they showed uncertainty with their previous position by giving these two statements. First, 
they are not persuaded that the object and purpose of the DSU would be exclusively to induce 
compliance, and second they stated that it is not completely clear what role is to be played by the 
suspension of obligations in the DSU.
88
 
 
In short, regardless of the disagreements amongst the observers or commentators, they 
actually promote the notion of single purpose of retaliation: either inducing compliance or 
rebalancing. Likewise, in most Article 22.6 arbitral proceedings, the arbitrators have endorsed a 
single purpose of retaliation, namely inducing compliance. Chapter three below examines further 
the purpose(s) of retaliation. 
 
                                                             
86 Dispute Settlement Body Minutes of Meeting - Held in the Centre William Rappard on 19 April 1999 WTO DOC 
WT/DSB/M/59 at 1-2 (3 June 1999) (statement by the United States). 
87 Dispute Settlement Body Minutes of Meeting - Held in the Centre William Rappard on 24-26 November 2004 
WTO DOC WT/DSB/M/178 at 73 (17 January 2005) (statement by the United States) (emphasis added). 
88 US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), above n 12, at [3.73], [6.4]. 
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3 Providing a different standard in the SCM Agreement: Does it help to clarify the 
purpose(s)? 
The DSU provides “equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment” as a ceiling for 
the level of suspension.
89
 The equivalent requirement appears to provide a limitation to the level 
of suspension stipulated under Article XXIII:2 of GATT
90
 and Article 4.10 of the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement to determine the level of suspension, both of which 
contain articles which use the word “appropriate”. In all subsidy cases, in light of the “inducing 
compliance” objective and by assessing the broader meaning of “appropriateness”, the arbitrators 
granted an award that is, in lieu of equivalence with the level of nullification, tailored to the total 
amount of subsidy (total value of violation). In the arbitrators‟ view, Article 4.10 cannot be 
confined to redress or neutralise effects only; so the arbitrators established that appropriate 
countermeasures under Article 4.10 do not have to be restricted to an actual trade effect test.
91
 
Therefore, when dealing with prohibited subsidies, arbitrators decided on a different standard, 
which is an amount of countermeasures that correspond to the total amount of the subsidy.
92
  
 
In the SCM Agreement disputes, arbitrators, by referring to the word “appropriate”, have 
consistently determined that the purpose of countermeasures is to induce compliance and have 
authorised a countermeasure that is close to punitive sanction. However, even by basing their 
decisions on the appropriateness standard, arbitrators‟ determinations on purpose and level of 
sanction are not free from controversy.  
 
                                                             
89 The DSU, art 22.4. It states that “the level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the 
DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.” 
90 Nothing in Article XXIII:2 explicitly limits the suspension to the level of equivalent. The “appropriateness” in 
Article XXIII:2 can be at the same level with the level of equivalent, but it may also go below or above that level. 
Mavrodis cites the legal adviser to the Director General of the GATT point of view stating that “Article XXIII, the 
wording was wider, referring to measures determined to be appropriate…which meant that there was a wider leeway 
in calculating the retaliatory measures under Article XXIII than under Articles XIX or XXVIII”. See Petros C 
Mavroidis “Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place” (2000) 11 EJIL 763 at 801 
[“Between a Rock and a Hard Place”].  
91 US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), above n 13, at [5.20]-[5.24].  
92 Ibid, at [5.57]-[5.62]; Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), above n 13, at [3.60].  
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(a) “Appropriate if it effectively induces compliance” in Brazil – Aircraft 
By referring to the general rules of international law, the International Law Commission 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (the ILC Draft 
Articles)
93
 and previous arbitrators‟ statement in EC – Banana III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), 
arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil) concluded that “a countermeasure is 
„appropriate‟ inter alia if it effectively induces compliance.”94 Thus, the level of appropriate 
countermeasures is set by arbitrators on the basis of whether the countermeasures have an 
inducement effect. They provided that if the actual level of nullification or impairment is 
substantially lower than the offending measure (the subsidy), a countermeasure based on the 
actual level of nullification will have less or no inducement effect.
95
  
 
The arbitrators‟ interpretation of appropriateness and the level of nullification seem to 
clash with their reference to the ILC Draft Articles and some decisions of other international 
tribunals. While the purpose of countermeasures under international law is definitely inducing 
compliance, Article 51 of the ILC Draft Articles provides the proportionality provision as a 
guideline principle so that a countermeasure does not become excessive. Thus, no matter how 
effective the countermeasure to induce compliance is, if it is not proportional, such 
countermeasure is not appropriate. 
 
Under Article 51 of the ILC Draft Articles, a countermeasure is proportional when it is 
commensurate with the injury that is suffered. This is recognised in state practice, doctrine, and 
confirmed in the Naulilaa and Air Service Agreement arbitration cases.
96
 Therefore, as Palmeter 
and Alexandrov argue, neither general international law nor the ILC Draft Articles support the 
conclusion of the Brazil – Aircraft arbitrators when they relied only on the sole stated purpose of 
                                                             
93 The basic rules of international law concerning responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts are 
codified and formulated by the United Nations‟ International Law Commission in the ILC Draft Articles. Although 
the rules are codified in the “Draft Articles”, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 56/83 which 
“commends [the Draft Articles] to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future 
adoption or other appropriate action”. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts GA Res 56/83, 
A/RES/56/83 (2001).  
94
 Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), above n 13, at [3.44]. 
95 Ibid, at [3.54]. 
96 International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts A/56/10 
chp.IV.E.1 (2001) [the ILC Draft Articles], Commentary art 51. 
22 
 
inducing compliance and ignored the proportionality principle by determining a level of 
countermeasure that is unrelated to the harm suffered.
97
 Additionally, Green and Trebilcock 
assert that there is no necessary connection between the level of subsidy and the harm caused to 
other Members; the level of subsidy may be much lower than the harm or higher than the harm.
98
 
 
(b) Larger sanction based on obligations erga omnes in US – FSC  
In US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), the arbitrators ruled that “the prohibition on export 
subsidies is a per se obligation, not itself conditioned on a trade effects test.”99 They argued that 
the emphasis is on the “unlawful character of export subsidies”, and “the effect of upsetting the 
balance of rights and obligations between the parties”, regardless of the “actual trade effects”.100 
Furthermore, the arbitrators referred to the prohibition of export subsidies as an erga omnes 
obligation owed to each or every Member. Therefore, the arbitrators provided that:
101
  
The United States had breached its obligation to the European Communities in respect of 
all the money that it has expended, because such expenditure in breach…is the very 
essence of the wrongful act.  
 
In other words, the arbitrators took into account the harm to the entire Members (under 
the concept of obligation erga omnes) in calculating the level of appropriate countermeasures. 
Gazzini supports the arbitrators‟ decision in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) by arguing that:102  
In the cases of obligations concerning both prohibited subsidies and trade in services, 
contracting parties intend to attach to violations of indivisible obligations some of typical 
consequences of erga omnes obligations.  
 
                                                             
97 Palmeter and Alexandrov, above n 63, at 658. 
98 Andrew Green and Michael Trebilcock “Enforcing WTO Obligations: What We Learn From Export Subsidies?” 
(2007) 10 JIEL 653 at 674-675. 
99 US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), above n 13, at [5.23]. 
100
 Ibid, at [5.23]. 
101 Ibid. at [6.10] (emphasis added). 
102 Tarcisio Gazzini “The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations and the Consequences of their Violation” (2006) 17(4) 
EJIL 723 at 731 [“The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations”]. 
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In Gazzini‟s view, the different treatment reserved for prohibited and actionable 
subsidies, and the special nature of trade in services that omits any reference to the concept of 
nullification and impairment from Article XXII of GATS, demonstrates the erga omnes nature of 
WTO obligations.   
 
However, the concept of obligation erga omnes considered by the arbitrators in US – FSC 
is debatable. Howse and Neven argue that “what the panel had in mind, most likely, was the 
concept of an erga omnes partes obligation”.103 An erga omnes partes obligation is an obligation 
owed not only to each Member individually, but collectively to the entire membership.
104
 
Nonetheless, Howse and Neven also reject those obligations considered as erga omnes partes, by 
arguing that the primary interest at stake in dispute settlement is individual Members, 
notwithstanding the fact that there is community interest in compliance. Dispute settlement 
rulings are binding between parties to disputes, and not legally binding on the Members as a 
whole.
105
  
 
(c) Larger penalties as a punitive sanction in Canada – Aircraft II 
Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada) is one example of a subsidy case where 
arbitrators decided on larger penalties. In this case, the arbitrators decided to adjust the level of 
countermeasures calculated on the basis of the total amount of the subsidy by an amount (20 per 
cent) which arbitrators deem reasonably meaningful to cause Canada to reconsider its current 
position to maintain the subsidy at issue.
106
 The 20 per cent adjustment seems to be a punitive 
sanction provided by the arbitrators for Canada‟s reluctance to modify its inconsistent measure.  
 
Many commentators criticise the arbitrators‟ decision on larger penalties under the SCM 
Agreement. Palmeter and Mavroidis challenge the view of the arbitrators that considered 
prohibited subsidies as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating factor because of the term 
                                                             
103 Robert Howse and Damien J Neven “United States – Tax Treatment for „Foreign Sales Corporations‟ Recourse 
to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement 
(WT/DS108/ARB): A Comment” (2005) 4 WTR 101 at 116. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid, at 118. 
106 Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada), above n 13, at [3.119]-[3.122]. 
24 
 
“appropriate” in Article 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement that should not be given the same 
meaning as the term “equivalent” in Article 22 of the DSU.107 Palmeter and Mavroidis claim that 
“the use of the term „prohibited‟ for these subsidies is more likely to distinguish them from those 
that are „actionable‟.”108 Nzelibe emphasises that it is unlikely that an enforcement mechanism 
that awards sanctions in excess of equivalency would be politically sustainable. In other words, 
larger penalties might develop into a trade war in which all parties would be worse off.
109
 Cho 
also states that the arbitral ruling, which imposed a sanction beyond a proportional level, seems 
excessive since a certain cap in the scale should nevertheless exist in light of equity or fairness. 
Without such a minimum discipline (proportionality), the sanctions risk being abused or 
misused, thereby making them illegitimate and unsustainable.
110
 
 
C  WTO Law in Relation to Other Legal Systems 
In order to provide a comprehensive assessment with respect to the purpose(s) of WTO 
retaliation, some discussions in this thesis refer to non-WTO law. There are two areas that this 
thesis looks at: public international law and contract. Commentators and observers have various 
opinions concerning the relationship between WTO law and these areas of study. The subsequent 
part explains their views.  
 
1 WTO law in relation to public international law 
The WTO is an inter-governmental organisation whose Members are actively engaged in 
international trade relations based on the agreements amongst themselves. In their trade 
interactions/relations, Members might perform an action or omission or both, that negatively 
affects other Members‟ rights. Under public international law, such conduct can be considered as 
a wrongful act and every internationally wrongful act entails international responsibility. The 
provisions for international wrongful acts are laid down under the ILC Draft Articles. Public 
international law also provides provisions governing international treaties: the Vienna 
                                                             
107
 Palmeter and Mavroidis, above n 18, at 291. 
108 Ibid, at 292.  
109 Nzelibe, above n 27, at 344. 
110 Cho, above n 25, at 779. 
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Convention on Law and Treaties (VCLT).
111
 As these two general rules appear to interweave 
with WTO law, the question as to whether WTO law can fall back on those general rules of 
public international law; or whether they do not apply because WTO law has contracted out of 
them, comes to the surface.  
 
(a) Is WTO law a self-contained regime? 
As a global trading system, the WTO sets up the rules of trade applied to nations as its 
Members. The “public international” character of WTO raises the issues of whether it is a part of 
international law or a self-contained regime.  
 
McRae argues from the traditional view that international trade law is considered outside 
the sphere of international law.
112
 Several arguments are presented by McRae, such as the fact 
that trade law is “technical” and its field is “special”, trade law is not seen as emerging from state 
practice but is seen more as the law of business transactions between individuals, and 
international trade law has nothing to do with sovereignty.
113
 Pauwelyn criticises McRae‟s view 
by stating that:
114
 
Whereas McRae‟s first and second reasons...are convincing, this third reason is both 
misleading and erroneous. It falls into the very trap that McRae himself warned about, 
namely the trap for trade lawyers to portray „their‟ discipline as something „special‟.  
 
Pauwelyn argues that McRae utilises a wrong benchmark to compare trade law with 
international law. He refers to, on the one hand, the traditional international law concept of “co-
existence”, and on the other hand, the modern international law concept of “co-operation” 
                                                             
111 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969 entered into force on 27 
January 1980, United Nations Treaties Series Vol 1155, p 331. 
112 Donald McRae “The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development of International Law” (1996) 
260 Recueil des Cours 109 [“The Contribution of International Trade Law”]; Peter Van den Bossche The Law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 61; Joost 
Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 29-31 [Conflict of Norms in Public International Law]. 
113 McRae “The Contribution of International Trade Law”, above n 112, at 115-117.    
114 Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, above n 112, at 31. 
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including GATT/WTO law. Thus, Pauwelyn concludes that McRae is not comparing 
international law to trade law, but old international law to new international law.
115
 
 
Furthermore, what is a self-contained regime? The ILC draft report on fragmentation of 
international law finalised by Koskenniemi notes that self-contained regimes may be established 
from a set of rules and principles that apply as lex specialis.
116
 Simma and Pulkowski state that 
the concept of a strong lex specialis is a self-contained regime.
117
  
 
Is WTO law a self-contained regime? Pauwelyn suggests that “it is not a „self-contained‟ 
regime in the sense of a regime existing outside of international law.”118 He argues that “states 
can „contract out‟ of one or more (other than jus cogens) rules of international law, but they 
cannot contract out of the system of international law.”119 The Appellate Body in US – Gasoline, 
also firmly acknowledged that WTO law is not a self-contained regime, stating that the 
Agreement “is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law.”120 For example, 
the rules of interpretation under Article 3.2 of the DSU refer to the customary rules of treaty 
interpretation of public international law.  
 
I agree with most commentators that WTO law is not a self-contained regime. Panels and 
the Appellate Body have referred to general international law as a consideration or cited the 
decisions of other international tribunals to support their decisions in a number of disputes. 
Moreover, Article 3.2 of the DSU explicitly demonstrates that WTO law has contracted in the 
customary rules of treaty interpretation of public international law. This shows that WTO does 
not rule out the general rules of international law entirely. 
 
                                                             
115 Ibid, at 32.  
116 Martti Koskenniemi Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law A/CN.4/L.682/Add.1 (2006) at 6. 
117 Brunno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski “Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law” 
(2006) 17(3) EJIL 483 at 490. 
118
 Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, above n 112, at 37. 
119 Ibid.  
120 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline WTO DOC WT/DS2/AB/R (1996) at 
[17] (Report of the Appellate Body) [US – Gasoline (AB)].  
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(b) WTO remedies and public international law remedies: inclusive or exclusive from 
the system? 
Public international law offers several remedies for the injured states as a result of 
international wrongful acts. Some forms of the remedies are cessation of wrongful acts under 
Article 30 of the ILC Draft Articles, countermeasures under Article 49 of the ILC Draft Articles, 
and reparation under Article 31 of the ILC Draft Articles. Similar to public international law, the 
DSU provides several remedies under its scheme. However, some characters and forms of the 
DSU remedies are different from those under public international law. For example, the DSU 
does not stipulate financial compensation in its text. Thus, the question is whether remedies 
under public international law overrule WTO remedies, or equally important, whether WTO 
remedies can fall back on remedies under public international law. 
 
Article 55 of the ILC Draft Articles, reflecting the maxim lex specialis derogat legi 
generali, provides that the articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the 
existence of an internationally wrongful act or its legal consequences are determined by special 
rules of international law. Therefore, we must determine whether remedies under the DSU 
incorporating special rules (lex specialis) exclude the application of state responsibility under the 
general rules of international law.  
 
Simma and Pulkowski also argue that remedies under the DSU embrace a full, exhaustive 
and definitive subsystem (secondary rules) which would exclude application of state 
responsibility under the general rules of international law as the primary rules.
121
 Van den 
Bossche, at the same time, asserts that by providing a detailed set of rules regarding remedies, 
the DSU has contracted out of the general rules of international law on State Responsibility.
122
  
 
I agree with the view that the remedies under the DSU are lex specialis. The WTO has 
contracted out of general rules of international law with respect to the remedies. This issue is 
examined further in chapter three below. 
                                                             
121 Simma and Pulkowski, above n 117, at 493.  
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In conclusion, this thesis takes the standpoint that WTO law is not a self-contained 
regime. In a number of cases, panels and/or the Appellate Body have applied or made reference 
to customary rules and general principles of international law. The question is to what extent 
does public international law play a role in WTO law? The panel in Korea – Measures Affecting 
Government Procurement interpreted the relationship between the WTO and public international 
law in a broader way than merely a relationship of interpretation rules. The panel stated that:
 123
 
Customary international law applies generally to the economic relations between the 
WTO Members. Such international law applies to the extent that the WTO treaty 
agreements do not „contract out‟ from it.  
 
In contrast, the United States challenged the insertion of the rules of public international 
law outside the customary rules of interpretation in WTO dispute settlement.
124
 Nonetheless, as I 
state further in chapter three below, it is not the intention of this thesis to resolve this issue. This 
thesis focuses mainly on the application of customary rules of treaty interpretation (“contract in”) 
and remedies under public international law (“contract out”) issues. 
 
2 WTO law in relation to contract 
Some commentators, particularly those who argue that compliance is not mandatory, 
provide contractual incompleteness of WTO agreements as their main argument. Green and 
Trelbicock, for instance, argue that WTO agreements are incomplete contracts and that 
compliance is not mandatory in all cases as the Members have built-in flexibility mechanisms to 
allow adjustments to new situations. They support the efficient breach theory that the remedies 
should be aimed at permitting breaches or adjustments when efficient, either on political or 
welfare basis.
125
 Similarly, Sykes and Schwartz utilise the public choice approach and refer to 
WTO agreements as contracts among the political actors. They assert that WTO Agreements are 
                                                             
123 Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement WTO DOC WT/DS163/R (2000) at [7.96] (Report of the 
WTO Panel) [Korea – Government Procurement (Panel)]. 
124 Dispute Settlement Body Minutes of Meeting – Held in the Centre William Rappard on 7 May 2003 WTO DOC 
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incomplete contracts that encourage efficient performance of commitments while facilitating 
efficient breach of commitments.
126
  
 
Nonetheless, other commentators are against these views. Fukunaga, for example, 
disagrees with the efficient breach theory by arguing that nothing in the DSU provides that the 
DSB can choose either to make recommendations or to award damages. She argued that 
recommendations are the primary remedy option, compensation and suspension of concessions 
are alternative remedies and are only available in the event that the recommendations are not 
implemented within a reasonable period of time.
127
 Additionally, Cho points out that Sykes‟ 
analogy to a private contract creates a misunderstanding as to the real identity of the WTO legal 
system. He argues that the WTO is no more “a mere contract among the contracting parties, but 
an independent international organization established by its Members in order to envisage an 
integrated legal system for international trade.”128 And therefore in his view, the concept of 
efficient breach is unacceptable under this legal system.
129
 Steger also argues that the “WTO 
Agreement is not a commercial contract that countries can cancel whenever it suits them, nor is it 
„soft law‟ that is not binding on Members.”130 
 
In my point of view, the WTO is an international “contract organisation”. It is a 
multilateral contract amongst nations that establishes the WTO as an international 
organisation.
131
 The Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages explicitly affirmed the 
“contract” character of the WTO by stating that “the WTO Agreement is a treaty – the 
international equivalent of a contract”.132  
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127 Yuka Fukunaga “Securing Compliance through the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Implementation of DSB 
Recommendations” (2006) 9 JIEL 383 at 397. 
128 Cho, above n 25, at 783. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Debra P Steger “The Culture of the WTO: Why It Needs to Change” (2007) 10(3) JIEL 483 at 490-491. 
131 Simon A B Schropp “Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the WTO – Reform Agenda towards an 
Efficient “Breach” Contract” (PhD Thesis, University of St. Gallen, 2008) at 148 [“Trade Policy Flexibility and 
Enforcement”]. 
132 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages WTO DOC WT/DS8/AB/R WT/DS10/AB/R WT/DS11/AB/R (1996) at 
[15] (Report of the Appellate Body) [Japan – Alcohol Beverages (AB)]. 
30 
 
With this in mind, it is relevant to analyse the problem (the purpose(s) of retaliation) from 
a contract-theoretic point of view. Schropp states that it is in the contract design stage that the 
parties determine what their substantive goals are and how these goals are achieved in the most 
effective way.
133
 In chapter 4 below, I establish the assessments that look to the design of WTO 
treaty to articulate the purposes of retaliation. 
 
D Options to improve remedies 
Some scholars and commentators provide options to enhance and improve the 
effectiveness of temporary remedies. For instance, Bronckers and van den Broek, and Fukunaga 
suggest financial or monetary compensation as an option.
134
 Fukunaga argues that one of the 
advantages of monetary compensation is that it allows for the provision of non-MFN 
compensation, since monetary compensation, unrelated to particular import or export 
transactions, neither distorts trade nor increases the transaction cost.
135
 Other commentators, such 
as Rafiqul Islam and Udombana, suggest multilateral collaborative efforts. Through a collective 
process, weaker injured Members can have access to remedial justice; and the application itself 
is the last resort to bring international pressure on the recalcitrant Member to comply.
136
 Choi 
proposes rotating retaliation combined with an increasing level of retaliation over time. This 
approach should be subject to the proportionality standard and should not have a punitive nature. 
Moreover, Choi also proposes such multilateral remedies as: (a) restricting a non-complying 
Member‟s voting rights; (b) obliging a non-complying party to pay legal costs incurred by the 
complaining party; and (c) requiring a non-complying party to make a financial contribution to 
certain neutral institutions such as the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL).
137
 
 
Charnovitz proposes a “transparency and sunshine” method. All of the DSU bodies 
should hold most of their sessions in public. Whenever a government fails to comply, the DSB 
                                                             
133 Schropp “Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement”, above n 131, at 42. 
134 Bronckers and van den Broek, above n 24; Fukunaga, above n 127, at 415. 
135 Fukunaga, above n 127, at 415. 
136 M Rafiqul Islam “Recent EU Trade sanctions on the US to Induce Compliance with the WTO Ruling in the 
Foreign Sales Corporation Case: Its Policy Contradiction Revisited” (2004) 38(3) JWT 471 at 481-487; see also 
Udombana, above n 39, at 1197-1199, the author suggests collective countermeasures through African Union. 
137 Won-Mog Choi “To Comply or Not to Comply? – Non-implementation Problems in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System” (2007) 41(5) JWT 1043 at 1067-1069. 
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should convene a public hearing where a government would be asked to explain its delays, and 
other governments and concerned private economic and social actors could respond.
138
 Van den 
Broek also provides some additional ideas, such as changes in the methods for calculations of the 
level of suspension or compensation; regular review of compliance with the Secretariat‟s dispute 
settlement reports; specific suggestions for compliance with dispute settlement reports; and 
damages in the case of mala fide non-compliance at the end of the compliance period.
139
 Other 
scholars suggest enhancing cross-retaliation as a mechanism to induce compliance for a 
developing country complainant Member.
140
 
 
A number of WTO Members have also proposed reforms of the current retaliation 
system. Their proposals, amongst others, include: collective retaliation,
141
 increasing the capacity 
of trade compensation,
142
 earlier determination of level of nullification or impairment,
143
 
introduction of the right to request or to take preventive measures in exceptional situations,
144
 
enhancing cross-retaliation,
145
 and tradable retaliation
146
.  
 
Those proposals are worth being considered in order to enhance the performance of WTO 
remedies; even though they are also not free from criticism and controversy. Chapter two below 
further explains these reform proposals. 
 
                                                             
138 Charnovitz “Last Resort against Noncompliance”, above n 8, at 431-432. 
139 Naboth van den Broek “Power Paradoxes in Enforcement and Implementation of World Trade Organization 
Dispute Settlement Reports: Interdisciplinary Approaches and New Proposals” (2003) 37(1) JWT 127 at 157-160. 
140 Lucas Eduardo F A Spadano “Cross-agreement Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: An 
Important Enforcement Mechanism for Developing Countries?” (2008) 7(3) WTR 511 at 533. See also Arvind 
Subramanian and Jayashree Watal “Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the 
WTO?” (2000) 3 JIEL 403. 
141 Mostly supported by least-developed countries and the Africa group. See also Udombana, above n 39, at 1198. 
142 Ecuador, for example, realised the short period of time (20 days) in negotiating compensation, therefore it 
proposed the possibility of negotiating compensation at all stage of sequence.   
143 Ecuador proposed to determine the level of nullification when determining the reasonable period of time under 
Article 21.3(a) or when it is mutually agreed by parties under Article 21.3. Mexico even went further by proposing 
retroactive determination and application of nullification or impairment (date imposing the measure or the date of 
the request for consultation or the date of establishment of panel).  
144 Mexico proposed that such right be activated when, for example, the challenged measure is causing damage that 
would be difficult to repair.  
145
 The proposal is to ensure that cross-retaliation is the exception rather than the rule, so the developing country 
complaining Member could cross-retaliate whenever it sees fit to do so.  
146 Mexico proposed that Members should be allowed to “negotiate” the right to suspend or transfer the right to 
suspend toward another Member.  
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IV Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter one introduces the main problem: the 
question of the effectiveness and the purpose(s) of retaliation. It also elaborates on the dilemmas 
experienced by WTO remedies amidst the high compliance enjoyed by WTO dispute settlement, 
and subsequently, presents various views from scholars, commentators and WTO Members 
concerning the issues of retaliation and the areas of study in this thesis. Finally, it states the 
methodology, scopes of the thesis and contribution of thesis to scholarship.    
 
Chapter two has two main parts of discussion. The first part elaborates on the basic 
features, nature and substantive rules of GATT/WTO retaliation. The purpose of this part is to 
provide a basic understanding of WTO retaliation under the DSU and the countermeasures under 
the SCM Agreement. The second part examines two important issues: the shortcomings of 
retaliation, and the reform proposals of retaliation. 
 
The key discussion of chapter three is about the question of effectiveness and the 
purpose(s) of retaliation. This chapter draws attention to the importance of determining the 
meaning of effectiveness, before responding to the question about the effectiveness of WTO 
retaliation. Following that, this chapter highlights the significance of identifying the purpose in 
measuring the degree of the effectiveness. Thus, a search of the purpose(s) of retaliation is 
conducted in this chapter, namely through: interpreting Article 22 of the DSU, examining the 
reference made by the arbitrators to the remedies of public international law, assessing academic 
writings or debates and the statements of arbitrators related to the purpose(s) of retaliation. This 
chapter provides that retaliation can have multiple purposes: inducing compliance, rebalancing, 
and reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. 
 
Chapter four examines the multiple purposes of retaliation from the structure of the WTO 
treaty. This chapter establishes three levels of assessment: the first level provides an analysis of 
the nature of WTO dispute settlement and retaliation entitlements; the second level elucidates on 
the transferability of the WTO entitlements and how these entitlements are protected (intra-
contractual commitments); and the third level examines the back-up enforcement level with 
33 
 
relation to the WTO preference for compliance (extra-contractual commitments). These three 
levels of assessment provide that the structure of WTO treaty accommodates the multiple 
purposes of retaliation.  
 
Chapter five proposes another purpose of retaliation: mutually agreeable solutions. This 
purpose was achieved in the EC – Hormones dispute. Moreover, by referring to the definition of 
effectiveness and the analysis of the purposes of retaliation, the chapter states that even though 
there is room for improvement, WTO retaliation performs reasonably well in light of its multiple 
purposes. 
 
Chapter six contains the conclusion of the thesis. This part summarises the main 
problems and arguments of the thesis, as well as states the outcomes reached in the thesis. 
 
V Methodology and the Scope of the Thesis 
There are several types of legal research: explanatory (explaining the law), empirical 
(identification of the valid law), hermeneutic (interpretation, argumentation), exploring 
(searching for new or fruitful path), logical (structuring concepts, rules), instrumental (concept-
building), and evaluative (testing the applicability of the rule in practice).
147
 The research in this 
thesis can be categorised as a “hermeneutical” type. It involves interpreting the legal text (the 
DSU), providing arguments to sustain the interpretation, and analysing the text, theories, and 
cases.
148
  
 
Overall, the research in this thesis is conducted as follows: firstly, the research begins 
with finding the legal issues or problems. Secondly, following the establishment of the legal 
issues, various sources (primary and secondary) are collected. Primary sources consist of, inter 
alia, the WTO panels and/or the Appellate Body reports, the arbitrators‟ decisions, the WTO 
legal text, WTO Secretariat documents, the DSU negotiating history, the DSB minutes of 
                                                             
147 Mark Van Hoecke (ed) Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline?  
(2011, Hart Publishing).  
148 Ibid, at 4. 
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meeting. Secondary sources include text books, monographs, edited collections, conference 
papers, unpublished seminars and papers, unpublished theses and research papers, and legal 
encyclopaedias. Thirdly, after the collection of the data, the assessments (interpretation and 
analysis of the sources) begin. The research in this thesis employs a normative (literature/text 
analysis) method. Interviews, field studies and the like are not appropriate.  
 
This thesis looks at the phase of non-implementation in WTO dispute settlement. 
Retaliation under the DSU is the main area of the study; nevertheless this thesis has to put in 
place several limitations regarding the areas of examination. In this regard, this thesis deals with 
violation complaints; and there are no, or very limited, discussion of non-violation complaints. 
Moreover, the thesis elaborates on the issues under legal perspective. Other dimensions, such as 
economic, politic, social, and ethical dimensions, are utilised as supporting information and are 
not discussed intensively. The research focuses on the issue of DSU remedies, and not on trade 
remedies such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Nonetheless, there are several 
discussions in this thesis regarding countermeasures under the SCM Agreement.  
 
VI Contribution of Thesis to Scholarship 
Many scholars and commentators observe retaliation from the “harm-resulted” 
perspective. Most studies also utilise the parameter of inducing compliance in order to measure 
the effectiveness of retaliation. The imposition of retaliation undeniably results in harm because 
retaliation, by nature, is trade restrictive. 
 
This thesis provides that compliance and effectiveness, although related, are distinct. The 
study in this thesis posits that effectiveness goes beyond compliance to determine whether a rule 
or standard achieves its purpose or objective. Consequently, to respond to the question of 
whether retaliation is effective or not, it is significant to identify the purposes of retaliation. This 
is the area in which the current study has lack of awareness.   
 
35 
 
Scholars, commentators, as well the arbitrators predominantly argue the single purpose of 
retaliation: either inducing compliance or rebalancing.
149
 My study, nevertheless, advocates the 
multiple purposes of retaliation: inducing compliance, rebalancing and reaching a mutually 
satisfactory solution. The standpoint of multiple purposes is established on the basis of the 
research of Article 22 (through interpretation in accordance with the customary rules of 
international law) and the structure of WTO treaty. The study in this thesis helps to provide a 
complete picture about the purposes and effectiveness of retaliation.  
 
In conclusion, there are two main contributions of this thesis to the scholarship: firstly, 
this thesis provides a clear and certain scheme in assessing the effectiveness of retaliation; 
secondly, it provides a more comprehensive study of the purposes of retaliation than the current 
academic writings have provided. 
                                                             
149 For example the arguments between Jackson and Bello. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RETALIATION: SHORTCOMINGS AND REFORM PROPOSALS  
 
“The principle of no right without a remedy has, however, a peculiar twist in the GATT. In an important sense 
Article XXIII gives a remedy without a right.”1  
“[R]etaliation has the disadvantage of requiring the complaining Member to „shoot itself in the foot‟ by restricting 
imports and thus hurting its own industrial users, importers and consumers.”2 
 
Overview 
The dispute settlement system has been evolved and strengthened by the advent of the 
WTO. The rules contained in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) eliminate several 
shortcomings in the GATT dispute settlement regime and provide clearer time-frames and 
clearer dispute procedures. Another appealing improvement is the provision of remedies in the 
case of continued non-compliance.  
 
Retaliation is considered to be a self-help instrument utilised by an injured state to force 
the violator state to withdraw its inconsistent measures in the event of continued non-
compliance. Nevertheless, numerous commentators demonstrate discontent with the WTO 
retaliation measures.
3
 Its ineffectiveness in inducing compliance is recognised as the major 
problem with retaliation.  
 
This chapter has three main topics: the basic features and rules of retaliation under the 
GATT, the DSU and the SCM Agreement;
4
 the shortcomings and problems of retaliation from 
                                                             
1 Kenneth W Dam The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization (the University of Chicago Press, 
1970) at 358. 
2 Bronckers and van den Broek, above ch 1, n 24, at 101 (emphasis added). 
3 Ibid; Mateo Diego-Fernández “Compensation and Retaliation: A Developing Country‟s Perspective” in George A 
Bermann and Petros C Mavroidis (eds) WTO Law and Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Cho, above ch 1, n 25; Udombana, above ch 1, n 39; Amin Alavi “African Countries and the WTO‟s Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism” (2007) 25(1) Development Policy Review 25 [“African Countries and the WTO‟s Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism”].  
4 Although the main analysis of this thesis is retaliation under the DSU, it is also important at some points to discuss 
the countermeasures under the SCM Agreement. The underlying reasons are: firstly, several Article 22.6 arbitral 
proceedings are to determine the level of countermeasures. Secondly, retaliation and countermeasures have similar 
37 
 
academic perspective and practice; and reform proposals offered by the WTO Members and 
other commentators. Moreover, before entering into the central discussions in this thesis, one 
needs a basic understanding on what retaliation is. Accordingly, this chapter begins with the 
nature and features of retaliation. 
 
I Nature, Features and Substantive Rules of GATT/WTO Retaliation 
The issue of non-compliance emerges when a violator State continues to maintain its 
inconsistent measures notwithstanding an adopted panel/Appellate Body report that recommends 
the violator Member bring its illegal measure into compliance. As explained in the introductory 
chapter, the WTO provides two kinds of remedies for the non-compliance problems. These are 
mutually acceptable compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations.   
 
Article 22 of the DSU provides that if the violator state fails to bring the inconsistent 
measures into compliance within a reasonable period of time, such Member shall enter into 
negotiations with the injured state to “develop mutually acceptable compensation”. If no 
satisfactory compensation has been agreed, any party to the dispute may request authorisation for 
the suspension of concessions or other obligations (retaliation). In short, Article 22 provides an 
option to a violator state who fails to bring its inconsistent measures into compliance that it can 
either enter into negotiations for compensation or suffer retaliation.  
 
Article 3.7 of the DSU provides a hierarchy of remedies available under WTO dispute 
settlement. It gives preference first of all to a solution which is mutually acceptable. In the 
absence of such an agreed solution, withdrawal of the inconsistent measure is the main objective 
of the WTO dispute settlement system. If the withdrawal is impracticable, the injured party can 
resort to the provision of compensation. Retaliation, ultimately, is the last resort which the DSU 
provides to the injured Member.  
    
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
form and characters, and several issues are applicable to both retaliation and countermeasure, unless the SCM 
Agreement states otherwise. Thirdly, we can have a proper study of retaliation under the DSU by doing an 
observation with respect to the countermeasures under the SCM Agreement. 
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 The main focus of this assessment is retaliation; however it is important to explain first 
trade/tariff compensation. Despite the fact that only in a few cases parties to a dispute have 
referred to compensation, trade/tariff compensation is one form of GATT/WTO remedy that 
parties to a dispute can agree on or utilise to settle the dispute. The subsequent part discusses 
several features of WTO compensation briefly. 
 
A Trade/Tariff Compensation 
The term “compensation”, during the GATT era, appeared in the 1979 Understanding, 
which provided that compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the 
measure was impracticable, and it was seen as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of 
the inconsistent measures.
5
 In US – Sugar Waiver, the GATT panel, by referring to Paragraph 4 
of the 1979 Understanding, noted that a contracting party might choose to grant compensation to 
forestall the request for an authorisation of retaliatory measures, but the Understanding did not 
oblige it to do so.
6
 In other words, the panel decided that compensation was optional and that it 
was up to the respondent to decide whether or not to compensate.
7
 
 
Under the WTO, Article 21.1 of the DSU provides that compensation is temporary, 
voluntary and shall be consistent with the covered agreements.  Many commentators argue that 
the last characteristic (consistent with the covered agreements including the MFN principle) 
makes compensation less preferred or less attractive.
8
 Since compensation here is more within 
the meaning of trade benefit/openness under preferential basis, by providing this benefit the 
respondent state is also required, under the MFN principle, to extend this benefit or advantage to 
other WTO Members. Consequently, parties have to select a sector of the respondent Member‟s 
                                                             
5 Paragraph 4 of the Annex to the 1979 Understanding. 
6 United States – Restriction on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar Containing Products Applied under 1955 
Waiver and under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff Concessions GATT BISD 37th Supp 228 GATT DOC 
L/6631 – 37S/228 (1990) at [5.22] (Report of the Panel adopted 7 November 1990).  
7 Sherzod Shadikhodjaev Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement (Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 22. 
8 Adebukola A Eleso “WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: Monetary Compensation as an Alternative for 
Developing Countries” (2006) Bepress Legal Series Paper 1378 at 12-14; Bryan Mercurio “Why Compensation 
Cannot Replace Trade Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement” (2009) 8(2) WTR 315 at 324-325 [“Why 
Compensation Cannot Replace Trade Retaliation”]; Pei-Kan Yang “Some Thoughts on a Feasible Operation of 
Monetary Compensation as an Alternative to Current Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement” (2008) 3 Asian J 
WTO&Int‟l Health L&Pol‟y 423 at 430.  
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trade that is less attractive for other Members, but nevertheless, significant for the complaining 
Member‟s trade.9  
 
In practice, there are few disputes where Members have utilised trade compensation as a 
remedy.
10
 For example in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Japan provided compensation in the 
form of a tariff reduction on certain products to the United States, the European Communities 
and Canada as the complainants to the case.
11
 Moreover, US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act, is 
the only dispute in which parties agreed to financial compensation instead of tariff compensation. 
  
Some scholars suggest financial/monetary compensation as an alternative to trade 
compensation or retaliation.
12
 Financial/monetary compensation as a remedy is not a novel idea 
under the GATT/WTO system. In 1965, Brazil and Uruguay proposed that financial 
compensation be included in the GATT, but the contracting parties did not accept the idea.
13
 In 
the current Doha Development Agenda negotiations on the DSU, the least-developed countries 
and Ecuador, for instance, have proposed monetary compensation as one of the WTO dispute 
settlement remedies.
14
 Strengthening trade/tariff compensation and providing financial/monetary 
compensation under reform proposals to WTO remedies are explained in more detail in the 
subsequent part of this chapter.  
 
  
                                                             
9 Shadikhodjaev, above n 7, at 22. 
10 For instance, trade compensation was reached in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, Turkey – Textile, US – Line Pipe 
disputes. See above ch 1, n 16.  
11 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – Mutually Acceptable Solution on Modalities for Implementation, above 
ch 1, n 16. 
12 Bronckers and Van den Broek, above ch 1, n 24.  
13 Committee on Trade and Development Ad Hoc Group on Legal Amendments to the General Agreement Proposal 
Submitted by the Brazilian and Uruguayan Delegations – Draft Decision on Article XXIII GATT DOC 
COM.TD/F/W/4 (11 October 1965) at para 7. See also Shadikhodjaev, above n 7, at 22-23.  
14
 Dispute Settlement Body Special Session Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Proposal by 
the LDC Group WTO DOC TN/DS/W/17 (9 October 2002); Dispute Settlement Body Special Session Negotiations 
on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Proposal by Ecuador WTO DOC 
TN/DS/W/33 (23 January 2003).  
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B Law to Retaliate under GATT and WTO 
Retaliation is the eventual remedy provided under this multilateral trading system when 
parties to a dispute have failed to reach an agreement on mutually acceptable compensation. 
Extensive academic writings, studies and reports have discussed retaliation; this part primarily 
examines the law governing retaliation under the GATT and, later, under the WTO.  
 
1 The term “retaliation” 
Neither the text of the International Trade Organisation (ITO) Charter nor the GATT nor 
the DSU actually utilises the term “retaliation”. Nevertheless, the word “retaliation” was often 
used by the negotiators in the ITO and GATT meetings.
15
 Moreover, the panel in US – Certain 
EC Products described the character of suspension of concessions as retaliatory in nature.
16
 
Numerous commentators and observers now utilise the term “retaliation” in referring to the 
remedy under suspension of concessions. In his work on the terms of sanctions under WTO law, 
Charnovitz points out that it is not clear when retaliation becomes the general term for the action 
under Article XXIII.
17
 However, Charnovitz explains that the repeated use of the term 
“retaliation” in Kenneth Dam‟s book (The GATT: Law and International Economic 
Organization) may have popularised the term.
18
 
 
Moreover, even though retaliation is often referred to as a “trade sanction”, the term of 
sanction here is not meant punitively.
19
 In this thesis, several terms are going to be used 
interchangeably in referring to retaliation under WTO and public international law, such as 
suspension of concessions or other obligations, countermeasures and sanctions. Retaliation and 
                                                             
15 John H Jackson World Trade and the Law of GATT (Bobbs-Merrill, 1969) at 170-171; Olivier Long Law and Its 
Limitation in the GATT Multilateral Trade System (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) at 66; WTO Secretariat 
Guide to GATT Law and Practice (1965) Volume 2 Article XXII-XXXVIII (Geneva, WTO, 1995) at 693. 
16 United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities WTO DOC WT/DS165/R 
(2000) at [6.23] (Report of the WTO Panel) [US – Certain EC Products (Panel)]. 
17 Steve Charnovitz “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions” (2001) 95(4) Am J Int‟l L 792 at 801 [“Rethinking WTO 
Trade Sanctions”] at 801. 
18 Ibid. 
19 For example, Olivier Long states that neither punitive action nor direct coercion is provided for in the General 
Agreement. See Olivier Long, above n 15, at 66.  
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suspension of concessions are utilised mostly in the context of the DSU, while countermeasures 
are used in the context of the SCM Agreement and public international law. 
 
2 Retaliation practice under GATT dispute settlement 
There were two cases during GATT dispute settlement where injured parties requested 
authorisation for retaliation: US – Suspension of Obligations20  and US – Superfund.21 In US – 
Suspension of Obligations, the Netherlands proposed an authorisation for a countermeasure in 
the form of an annual reduction of United States exports of wheat flour.
22
 The working party 
subsequently provided the amount that they deemed appropriate and authorised the suspension of 
obligations to the Netherlands.
23
 However, the Netherlands did not impose such authorised 
suspension of obligations.
24
 In US – Superfund, both Canada and the European Communities 
requested authorisation for retaliation; however, the request was blocked by the United States.
25
  
 
In Dam‟s view, there are two considerations as to why the GATT parties avoided 
recourse to retaliation. First is the preference of Contracting Parties to act as conciliators rather 
than arbitrators and thus they had the tendency to postpone as long as possible the imposition of 
retaliation.
26
 Second is that retaliation may also result in harm to the retaliating party.
27
 Due to 
the fact that authorised suspension of obligations was never utilised, the effectiveness of 
retaliation as a remedy was never tested during the GATT era.
28
 
 
                                                             
20 Netherlands Action under Article XXIII:2 to Suspend Obligations to the United States GATT BISD 1st Supp 62 
GATT DOC L/61 (1952) (Report of the GATT Working Party adopted 8 November 1952) [US – Suspension of 
Obligations]. 
21 United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances GATT BISD 34th Supp 136 GATT DOC 
L/6175 – 34S/136 (1987) (Report of the Panel adopted 17 June 1987) [US – Superfund (Panel)]. 
22 US – Suspension of Obligations, above n 20, at [1]. 
23 Ibid, at [7]. 
24 Charnovitz “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions” above n 17, at 802. 
25 Pauwelyn “Enforcement and Countermeasures”, above ch 1, n 84, at 335. 
26 Dam writes that although the Contracting Parties in several cases have found nullification or impairment, they 
have avoided authorising retaliation, for instances in the Australian fertilizer case, the French compensatory tax 
case, and the French import restriction case. See Dam, above n 1, at 364.  
27 Ibid, at 368. 
28 Charnovitz “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions”, above n 17, at 802. 
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3 Substantive rules of GATT retaliation  
There are two requirements under GATT Article XXIII:2 for the authorisation of the 
suspension of concessions or other obligations (retaliation) by the contracting parties. They are: 
(1) there are “serious enough circumstances”; and (2) the proposed suspension is “appropriate”.  
 
What constitutes “serious enough circumstances” can be derived from GATT practices. 
The first component of “serious enough” is the existence of nullification or impairment.29 The 
second component is that all endeavours to solve the problem through all other remedies have 
not proved successful.
30
 Finally, the third component is that the retaliation action taken is to 
prevent serious economic consequences of nullification or impairment, or to restore the original 
situation.
31
  
 
Determination of the “appropriate” standard has proven to be quite problematic. There 
were several practices and statements during the GATT era in an attempt to define 
“appropriateness”. For instance, a 1988 statement by the Legal Adviser to the GATT Director 
General stated that in the case of Article XXIII, the wording (“appropriate”) was wider, which 
meant that there was wider leeway in calculating the retaliatory measures under Article XXIII 
than under Article XIX or XXVIII.
32
 Consequently, the GATT Deputy Director in considering 
the EEC‟s request for the authorisation to retaliate against the United States stated that:33  
Article XXIII:2, unlike Article XXVIII, did not speak about equivalent concessions. 
Therefore, it was not really a question of authorizing the withdrawal of equivalent 
concessions as such. That was why the Secretariat had pointed out that Article XXIII did 
not require that the amount of retaliation should be equivalent.   
                                                             
29 Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII GATT BISD 11th Supp 95 GATT DOC L/1923 – 11S/95 (1964) (Report of 
the Panel adopted 16 November 1962) at [13]; United States Manufacturing Clause GATT BISD 31th Supp 74 
GATT DOC L/5609 – 31S/74 (1984) (Report of the Panel adopted on 15/16 May 1984).   
30 Contracting Parties Ninth Session Report of Review Working Party IV on Organizational and Function Questions 
GATT DOC L/327 (22 February 1955) at 63.  
31 Ibid.  
32
 Council of Representatives Minutes of Meeting – Held in the Centre William Rappard on 4 May 1988 GATT 
DOC C/M/220 (8 June 1988) at 35-36. 
33 Council of Representatives Minutes of Meeting – Held in the Centre William Rappard on 22 September 1988 
GATT DOC C/M/224 (17 October 1988) at 19.  
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However, in the US – Suspension of Obligations case, the Working Party was instructed 
by the contracting parties to investigate the appropriateness of the measure which the 
Netherlands government proposed to take, having regard to its equivalence to the impairment 
suffered by the Netherlands as a result of the United States restriction.
34
 Provided that, the 
Working Party stated there were two issues to be considered. The first was whether in the 
circumstances, the measure proposed was appropriate in character; and the second was whether 
the extent of the retaliation proposed was reasonable, having regard to the impairment suffered.
35
 
In short, the 1952 Working Party noted that “appropriate” in the context of Article XXIII 
referred to the character of the proposed measure and that the amount equivalent to the level of 
the impairment suffered was the standard to be fulfilled.
36
 By citing Hudec‟s book, Palmeter and 
Alexandrov point out the explanation of the Chairman of the Working Party that the word 
“appropriate” in Article XXIII meant more than just “reasonable” as it required the Working 
Party to take into account the desirability of limiting such action to the best calculated in the 
circumstances to achieve the objective.
37
   
 
Why did the Working Party believe that it was important to limit the sanction? What is 
the objective that was intended to be achieved? Kenneth Dam provides the best answer for these 
questions by arguing that nowhere in GATT dispute settlement provisions could one find a 
reference to a punitive sanction for non-performance.
38
 Dam notes that the principle, that the 
GATT as a whole is a system of reciprocal rights and obligations to be maintained in balance, 
means that the remedy provision is not understood in terms of sanctions; rather it is a system of 
reciprocal rights and obligations. Consequently, a failure to respect a tariff concession is not a 
transgression to be punished, but rather an event giving injured parties the privilege of 
suspending reciprocal concessions.
39
 Dam states that the best example to support the argument 
underlying this principle is that the main interest of GATT is to make as many agreements to 
                                                             
34 US – Suspension of Obligations, above n 20, at [2]. 
35 Ibid, at [3]. 
36
 Palmeter and Alexandrov, above ch 1, n 63, at 648-649.  
37 Ibid, at 649. 
38 Dam, above n 1, at 351-352. 
39 Ibid, at 352. 
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reduce tariffs as possible, instead of assuring all commitments made are carried out.
40
 Therefore, 
punitive sanctions, arguably, might lessen contracting parties‟ interest in agreeing to further tariff 
concessions. 
 
4 An overview of WTO retaliation 
The general provisions concerning the procedures of retaliation under the WTO dispute 
settlement system are governed under the DSU. The retaliation stage may start following the lack 
of implementation by the violator state of recommendations or rulings within a reasonable time. 
Article 22 of the DSU provides the injured party a right either to negotiate mutually agreed 
compensation or to request authorisation for retaliation for the violator state‟s lack of compliance 
within a reasonable period of time. In practice, because it is hard to achieve mutually agreed 
compensation, the parties to a dispute often directly request the authorisation to retaliate.   
 
The assessment of retaliation in this section is divided into two main parts. The first part 
explains the characteristics and substantive rules of retaliation under the DSU. The second part 
assesses the countermeasures under the SCM agreement. 
 
(a) The basic features of WTO retaliation 
This part refers to the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body as well as the arbitrators‟ 
decisions to explain the basic characteristics and features of WTO retaliation, for instance 
whether it is prospective or retroactive in nature, or what the limitation level of retaliation is.  
  
(i) Retaliation is the last resort and the sole remedy against non-compliance 
The DSU provides retaliation as the last resort remedy, and this has two meanings. 
Firstly, it is not the first preference in settling a dispute, and secondly there are no other remedies 
available afterwards. The first meaning is demonstrated under Article 3.7 of the DSU which 
established the remedial hierarchy. The order of preference is as follows: (1) bilateral settlement; 
                                                             
40 Ibid, at 80. Dam states that it is better that 100 commitments should be made and that 10 should be withdrawn 
than that only 50 commitments should be made and that all of them should be kept. 
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(2) withdrawal of inconsistent measures; (3) compensation; and (4) retaliation.
41
 From this we 
can conclude that the primary objective of parties to a dispute is the withdrawal of the 
inconsistent measures and only in special circumstances do they have to resort to retaliation. The 
second meaning is revealed in Article 22.2 of the DSU. When the violator state fails to comply 
within a reasonable period of time (non-compliance), there are only two remedies available for 
the injured state: either compensation or the suspension of concessions or other obligations. The 
DSU does not provide any form of remedy where retaliation fails to cause the violator state to 
remove its inconsistent measures. The article also reveals that the only form of retaliation under 
the DSU is the suspension of concessions or other obligations.   
 
One of the issues in the EC – Commercial Vessels case was whether attempts to redress 
non-compliance by taking other WTO consistent measures would contravene the DSU.
42
 The 
panel considered that by adopting the TDM regulation (a measure to redress the violation) in 
response to Korea‟s violation of the SCM Agreement without first resorting to the DSU, the 
European Communities have acted unilaterally, and thus, such measures contravened Article 
23.1 of the DSU.
43
 Sebastian examines the panel‟s reasoning more broadly by arguing that this 
reasoning also implies that suspension under non-WTO treaties, such as an expropriation of the 
Bilateral Investment Treaty, if taken to redress WTO violation, could contravene Article 23.1 of 
the DSU.
44
 
   
(ii) Retaliation is temporary and prospective in nature 
The temporary nature of retaliation is related to the fact that its application is conditional 
on the removal of the inconsistent measures by the violator state. In short, retaliation remains in 
place until there is compliance. Bermann criticises that the lack of an explicit post-retaliation 
                                                             
41 McGivern, above ch 1, n 49, at 142. 
42 European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels WTO DOC WT/DS301/R (2005) 
(Report of the WTO Panel) [EC – Commercial Vessels (Panel)]. 
43
 Ibid, at [7.220]-[7.222].  
44 Thomas Sebastian “The Law of Permissible WTO Retaliation” in Chad Brown and Joost Pauwelyn (eds) The 
Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 89 at 
90-91 [“The Law of Permissible WTO Retaliation”]. 
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complaint procedure under the DSU could result in never-ending retaliation.
45
 The EC – 
Hormones dispute is one example. In this case, there was a disagreement between the European 
Communities and the United States and Canada concerning compliance by the European 
Communities, which resulted in the United States and Canada continuing to impose retaliation. 
Consequently, the European Communities brought a new dispute before the panel against the 
United States and Canada‟s continued suspension.46 
  
Nothing in the DSU explicitly states that retaliation is a prospective remedy. However, 
Article 3.7, 19.1 and 21.3 of the DSU envisage a panel or Appellate Body‟s recommendation to 
be prospective only.
47
 In general, Article 3.7 prescribes the hierarchy of remedies; Article 19.1 
provides that the dispute panel and/or Appellate Body would recommend that the violator state 
brings its inconsistent measures into compliance; and Article 21.3 stipulates a reasonable period 
of time for the violator state to bring its inconsistent measures into compliance. If these three 
articles are read jointly, they implicitly limit the scope of what the injured state may request. The 
injured state cannot request that the violator state be required to make reparation for injury 
caused by the inconsistent measure which predates the expiry of a reasonable period of time.
48
 
Put differently, retaliation only covers the time period after the DSB grants authorisation, not the 
whole period of the inconsistent measure applied.
49
  
  
Under GATT/WTO case law, however, some panel‟s decisions provided retroactive 
remedies. During the GATT era, for instance, several disputes which were related to subsidies 
and countervailing measures and anti-dumping resulted in the granting of retrospective 
                                                             
45 Suzanne Bermann “EC-Hormones and the Case for an Express WTO Postretaliation Procedure” (2007) 107 
Colum L Rev 131. 
46 The United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute WTO DOC 
WT/DS320/R (2008) (Report of the WTO Panel) [US – Hormones Suspension (Panel)] and Canada – Continued 
Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute WTO DOC WT/DS321/R (2008) (Report of the Panel) 
[Canada – Hormones Suspension (Panel)]. 
47
 Gavin Goh and Andreas R Ziegler “Retrospective Remedies in the WTO after Automotive Leather” (2003) 6(3) 
JIEL 545 at 555-556. 
48 Sebastian “The Law of Permissible WTO Retaliation”, above n 44, at 93. 
49 A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, above ch 1, n 4, at 82. 
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remedies.
50
 Those cases were Canada – Manufacturing Beef CVD,51 US – Canadian Pork,52 US 
– Softwood Lumber II,53 NZ – Finnish Transformers,54 US – Cement,55 and US – Swedish Steel.56  
 
Under the WTO dispute settlement scheme, Brazil – Aircraft and Guatemala – Cement 
are two cases where the complaining party requested that the panel awards a retrospective 
remedy.
57
 Additionally, in the Australia – Automotive Leather (Article 21.5 – US) case, despite 
the fact that Australia and the United States requested the withdrawal of the subsidy in a 
prospective way, the panel provided that the prospective remedy proposed by Australia would be 
ineffective. Thus, the panel concluded that repayment in full of the prohibited subsidy was 
necessary in order to “withdraw the subsidy” in this case.58 The Australia – Automotive Leather 
(Article 21.5 – US) panel report received many criticisms from WTO Members.59  
                                                             
50 Patricio Grané “Remedies under WTO Law” (2001) JIEL 755 at 764. 
51 Canada – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Manufacturing Beef from the EEC GATT DOC DS 
SCM/85 (1987) at [15] (Report by the Panel unadopted). The Panel suggested that “the Committee recommend that 
Canada terminate the outstanding countervailing duty order on manufacturing beef from the EEC, and that it refund 
any duties collected under that order.” 
52 United States – Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada GATT BISD 38th Supp 
30 GATT DOC DS7/R – 38S/30 (1990) at [5.2] (Report of the Panel adopted on 11 July 1991). The Panel 
recommended that “the CONTRACTING PARTIES request the United States to either reimburse the countervailing 
duties corresponding to the amount of the subsidies granted...or to make a subsidy determination which meets the 
requirements of Article VI:3 and reimburse the duties to the extent that they exceed an amount equal to the subsidy 
so determined to have been granted to the production of pork.” 
53 United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada GATT BISD 40th Supp 358 GATT 
DOC SCM/162 (1993) at [415] (Report of the Panel adopted by the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures on 27 October 1993). The Panel recommended the United States to refund the cash deposits made during 
the period of application of its inconsistent measures.  
54 New Zealand – Import of Electrical Transformers from Finland GATT BISD 32th Supp 55 GATT DOC L/5814 
(1985) at [4.11] (Report by the Panel adopted on 18 July 1985). The Panel proposed to the Council that it addresses 
to New Zealand a recommendation to revoke the anti-dumping determination and to reimburse the antidumping duty 
paid.  
55 United States – Anti-Dumping Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico GATT DOC 
ADP/82 (1992) at [6.2] (Report of the Panel unadopted). The Panel recommended the United States to revoke the 
anti-dumping duty order and to reimburse any anti-dumping paid.   
56 United States – Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Seamless Stainless Steel Hollow Products from 
Sweden GATT DOC ADP/27 (1990) at [5.24] (Report of the Panel unadopted). The Panel suggested the United 
States to revoke the anti-dumping duties imposed and to reimburse the anti-dumping paid. The United States did not 
agree with the retrospective corrective measures and refused to adopt the report. 
57 Brazil – Export Financing Program for Aircraft WTO DOC WT/DS46/R (1999) (Report of the WTO Panel); 
Guatemala – Anti-dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico WTO DOC WT/DS60/R (1998) 
(Report of the WTO Panel). Nevertheless in both cases, panels did not issue specific recommendations requested by 
those complaining parties. 
58
 Australia – Subsidies to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
the United States) WTO DOC WT/DS126/RW (2000) at [6.47]-[6.48] (Report of the Panel). 
59 Dispute Settlement Body Minutes of Meeting – Held in the Centre William Rappard on 11 February 2000 WTO 
DOC WT/DSB/M/75 (7 March 2000) at 5-9. 
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Although no provision under the DSU explicitly prohibits retroactive remedies and 
several panels‟ decisions provide for such retroactive relief, retroactive remedies, arguably, are 
not preferred by WTO Members. Palmeter and Mavroidis refer to the phrase “today‟s 
complainant may be tomorrow‟s respondent” to explain why Members dislike retroactive 
remedies.
60
 Additionally, Grané argues from the perspective of Members‟ sovereignty that such 
sovereignty would be impinged by stringent corrective remedies, which might result in states 
losing their interest in staying inside the system.
61
 Recommendations for retroactive remedies are 
actually quite uncommon and depart from general practice in GATT and WTO. For example, the 
GATT Panel in the Norway – Trondheim case concluded that no GATT practice instituted 
“retroactive compensation”.62 The WTO panel in US – Certain Products from the EC also stated 
that “retroactive remedies are alien to the long established GATT/WTO practice where remedies 
have traditionally been prospective.”63    
 
(iii) Retaliation consists of a certain magnitude and is not punitive  
The WTO provides several standards to determine the magnitude of retaliatory measures. 
Firstly, Article 22.4 of the DSU stipulates that retaliation shall be equivalent to the level of 
nullification or impairment. Secondly, Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement provides for an 
“appropriate” standard for countermeasures against prohibited subsidies. Thirdly, Article 7.9 of 
the SCM Agreement states that the countermeasures in the case of actionable subsidies must be 
commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects. Fourthly, Article XXVIII:3(b) 
of the GATT provides the standard of substantially equivalent concessions on retaliatory 
withdrawal measures.  
 
                                                             
60 Palmeter and Mavroidis, above ch 1, n 18, at 165. For instance, in Australia – Automotive Leather (Article 21.5 – 
US), even though the United States was the winner, it provided a statement that it “did not agree with every word of 
the Panel Report” and that “the Panel‟s remedy went beyond that sought by the United States”. See WT/DSB/M/75, 
above n 59 at 5. 
61 Grané, above n 50, at 772. 
62
 Norway – Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of Trondheim GATT BISD 40th Supp 319 
GATT DOC GPR.DS2/R (1992) at [3.37] (Report of the Panel adopted by the Committee on Government 
Procurement on 13 May 1992).  
63 US – Certain EC Products (Panel), above n 16, at [6.106]. 
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Retaliation under the WTO Agreement is not designed to be punitive. The availability of 
these standards is intended to limit retaliatory measures so that they do not become punitive 
sanctions. The non-punitive nature is primarily reflected in the “equivalent” standard under 
Article 22.4 of the DSU. The SCM Agreement also does not justify punitive sanction. Mavroidis 
notes that the definition of “proportionate” in the footnote to Article 4.10 of the SCM 
Agreements means not disproportionate, and therefore, has the reasonable interpretation that 
punitive damages are excluded.
64
  
 
In practice, arbitrators in EC – Bananas (Article 22.6 – EC) also considered that there is 
nothing in Article 22 that could be read as justifying punitive countermeasures.
65
 Moreover, in 
US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) the arbitrators emphasised that nothing in the text or in the context 
of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement suggests an entitlement to punitive measures.
66
 
 
(b) Three principles and calculation methods of retaliation under the DSU 
There are two main things that are requested or challenged by parties to the dispute in 
Article 22.6 arbitral proceedings. The first relates to cross-retaliation, and the second relates to 
the determination of the level of retaliation. Hence, this part has two main points of discussion. 
Firstly, this part discusses three principles which the requesting party should seek to satisfy 
before it is entitled to do cross-retaliation. Secondly, this part explains the calculation methods of 
WTO retaliation such as the determination of counterfactual and the level of calculation. 
 
(i) Three principles of retaliation 
Unlike its predecessor, the WTO has governed not only the area of goods but also 
services and intellectual property rights. Thus, considering the concessions or obligations to 
suspend, the DSU sets forth three main principles related to those areas under Article 22.3.  
 
                                                             
64 Mavroidis “Between a Rock and a Hard Place”, above ch 1, n 90, at 805-806. 
65 EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), above ch 1, n 12, at [6.3]. 
66 US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 13, at [5.62]. 
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The first principle is that the complaining party should first seek to retaliate with respect 
to the same sectors in which nullification or impairment has been found.
67
  If the party considers 
that it is impracticable or ineffective to retaliate in the same sectors, the second principle applies 
which is that party may seek to retaliate in other sectors under the same agreement.
68
 If the 
complaining party considers that it is not practicable or effective to retaliate in other sectors 
under the same agreement, and the circumstances are serious enough, the third principle provides 
that the complaining party may retaliate under another covered agreement.
69
 In short, the three 
principles of retaliation are “same-sector” retaliation, “cross-sector” retaliation and “cross-
agreement” retaliation.  
 
Moreover, the term “sector” means:70 
(i) with respect to goods, all goods; 
(ii) with respect to services, those identified in the current “Service Sectoral 
Classification List” (for instances business, communications, distribution, financial, 
health, and so forth);  
(iii) with respect to TRIPS, each category of intellectual property rights covered in the 
first seven sections of Part II (for example copyright, patents, trademarks, 
geographical indications and so forth) or the obligations under Part III (enforcement 
obligations) or IV (acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property rights and 
related inter partes procedures) of the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
In applying these three principles for cross-retaliation, the complaining party shall take 
into account:
71
 
(i) the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the violation or other 
nullification or impairment has been found, and the importance of such trade to the 
complaining party; 
                                                             
67 The DSU, art 22.3(a). 
68 Ibid, art 22.3(b). 
69
 Ibid, art 22.3(c). 
70 Ibid, art 22.3(f)(i)(ii)(iii). 
71 Ibid, art 22.3(d). The cross-retaliation provision does not apply to the plurilateral agreement on government 
procurement (GPA), see the GPA, art XXII:7. 
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(ii) the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the 
broader economic consequences of the retaliation. 
 
As regarding “the importance of such trade” to the complaining party, arbitrators in EC – 
Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) held that this criterion relates primarily to the trade 
nullified or impaired by the WTO inconsistent measures.
72
 Thus, in the arbitrators‟ view, the 
trade in its entirety (in this case, they are under the GATT and GATS) is of subsidiary 
importance.
73
 In contrast, the arbitrators in US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US) held the view that 
“the ordinary meaning of subparagraph (d)(i) suggests that a consideration of the entirety of 
„trade in the sector‟ under which a violation was found is pertinent”.74 The arbitrators‟ view in 
US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), arguably, is more appropriate, because Article 22.3 
paragraph 3(d)(i) does not distinguish between trade of primary and subsidiary importance and 
that the meaning of “sector” in paragraph 3(f)(i) with respect to goods is all goods.75  
 
With regards to the “broader economic elements” and “broader economic consequences 
of the retaliation”, the arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) stated that 
the former criterion primarily relates to the suffering of the complaining party as a result of the 
nullification or impairment. The latter criterion relates to the consequences not only for the 
respondent party, but also for the complainant party.
76
   
  
Furthermore, the arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) assessed 
what is meant by saying that retaliation in the same sector or the same agreement “is not 
practicable or effective” and that “the circumstances are serious enough” under Article 22.3 
paragraph (b) and (c). In assessing the former question with regards to goods, Ecuador argued 
that most of its imports of goods from the European Communities were of primary goods or 
investment goods rather than consumer goods. Therefore, Ecuador stated that retaliation in the 
                                                             
72 EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), above ch 1, n 12, at [84]. 
73
 Ibid at [128]. 
74 US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 12, at [4.33].  
75 Shadikhodjaev, above n 7, at 71. 
76 EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), above ch 1, n 12, at [71]. 
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goods sector would not be practicable or effective, and would harm Ecuador more than the 
European Communities.
77
  
 
The arbitrators considered the effects on primary and investment goods and on consumer 
goods separately. With respect to primary and investment goods, the arbitrators stated that in the 
absence of alternative sources of supply at similar prices, Ecuadorian industry would be hurt by a 
suspension of these products.
78
 The arbitrators concluded that the European Communities did not 
prove that retaliation under the GATT with respect to primary and investment goods is both 
“practicable and effective” for Ecuador.79 However, the arbitrators noted that it was both 
“practicable and effective” for Ecuador to suspend imports of “consumer goods” because the 
suspension would not cause any direct adverse effects on Ecuadorian domestic industries.
80
 As 
regards services, the arbitrators found that Ecuador‟s concessions on services were limited. Thus, 
the arbitrators concluded that a suspension of services is not practicable or effective for 
Ecuador.
81
 
 
Additionally in relation to the phrase “circumstances are serious enough”, the arbitrators 
stated that Article 22 does not provide any threshold for determining when circumstances can be 
considered “serious” enough to justify retaliation. Thus, the arbitrators utilised the ordinary 
meaning of “serious” and contextual guidance under Article 22.3(d) of the DSU.82 Accordingly, 
to be considered as serious, circumstances must reach a certain degree of importance that is 
manifested in the provision of Article 22.3(d).
83
  
    
(ii) Calculation of the level of suspension 
In most arbitration proceedings the arbitrators, by referring to Article 22.4 of the DSU, 
determined that the level of suspension shall be equivalent to the level of nullification or 
impairment. Accordingly, the arbitrators need to determine at first the level of nullification and 
                                                             
77 Ibid, at [89]. 
78 Ibid, at [92]-[95]. 
79 Ibid, at [96]. 
80
 Ibid, at [100]-[101]. 
81 Ibid, at [103]-[105]. 
82 Ibid, at [81], [121]. 
83 Shadikhodjaev, above n 7, at 71-72. 
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impairment. To calculate the level of nullification or impairment, the arbitrators have to compare 
the trade value of the current WTO-inconsistent situation with the trade value of a 
“counterfactual” WTO-consistent situation. The counterfactual is a trade value in a situation that 
arguably would exist if the violator state had removed the WTO-inconsistent measure within a 
reasonable period of time.  
 
(iii) Determining the counterfactual and the method of calculation 
The determination of the counterfactual is a hypothetical analysis by the arbitrators. 
McGriven notes that the use of the counterfactual can involve a fair degree of subjective 
assessment by the arbitrators.
84
 Hudec also states that by simply announcing the “correct” 
methodology and number with little explanation, the arbitrators‟ panel reports might be 
disappointingly obscure; however, as long as the parties are willing to accept the decision, it is 
politically acceptable.
85
  
  
The choice of counterfactual in practice has been quite varied. In EC – Bananas III (US) 
(Article 22.6 – EC), the arbitrators selected a counterfactual (a global tariff quota and unlimited 
access for ACP bananas at a zero tariff) that was quite different from several counterfactuals 
proposed by the United States and provided no explanation for their choice of counterfactual.
86
 
The arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) selected the same 
counterfactual as the one in EC – Bananas III (US) arbitration to ensure consistency and to 
prevent double-counting on the nullification or impairment carried by the United States.
87
  
 
In both EC – Hormones (Article 22.6) disputes, the arbitrators focused on the trade 
foregone due to the continuance of the existing ban on hormone-treated beef. The arbitrators 
calculated the detrimental effects by comparing annually the value of hormone-treated beef 
exports under the current European Communities-inconsistent measure with the value of 
hormone-treated beef exports which would take place in the European Communities if the 
                                                             
84
 McGriven, above ch 1, n 49, at [151]. 
85 Ibid, at [151]; Hudec “Broadening the Scope of Remedies”, above ch 1, n 14, at 391. 
86 EC- Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), above ch 1, n 12, at [7.4]-[7.8]. 
87 EC- Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), above ch 1, n 12, at [166]. 
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measure was WTO-consistent.
88
 In these disputes, however, there were two possible relevant 
counterfactuals. First, there was the situation where the European Communities had withdrawn 
its inconsistent measure, and second, there was a situation where the European Communities 
maintained its import ban but supported it with a proper risk assessment as required by the SPS 
Agreement. The arbitrators selected the first counterfactual, and the European Communities did 
not contest it.
89
 However, it is arguable that the choice of this counterfactual scenario affected 
the calculation of the level of nullification or impairment.
90
  
  
The counterfactual in US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US) was the trade effect of 
the CDSOA disbursements. Here the arbitrators departed from the counterfactual applied in EC – 
Bananas III and EC – Hormones by applying an economic model, rather than the value of the 
violation itself, to assess to what extent the payments nullified and impaired benefit to the injured 
party.
91
 In this case, the arbitrators also refused to include the calculation of the detrimental 
effects experienced by the third country entities. The arbitrators stated that “a Requesting Party 
may only request suspension of concessions or other obligations with respect to the trade effect 
caused by disbursements under the CDSOA relating to its own exports”.92  
 
In US – 1916 Act (Article 22.6 – EC), the arbitrators refused the European Communities‟ 
proposal on “mirror” regulation. The arbitrators argued that it is impossible to determine the 
WTO-consistency of a “qualitative equivalence”, thus it is essential to determine the trade or 
economic effect of the 1916 Act on the European Communities in numerical or monetary terms 
(quantitative equivalence).
93
 This case is quite unique, since after a reasonable period of time, no 
order under the 1916 Act had been in place against the European Communities‟ products. Thus, 
the arbitrators provided that the calculation method was to rely on the future situations. These 
were any final judgments that would be made against the European Communities‟ entities under 
the 1916 Act, and the situation that an award would be payable by the European Communities‟ 
                                                             
88 EC – Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 – EC), above ch 1, n 12, at [42]; EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – 
EC), above ch 1, n 12, at [43].  
89 Ibid, at [37]; Ibid, at [38]. 
90
 Sebastian “The Law of Permissible WTO Retaliation”, above n 44, at 101-102; Shadikhodjaev, above n 7, at 125. 
91 US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 12, at [3.77]. 
92 Ibid, at [4.16]. 
93 US – 1916 Act (Article 22.6 – EC), above ch 1, n 12, at [5.20]-[5.23].  
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entities to settle claims under the Act.
94
 The arbitrators also refused to include the “chilling 
effect” of the 1916 Act and the litigation cost in the calculation.95  
  
The counterfactual in US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US) was rather controversial. In this 
case, the arbitrators provided that only a “counterfactual that allowed remote gambling on 
horseracing but disallowed other types of gambling is plausible.”96 By allowing the remote 
gambling on horseracing as the counterfactual, the arbitrators provided a WTO-inconsistent 
counterfactual scenario. Sebastian argues that it is hard to reconcile the United States position 
that remote gambling must be banned to protect public morals with the counterfactual that 
permitted remote gambling on horseracing.
97
 Thus, Ehring writes that the US – Gambling 
arbitration proceeding was a judicial disaster.
98
 
 
5 Countermeasures under the SCM Agreement 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement) 
provides rules on subsidies and countervailing duties under multilateral trade agreements. A 
subsidy under the SCM Agreement consists of three main elements which are as follows: (i) a 
financial contribution (such as a direct transfer of funds, a potential direct transfer of funds or 
liabilities, government revenue foregone or not collected, the provision by a government of 
goods or services other than general infrastructure, the purchase by a government of goods, 
government payments to a funding mechanism or entrusts or direction of a private body); (ii) by 
a government or any public body; and (iii) conferring a benefit.
99
 The Agreement also 
distinguishes between three types of subsidies: prohibited, actionable and non-actionable 
subsidies.
100
 Prohibited subsidies are those contingent upon export performance or upon the use 
                                                             
94 Ibid, at [5.45], [5.58]. 
95 Ibid, at [5.72], [5.78]. 
96 US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 12, at [3.54]. 
97 Sebastian “The Law of Permissible WTO Retaliation”, above n 44, at 104. 
98 Lothar Ehring “The European Community‟s Experience and Practice in Suspending WTO Obligations” in Chad P 
Bown and Joost Pauwelyn (eds) The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010) 244 at 261-264. 
99 The SCM Agreement, art 1.1. 
100 The third category, non-actionable subsidies, as from 1 January 2000 contains non-specific subsidies, thus it does 
not longer in effect.  
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of domestic over imported goods.
101
 Export subsidies and import substitution subsidies are 
prohibited under the SCM Agreement. Outside these prohibited subsidies, most subsidies are 
actionable, which means that they are not prohibited but are subject to challenge in the case that 
they cause “adverse effects to the interests of other Members”.102 
 
The SCM Agreement also sets forth special rules for dispute settlement, including the 
countermeasures. Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement provides that when a panel finds the 
measure in question to be a prohibited subsidy, the panel shall recommend that the subsidising 
Member withdraw the subsidy without delay. If the prohibited subsidy is not withdrawn, Article 
4.10 of the SCM Agreement provides that the DSB shall grant authorisation to the complaining 
party to take appropriate countermeasures. Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement refers to 
arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU to determine whether the countermeasures are 
appropriate. Footnote 10 of the SCM Agreement states that “this expression [appropriateness] is 
not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the 
subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited”.       
 
(a) The meaning of countermeasures 
The SCM Agreement does not provide a clear definition concerning what “appropriate” 
and the countermeasures mean. Nevertheless, the meaning of “countermeasures” has been 
determined in practice. The arbitrators in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) stated that “the 
dictionary definitions suggest that a countermeasure is essentially by reference to the wrongful 
action to which it is intended to respond”; accordingly, this ordinary meaning suggests that “a 
countermeasure bears a relationship with the action to be counteracted, or with its effects”.103 
The arbitrators, thus, decided that the term “countermeasures” in the context of Article 4 of the 
SCM Agreement, is in line with its ordinary meaning and that these measures are “authorized to 
counteract...a wrongful action in the form of an export subsidy that is prohibited per se, or the 
effect, thereof.”104 Therefore, the arbitrators concluded that the countermeasures can be utilised 
                                                             
101
 The SCM Agreement., art 3.  
102 Ibid, art 5. 
103 US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 13, at [5.4].  
104 Ibid, at [5.5] (emphasis added). 
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either to counter the measure at issue (neutralising the export subsidy), or to counteract its effect 
on the affected party, or both.
105
   
  
Furthermore, although the DSU and the SCM Agreement use different terms for 
retaliation, the arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil) considered that the term 
“countermeasures” may also include suspension of concessions or other obligations.106 The 
arbitrators in Canada – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Canada) decided the same thing by stating that 
there is no restriction on the types of countermeasures under Article 4.10 of the SCM 
Agreement, however Brazil in this case requested the suspension of tariff concessions and other 
obligations as the countermeasures.
107
 
  
(b) What constitutes “appropriate”? 
A comprehensive definition of “appropriateness” is essential to determine the level of 
countermeasures. The arbitrators in US – Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) stated that the permissible 
level of countermeasures is mainly defined through the term “appropriate” and the wording of 
footnote 9.
108
 What constitutes “appropriate” is quite unclear under the SCM Agreement. 
Nevertheless, arbitrators‟ decisions in several prohibited subsidies disputes elaborated on several 
elements of the “appropriate” standard. 
 
(i) It mainly corresponds to the amount of subsidy rather than the harm that has 
occurred  
Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil) was the first dispute where the meaning of 
“appropriate” became the primary issue before the arbitrators. The meaning of countermeasures 
was not the central issue because Canada requested countermeasures in the form of suspension of 
concessions or other obligations, and Brazil did not challenge this.
109
 However, Canada did not 
request authorisation for the level of nullification or impairment, but for the amount of the 
                                                             
105 Ibid, at [5.6]. 
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 Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), above ch 1, n 13, at [3.29]. 
107 Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada), above ch 1, n 13, at [footnote 82].  
108 US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 13, at [4.43].  
109 Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), above ch 1, n 13, at [3.28]. 
58 
 
prohibited subsidy. Canada argued that countermeasures are appropriate if they correspond to the 
amount of the prohibited subsidy granted. Brazil challenged Canada‟s approach and asserted that 
countermeasures should correspond only to the part of payments or supports used to “secure a 
material advantage in the field of export credit terms”.110 The arbitrators stated that, with regard 
to footnotes 9 and 10, “the reference to the fact that subsidies dealt with are prohibited can most 
probably be considered more as an aggravating factor than as a mitigating factor”.111 Therefore, 
they favoured Canada‟s approach. The arbitrators concluded that when dealing with prohibited 
subsidies, an amount of countermeasures which corresponds to the total amount of the subsidy is 
“appropriate”.112 Palmeter and Mavroidis challenge this finding and argue that reference in 
footnotes 9 and 10 to the fact that the subsidies involved are prohibited does not constitute an 
aggravating or mitigating factor, but instead, the use of the term “prohibited” is more to 
distinguish prohibited subsidies from those that are actionable.
113
  
 
The arbitrators in Canada – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Canada) went further by finding that 
although the level of countermeasures is more appropriately determined on the basis of the 
amount of subsidies, the level of countermeasures does not have to be limited to such amount.
114
   
 
(ii) It allows more leeway than the word “equivalent” 
The arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil) noted that “equivalent” and 
“appropriate” should not be given the same meaning, and that instead, the term appropriate 
should give more leeway than the word “equivalent” in assessing the level of countermeasures. 
Although the countermeasures may be in the form of suspension of concession or other 
obligation, the arbitrators in determining the appropriate level of suspension stated that there is 
no legal obligation that the appropriate level of countermeasures should be based on the level of 
nullification or impairment, since there is no reference made to nullification or impairment in 
                                                             
110 Ibid, at [3.30]. 
111
 Ibid, at [3.51]. 
112 Ibid, at [3.60]. 
113 Palmeter and Mavroidis, above ch 1, n 18, at 292. 
114 Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada), above ch 1, n 13, at [3.91]. 
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Article 4 of the SCM Agreement.
115
 In other words, the appropriate level of countermeasures 
might go beyond the level of equivalent.    
  
(iii) It is expected to have the effect of inducing compliance 
In four arbitral proceedings on prohibited subsidies disputes, the arbitrators 
acknowledged that a countermeasure is appropriate if it induces compliance. In Brazil – Aircraft 
(Article 22.6 – Brazil), the arbitrators examined the term “appropriate” by referring to its 
meaning in general international law and in the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) 
on state responsibility and thereby came to a similar conclusion to the arbitrator in EC – Bananas 
III (Article 22.6 – EC) that “a countermeasure is „appropriate‟ inter alia if it effectively induces 
compliance.”116  
 
The arbitrators in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) noted two things in assessing what may 
be deemed “appropriate” countermeasures. Firstly, the subsidy at issue should be withdrawn; and 
secondly, countermeasures should contribute to the withdrawal of the prohibited subsidy without 
delay.
117
 Thus, the arbitrators in Canada – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Canada), with regard to 
Canada‟s statement that it did not intend to withdraw the subsidy and to the finding in US – FSC 
(Article 22.6 – US) which stated that the prohibited subsidy should be withdrawn without delay, 
introduced an additional 20 per cent to the amount of the countermeasure in order to induce 
Canada to withdraw the subsidy.
118
   
 
In US – Cotton (Article 22.6 – US), the most recent Article 22.6 arbitral proceeding, the 
arbitrators found that inducing compliance seems to be the common purpose of retaliation in the 
WTO dispute settlement system including Article 22.4 of the DSU, but that this “inducing 
compliance” purpose does not by itself provide specific indication as to the permissible level of 
countermeasures.
119
 
 
                                                             
115 Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), above ch 1, n 13, at [3.48]. 
116
 Ibid, at [3.44]. 
117 US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 13, at [5.51]-[5.60]. 
118 Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada), above ch 1, n 13, at [3.106]-[3.107]. 
119 US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 13, at [4.112]. 
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(iv) Not disproportionate 
Footnotes 9 and 10 of the SCM Agreement provide a substantive rule for the 
appropriateness standard of the countermeasures: it should not be disproportionate. However, the 
SCM Agreement does not provide further explanation concerning the meaning of 
disproportionate. Because of this uncertainty, the arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – 
Brazil) encountered difficulty identifying the relationship between the second part of the 
sentence in the footnote (“in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions 
are prohibited”) to the first part of the sentence (“this expression is not meant to allow 
countermeasures that are disproportionate”). The arbitrators in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) by 
referring to footnote 9 to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, provided a more certain 
explanation concerning the text in the footnote 9. The arbitrators found that the footnote requires 
them:
 120
 
...to maintain a congruent relationship in countering the measure at issue so that the 
reaction is not excessive in light of the situation to which there is to be a response. But 
this does not require exact equivalence – the relationship to be respected is precisely that 
of “proportion” rather than “equivalence”.  
 
Howse and Neven argue that the footnote can be read as setting an upper bound on the 
countermeasures, and at the same time, as emphasising the unlawful character of the prohibited 
subsidy; hence, it provides a warning against excessively low countermeasures.
121
  
 
(c) Justification of the “amount of subsidy” approach 
In most arbitral proceedings on prohibited subsidies, the arbitrators have provided a 
calculation of countermeasures that corresponds to the amount of the subsidy. Several 
commentators provide terms for this approach. For instance, Shadikhodjaev in his book utilises 
the term “violation value” approach, while Sebastian utilises the term “the amount-of-subsidy” 
approach, which is the opposite of the “equality-of-harm” approach under Article 22 of the DSU.   
                                                             
120 US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 13, at [5.18]. 
121 Howse and Neven, above ch 1, n 103, at 106. 
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The arbitrators have provided various justifications to support the approach that they 
employed. Firstly, there was the nonexistence of a reference to the concept of nullification or 
impairment in Articles 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement, in contrast to Article 22.4 of the DSU.
122
 
Thus, the calculation of “appropriate countermeasures” might not be based on the equivalent 
standard to the harm approach under the DSU. Such a calculation is possible as the arbitrators in 
US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) recalled that Article 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement are 
special and additional rules; and according to Article 1.3 of the DSU such special rules and 
procedures are to prevail over the rules and procedures under the DSU.
123
   
  
Secondly, the arbitrators provided a comparison between Article 4.10 and Article 7.9 of 
the SCM Agreement. The arbitrators stated that the term “appropriate countermeasures” under 
Article 4.10 for prohibited subsidies does not impose similar constraints to the term 
“commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist” under 
Article 7.9 for actionable subsidies.
124
 In other words, Article 7.9 provides a tighter restriction on 
calculation by imposing a requirement of proportionality between the countermeasures and the 
adverse effects of the subsidy.
125
 
  
Thirdly, there is the justification under the concept of obligations erga omnes provided by 
the arbitrators in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US). The arbitrators considered obligations under 
prohibited subsidies as obligations erga omnes that are owed to all Members. A breach of the 
obligation is considered a wrongful act against all Members; therefore the arbitrators concluded 
that “the United States has breached its obligations to the European Communities in respect of 
all money that it has expended”.126 The arbitrators derived the notion of obligations erga omnes 
from general international law. The application of the concept of obligations erga omnes in this 
case is somewhat controversial. One of the issues is the insertion of general international law 
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 US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 13, at [5.47]. 
124 Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), above ch 1, n 13, at [3.49].  
125 Sebastian “The Law of Permissible WTO Retaliation”, above n 44, at 114; Shadikhodjaev, above n 7, at 103. 
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concepts into WTO dispute settlement.
127
 In the DSB meeting, the United States addressed the 
arbitrator's declaration in paragraph 6.10 and noted “the dubious quality legal analysis which, 
without foundation in the DSU, incorrectly and inappropriately purported to import into WTO 
jurisprudence the concept of erga omnes.”128 Another issue is that the approach would not be 
proportional when there are multiple complainants seeking to take countermeasures. In US – 
FSC (Article 22.6 – US), the arbitrators were helped by the fact that the European Communities 
was the sole complainant. However the arbitrators realised that the consideration might be 
different in the case of multiple complainants.
129
 
 
(d) Commensurate standard 
Article 7.10 of the SCM Agreement provides that the countermeasures are commensurate 
with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist. So far, there is only one 
dispute that has been brought to arbitral proceedings to determine the commensurate standard of 
countermeasures. In US – Cotton (Article 22.6 DSU and Article 7.10 SCM – US), the arbitrators 
examined the terms “commensurate”, “the degree and nature”, and “the adverse effects 
determined to exist” separately. The arbitrators stated that commensurate does not require exact 
equality between the two elements being compared. It connotes a less precise degree of 
equivalent than exact numerical correspondence. However, it indicates a relationship of 
correspondence and proportionality between two elements, and this correspondence might be 
qualitative and quantitative.
130
 The arbitrators‟ finding demonstrates that the “commensurate” 
standard demands a higher degree of correspondence than the “appropriate” standard, but 
provides more flexibility in calculation than the “equivalent” standard. Thus, the 
“commensurate” standard stands somewhere between the “appropriate” and “equivalent” 
standard. 
  
                                                             
127 In the DSB meeting, the United States challenged the insertion or application of the rules of international law 
outside the customary rules of interpretation into the WTO dispute settlement. It stated that “[r]eliance on public 
international legal concepts outside of rules of interpretation was not permitted under either DSU provision, and the 
arbitrator had erred in importing this concept as a means to justify its award.” See WT/DSB/M/149, above ch 1, n 
124, at para 20. 
128 Ibid.  
129 US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 13, at [6.27]. 
130 US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 13, at [4.39]. 
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Furthermore the “degree and nature” of adverse effects is needed in assessing the 
commensurateness of the proposed countermeasures.
131
 The “degree” of the adverse effect is a 
quantitative assessment, while the “nature” is more a qualitative assessment. A qualitative 
assessment makes the countermeasures standard more flexible or less stringent than the 
“equivalent” standard that requires only quantitative assessment.132 In the end, the arbitrators 
examined the term “the adverse effects determined to exist” by referring to the specific “adverse 
effects” within the meaning of Articles 5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement.133   
 
Summary 
The first part of this chapter discussed the notion of retaliation. It examined the basic 
features, nature and substantive rules of GATT/WTO retaliation. It also carried out an 
assessment of three principles of retaliation and the method of calculation employed by the 
arbitrators in determining the level of retaliation. Because this part is aimed to provide a 
basic/general understanding of what WTO retaliation is, it is also important to include the 
assessment of countermeasures under the SCM Agreement. As stated previously, retaliation and 
the countermeasures have similar forms and characteristics, and unless the SCM Agreement 
requires otherwise, several issues are applicable to both measures.   
 
The subsequent part examines the shortcomings and problems encountered by retaliation. 
Due to these shortcomings and problems, retaliation has often been claimed harmful and 
ineffective by commentators and WTO Members. 
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132 Shadikhodjaev, above n 7, at 111. 
133 US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 13, at [4.50]. 
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II The Shortcomings and Problems of Retaliation: Academic Perspectives and 
Practice 
Retaliation is normally in the form of suspension of concessions or other obligations. The 
suspension implies trade restrictions and seems to go against the basic trade liberalising principle 
of the WTO. One might question why the WTO provides trade restrictions as the remedy. To 
respond to this question, first we need to understand that WTO trade concessions are based on 
reciprocal exchange between Members. Consequently, if one breaks its promise, another 
Member is entitled to withdraw its promise too. Nonetheless, imposing a trade restriction with 
the intention to redress the injury suffered because of another trade restriction, is just like adding 
one problem to another problem. In short, retaliation measures are trade destructive; therefore, it 
by its nature produces harm and has negative effects on the retaliating state.    
 
Part two of this chapter carries out an analysis of the shortcomings and problems of 
retaliation. These issues have been comprehensively discussed academically. Part A explores 
these academic views and highlights several arguments about what are considered as the major 
shortcomings and problems of retaliation. Part B deals with retaliation problems in practice. It 
refers to several retaliation disputes under Article 22.6 of the DSU, and elaborates on the 
shortcomings and problems encountered by the complainant and respondent states with regard to 
retaliation.  
 
A Academic Perspectives 
The effectiveness of retaliation has been challenged since GATT dispute settlement. Dam 
writes that the scheme of retaliation [the withdrawal of concessions or other obligations] creates 
paradoxical consequences in regard to one of the basic principles of GATT: the reciprocity 
principle.
134
 The concept of reciprocity underlies the notion of exchanging the obligations of 
each government to the agreement which involves a balance of benefits and cost.
135
 Dam points 
out that fortuitous protection can be provided by retaliation towards industries that do not 
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deserve such protection, while the injured industries and domestic customers may not gain any 
benefit from the remedy.
136
 Thus, Dam argues that Article XXIII gives a remedy without a 
right.
137
 Hudec affirms Dam‟s view by stating that the balancing rationale for retaliation is a 
fiction in economic terms because the injured state does not gain anything by raising tariff 
barriers, instead its customers are afflicted by such barriers.
138
 
 
The shortcomings of retaliation continue under the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Bronckers and van den Broek write that the threat of retaliation has proven effective in placing 
pressure on a violator government to comply with its WTO obligations; however, in their view 
the WTO remedies system also suffers from several significant flaws.
139
 Considerable academic 
writings primarily point out the shortcomings of retaliation, which as follows. 
 
1 “Shooting [oneself] in the foot” 
“Shooting [oneself] in the foot” is a term utilised by some scholars and commentators in 
describing the self-defeating consequences of retaliation.
140
 This term explains that by imposing 
retaliation, the retaliating state could harm its own economy; this is because retaliation normally 
takes the form of increasing the tariff barriers (namely 100 per cent duties) on the violator state‟s 
products. For example the United States retaliated in the form of a 100 per cent duty on certain 
European Communities products, ranging from Italian scarves to French Roquefort cheese, 
against the European Communities ban on hormone-treated beef.
141
  
 
By creating another trade barrier, retaliation results in a loss of welfare for the customers 
and industries of the retaliating state and distorts the market.
142
 For instance, customers in the 
retaliating state have to pay a higher price when the tariff on selected products is increased, and 
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140 Ibid, at 104; Spadano, above ch 1, n 140, at 533; Bermann, above n 45, at 148. 
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industries that need those imported products for their production process will face commercial 
difficulties.
143
 
 
2 Paradoxical to the basic principle of the WTO 
In the event of retaliation, the retaliating state generally imposes trade restrictions on 
imports from the violator state. A retaliatory measure in the form of additional custom duties is, 
arguably, contrary to the basic principle of the WTO trade liberalisation. In other words, many 
question the notion of “protectionism against protectionism”.  
 
The Report of the Meltzer Commission raised a similar concern, noting that “retaliation is 
contrary to the spirit of the WTO”.144 Pauwelyn points out this paradox, by stating that it is an 
irony that the world body preaching trade liberalisation depicts trade protectionism [retaliation] 
as offering some kind of benefit that could neutralise the effect of illegal trade restrictions.
145
  
 
3 Imposing an inappropriate burden on innocent industries 
Retaliation is perceived as unfair by affected private parties or industries of the 
responding state. These parties or industries are not involved at all in the trade dispute; yet will 
suffer and have to carry an inappropriate burden as a result of trade retaliation.
146
 Bronckers and 
van den Broek point out that the objective of this scheme is to encourage the innocent bystanders 
to put more pressure on their non-complying government.
147
 Despite this objective, retaliation 
itself is perceived as an unfair remedy. Firstly, it provides fortuitous protection to industries that 
do not deserve such protection while leaving industries that have suffered from illegal measures 
uncompensated. Secondly, it affects parties or industries that are not involved in the particular 
trade dispute or breach.  
                                                             
143 McGivern, above ch 1, n 49, at 153. 
144 The Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (March 2000) at 108. International 
Financial Institution Advisory Commission, chaired by Allan H Melzer, was a commission established by the United 
States Senate to make recommendations on future United States policies towards several international organisations 
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4 Counterproductive for developing and least-developed countries 
Retaliation is also counterproductive for developing and least-developed country 
Members because it is hard for them to afford the cost of retaliation. For instance, they may have 
to eliminate their access to foreign products or make those products more expensive for their 
domestic customers. Alavi argues that it is difficult for African countries to retaliate against 
bigger trading states because such retaliatory measures would impede their trade and losses 
would exceed any possible gains.
148
 The fear of “shooting [oneself] in the foot”, therefore, makes 
retaliation unappealing in the eyes of developing and least-developed countries.  
 
B Retaliation Issues from Case Studies 
To date, the DSB has authorised retaliation in nine disputes.
149
 Three among the nine are 
disputes in which retaliation under different sectors or agreements (cross-retaliation) has been 
requested and authorised.
150
 Retaliatory measures have several problematic aspects which are 
evident in practice. For instance, there was a disagreement between the United States and the 
European Communities in EC – Hormones on whether implementation had occurred so that 
retaliatory measures could be terminated. Therefore, some proposals have been offered to 
enhance the existing retaliation provision. These proposals are elaborated on the subsequent part 
below.  
 
This part elaborates on three major issues regarding the imposition of retaliatory 
measures by the complainant Members. The issues are as follows: 
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1 Lack of inducement power for the measures that have strong domestic political support 
This problem occurred, for instance, in the US – Byrd Amendment case. The Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA), also known as the Byrd Amendment,
151
 
provides for the distribution of collected antidumping and countervailing duties to the United 
States companies that brought and supported petitions for antidumping/countervailing 
investigations against foreign producers. The panel, in a decision which was upheld by the 
Appellate Body, found that the Byrd Amendment was inconsistent with the GATT, the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement. Following the expiry of a reasonable period of 
time, the complainants proceeded to request the authorisation for retaliation, even though only 
the European Communities, Japan, Mexico and Canada imposed the retaliatory measures against 
the United States.  
 
Nonetheless, the imposition of retaliatory measures by the retaliating states seemed to do 
little in inducing the United States to cease its inconsistent measures promptly. The US Congress 
passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 which repealed the Byrd Amendment in February 
2006. However the Act allowed for a two year transition.
152
 The complainant states denied the 
United States claim about compliance and asserted that the transitional provisions in the Act still 
permit distribution of antidumping and countervailing duties collected on goods that are 
imported into the United States before 1 October 2007 to eligible United States companies.
153
 
 
Regardless of the sanctions imposed by the complaining Members and the fact that the 
United States administration strongly urged to repeal the Byrd Amendment, the strong support 
which the Byrd Amendment enjoyed in the Senate as well as the domestic support which it 
received from the companies which benefited from it, had made the repeal process difficult. 
Consequently, a long delay for the United States in implementing the WTO ruling was 
inevitable.  
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2 Continued sanctions  
Another retaliation problem that occurs in practice is that parties to the dispute continue 
to disagree what constitutes compliance, and as a result, retaliatory measures remain in place 
longer than necessary. This has happened in the EC – Hormones case. The European 
Communities, by adopting a new directive, claimed that it had complied with the DSB 
recommendations and the WTO covered agreements, because the prohibition of certain 
hormones under the new directive was based on a comprehensive scientific assessment which 
was required by the SCM Agreement.
154
 However, the United States and Canada disagreed that 
the new directive was based on a scientific assessment and argued that it was still inconsistent 
with the European Communities obligations under the SPS Agreement. Therefore, both states 
insisted on maintaining their retaliatory measures.
155
 Subsequently, the European Communities 
brought a new complaint against the continued suspension of obligations by the United States 
and Canada.
156
  
 
The EC – Hormones case demonstrates post-retaliation problems, particularly the 
disagreement on whether implementation has occurred, and when retaliatory measures should be 
terminated. This implementation disagreement and continued sanctions definitely prolong 
dispute, and in the end might undermine the purpose of “security and predictability” of the WTO 
dispute settlement system. 
 
3 Lack of retaliating capacity for small developing countries and least-developed countries  
The retaliating Member normally imposes retaliatory measures in the form of suspension 
of concessions or other obligations by increasing tariff barriers (for example 100 per cent tariff) 
against the products of violator states. Because retaliation is trade destructive, the retaliating state 
is also negatively affected by the measures. Therefore, for small developing-country and least-
developed country Members, imposing retaliatory measures is often not the best option. 
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Moreover, because of their small economy and trade, imposing retaliation under the same sectors 
by small-developing or least-developed countries would not produce harm or significant impact 
on the developed-country Members.
157
  
 
To increase their bargaining leverage, less economically powerful Members requested an 
authorisation for cross-retaliation. The authorisation to cross-retaliate has arisen in three 
disputes: EC – Bananas III, US – Gambling and US – Upland Cotton. However from practice we 
can learn that not all developing countries are in the position to impose cross-retaliation 
effectively.  
 
Antigua, for instance, requested an authorisation to cross-retaliate at first under GATS 
and TRIPS Agreement; however, in the end, it limited its request to the TRIPS Agreement only. 
At the time of writing, Antigua had not yet imposed any retaliation against the United States. It 
has chosen to pursue a negotiated solution with the United States.
158
 Given the huge asymmetry 
between the economic situations of the two countries, it is doubtful that the threat of suspension 
of TRIPS concessions would have any meaningful power to promote a more favourable 
settlement for Antigua.
159
 In contrast, in the US – Upland Cotton case, Brazil‟s threat to impose 
cross-retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement has successfully led to the temporary agreement 
between Brazil and the United States. Therefore we can conclude that the credible threat of 
retaliatory measures depends on the economy and market size of the retaliating state as well as 
its substantial interest in intellectual property rights. 
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imposition of retaliation under the GATS would have “a disproportionate adverse impact” on Antigua while it 
would cause “virtually no impact” on the United States. See US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1 n 12, at 
[4.87]. 
158 Mark E Mendel “Retaliation in the WTO: The Experience of Antigua and Barbuda in US – Gambling” in Chad P 
Bown and Joost Pauwelyn (eds) The Law, Economic and Politic of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010) 310 at 313. 
159 Frederick M Abbot “Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS: Options for Developing Countries” (International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development Issue Paper No 8, April 2009) at 8. 
71 
 
III Proposals to Enhance WTO Retaliation and the Criticisms 
The previous part of this chapter described the shortcomings and problems of retaliation. 
The harm caused by retaliation and its inability to induce compliance are, amongst others, 
considered to be the major shortcomings of WTO retaliation. Several reform proposals have been 
made to improve the performance of retaliation. This part explains several major proposals, 
including criticisms to these proposals.  
 
A Collective Retaliation 
Generally, collective retaliation would allow states which are not directly injured to 
impose retaliation collectively on a recalcitrant state in order to force it to cease its illegal 
measures. Some commentators support a collective retaliation proposal in light of the inability of 
smaller countries to engage effectively at the dispute settlement and enforcement level against 
bigger countries.
160
 The proposal of collective retaliation was first submitted by a group of 
developing states in 1965.
161
 The background of this submission was because the developing 
countries felt that bilateral retaliation only works effectively if it is used by two major players, 
which are the United States and the European Communities.
162
 During the WTO era, a group of 
least-developed countries also proposed collective retaliation in cases where the complainant was 
a least-developed country.
163
 
  
Even though this proposal seems to bring more power to developing and least-developed 
countries in the enforcement level, several commentators express doubt that the proposal would 
be successful. Fukunaga, for instance, argues that this proposal is legally unsound and politically 
                                                             
160 For instance, Udombana suggests collective countermeasures for African countries through African Union. See 
Udombana, above ch 1, n 39, at 1198-1199. 
161 Ad Hoc Group on Legal Amendments to the General Agreement Proposals for Amendments to the General 
Agreement - Note by the Secretariat GATT DOC COM.TD/F/W/1 (27 April 1965). See also: Robert E Hudec “The 
Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A Developing Countries Perspective” in Bernard M Hoekman, 
Aaditya Mattoo and Philip English (eds) Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook (the World Bank, 2002) 
at 84. 
162 Debra P Steger Peace through Trade: Building the World Trade Organization (Cameron May, 2004) at 248.   
163
 TN/DS/W/17, above n 14; Dispute Settlement Body Special Session Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding – Proposal by African Group WTO DOC TN/DS/W/15 (25 September 2002); and Dispute 
Settlement Body Special Session Text for the African Group Proposals on Dispute Settlement Understanding 
Negotiations – Communication from Kenya WTO DOC TN/DS/W/42 (24 January 2003).  
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unrealistic because the nature of WTO obligations is reciprocal; so the participation of other non-
party Members would induce disruption and increase tension rather than achieve 
implementation.
164
 Malacrida also notes a number of difficulties in implementing collective 
retaliation, such as the problem a developing country Member would face in convincing non-
party Members to participate in collective action due to the high cost of retaliation.
165
 
 
B Transferrable Retaliation 
During the DSU negotiations, Mexico proposed a concept that allows the right to suspend 
to be transferred to one or more Members.
166
 Diego-Fernandez argues that negotiable retaliation 
creates a market because it opens up the possibility to auction the right to retaliate to the rest of 
the Members.
167
 It also brings benefits in terms of inducing compliance; developing countries 
that are unable to utilise or impose retaliation might transfer the right to countries that are 
interested in exercising the right against the Member concerned.
168
  
  
However, some commentators raise the question of why a country would buy the right to 
retaliate due to the fact that retaliation itself is harmful or problematic. Yenkong states it is hard 
to imagine that a country would want to buy trouble; it would be like shooting oneself in the 
foot.
169
 Malacrida suggests that the most probable reason for a Member to buy the right to 
retaliate is to provide temporary protection to its domestic interest groups against competition 
from the respondent state. However, since retaliation is only a temporary measure, the issue of 
lack of predictability emerges.
170
 
 
                                                             
164 Fukunaga, above ch 1, n 127, at 425. She suggests that collective retaliation is possible to be implemented when 
the obligation is owed to the international community as a whole or when it is established to protect the collective 
interest of the group of states. 
165 Malacrida, above ch 1, n 28, at 22.  
166 TN/DS/W/40, above ch 1, n 55. 
167 Diego-Fernandez, above n 3, at 241. 
168 Ibid. 
169
 Ngangjoh H Yenkong “World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Retaliatory Regime at the Tenth 
Anniversary of the Organization: Reshaping the “Last Resort” Against Non-Compliance” (2006) 40(2) JWT 365 at 
380-381. 
170 Malacrida, above ch 1, n 28, at 23.  
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C Financial/Monetary Compensation 
The idea of adding monetary or financial compensation as one of the dispute settlement 
remedies emerged a long time ago. In 1965, alongside the collective retaliation proposal, GATT 
developing country parties also submitted the monetary compensation proposal.
171
 Hudec 
describes the reason behind this proposal being that developing countries perceived that illegal 
measures not only caused serious harm but also hampered their development process, and thus 
the forward-looking remedies would not be sufficient to cover all the damage.
172
 Therefore, 
developing countries claimed that they were entitled to be awarded retroactive monetary 
compensation that would be paid to the government economic development program rather than 
to private interests.
173
    
 
Numerous commentators also suggest the application of financial or monetary 
compensation in the WTO dispute settlement remedies. Bronckers and van den Broek, for 
instance, strongly argue several advantages of monetary compensation, such as the fact that it is 
not trade restrictive, it helps to redress the injury of the country and/or private interests, it does 
not put a disproportionate burden on innocent bystanders, and it is a better device to induce 
compliance.
174
 Fukunaga also asserts one of the advantages of financial compensation is that it is 
permitted to be non-MFN compensation because its existence is not related to either import or 
export transactions or market access.
175
 At the time of writing, there were two cases where a deal 
related to financial matters was agreed upon by the parties to the dispute. Those cases are US – 
Copyright Act and US – Upland Cotton.  
  
There is no provision for financial compensation in the DSU; however, there is also 
nothing in the DSU that precludes compensation from being pecuniary. Furthermore, providing 
financial compensation as a temporary settlement should not lead to another violation of WTO 
                                                             
171 COM.TD/F/W/4, above n 13; see also Report of the Ad Hoc Group on Legal Amendments to the General 
Agreement GATT DOC COM.TD/F/4 (4 March 1966). 
172 Hudec “Broadening the Scope of Remedies”, above ch 1, n 14, at 383. However the monetary compensation 
proposal was not adopted. 
173 Ibid.  
174 Bronckers and van den Broek, above ch 1, n 24, at 110-111. 
175 Fukunaga, above ch 1, n 127, at 415. 
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law, or become another inconsistent measure that nullifies or impairs other states‟ benefit. We 
take as examples the two cases (US – Copyright Act and US – Upland Cotton) where the United 
States provides a compensatory arrangement in the form of a financial settlement. Although both 
cases relate to a temporary settlement in a monetary form, the nature of the monetary 
arrangements in both cases is different. The lump-sum payment made by the United States “to a 
fund to be set up by performing rights societies in the European Communities” in US – 
Copyright Act resembles financial compensation.
176
 The payment was made to compensate the 
royalty loss suffered by the European Communities intellectual property holders because of the 
application of Section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act.
177
 In contrast, the funds or 
payments scheme made by the United States in US – Upland Cotton may constitute subsidy. It is 
a direct transfer of funds from the United States government to Brazilian cotton industries.
178
 In 
this situation it seems that the United States is subsidising Brazil cotton farmers in order to allow 
itself to maintain its subsidy to the United States‟ domestic cotton farmers. Such a payment 
scheme is likely to be challenged by other cotton-exporting Members. 
 
Additionally, not all scholars are strong supporters of financial compensation. Mercurio, 
for example, argues that financial compensation is unpersuasive because only rich and developed 
countries can afford it, while poor countries are left in a helpless position. Further, it does not 
redress the injury of the aggrieved industry and it allows the continuance of a non-complying 
measure, and so forth.
179
 
 
 
 
                                                             
176 WT/DS160/23, above ch 1, n 16. 
177 Bryan Mercurio “Retaliatory Trade Measure in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Are There Really 
Alternative?” in James C Hartigan (ed) Trade Disputes and the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO: An 
Interdisciplinary Assessment (Emerald, 2009) 397 at 414-415 [“Retaliatory Trade Measure”].  
178 Randy Schnepf Brazil‟s WTO Case against the US Cotton Program (Congressional Research Service, 5 January 
2011) at 28. 
179 Bryan Mercurio “Why Retaliation Cannot Replace Trade Retaliation”, above n 8, at 328-335.  
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D Compulsory Compensation 
Since imposing retaliation may cause harm to retaliating states‟ economy and trade, 
several developing countries proposed compulsory compensation to an injured state instead of 
authorising retaliation. The proposal also suggested the inclusion of a temporary MFN waiver to 
developing countries in terms of compensation granted.
180
  
  
Fukunaga demonstrates her disagreement with compulsory compensation by stating that 
it is not a realistic option because compensation always depends on voluntary payment by the 
respondent Member concerned.
181
 
 
E Automatically Permitting Cross Retaliation for Developing Countries 
This proposal came from a group of developing countries that suggested that in the case 
of a developing country Member being the complainant against a developed country Member, 
the developing country Member should be permitted to seek retaliation in the sector of its choice 
(any or all sectors). In other words, developing country Members should not need to go through 
Article 22.6 arbitral proceedings to request cross-retaliation.
182
  
 
Malacrida comments that this proposal would minimise the cost of retaliation and make 
retaliation a more practical enforcement device for developing country Members.
183
 Although 
direct application of cross-retaliation would streamline procedures and reduce the cost of 
retaliation, the role of cross-retaliation as a practical enforcement device is still debatable.
184
    
                                                             
180 Dispute Settlement Body Special Session Contribution of Ecuador to the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the WTO – Communication from Ecuador WTO DOC TN/DS/W/9 (8 July 2002); Dispute 
Settlement Body Special Session Negotiations on Improvement and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding – Proposal by Mexico WTO DOC TN/DS/W/23 (4 November 2002). 
181 Fukunaga, above ch 1, n 127, at 412. 
182 Dispute Settlement Body Special Session Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Special and 
Differential Treatment for Developing Countries – Proposals on DSU by Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe WTO DOC TN/DS/W/19 (9 October 2002); Dispute 
Settlement Body Special Session Dispute Settlement Understanding Proposals: Legal Text – Communication from 
India on Behalf of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia WTO DOC TN/DS/W/47 
(11 February 2003). 
183 Malacrida, above ch 1, n 28, at 20-21. 
184 Subramanian and Watal, above ch 1, n 140; van den Broek, above ch 1, n 139, at 154-155. 
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F Retroactive Remedies 
The WTO remedies under the current DSU are prospective in nature. In other words, the 
amount of retaliation does not cover the entire period the inconsistent measure has been applied. 
Even though in the past, particularly in the safeguard and anti-dumping disputes, panels have 
granted retroactive remedies, it is an uncommon practice in WTO dispute settlement.  
 
Nevertheless, several Members, particularly the least-developed countries and the 
African group, support the inclusion of retroactive remedies in the dispute settlement system.
185
 
Mexico also proposed that the level of nullification or impairment be calculated from the date of 
the imposition of the measure or request for consultation or establishment of panels.
186
 
Commentators have brought forward various arguments concerning retroactive remedies. 
Yenkong argues that retroactive remedies may provide more pressure or incentive to comply.
187
 
Moreover, Plasai suggests the introduction of an interim relief measure; this measure can be 
deemed to be a de facto retroactive remedy.
188
 Plasai adds that even without interim relief, 
retroactive remedies are significant in restoring the complaining party to the situation that existed 
before the violation.
189
 Nonetheless, Grané suggests that for the time being, WTO remedies 
should be prospective in nature. He argues that although retroactive remedies may provide more 
often incentive to comply, they may also encroach too much on the sovereignty of a state, and if 
a state feels the “system has gone too far” and is no longer protecting their interests, a reason to 
opt-out from the system is created.
190
         
 
                                                             
185 Dispute Settlement Body Special Session Text for LDC Proposal on Dispute Settlement Understanding 
Negotiations – Communication from Haiti WTO DOC TN/DS/W/37 (22 January 2003) at para VII; TN/DS/W/42, 
above n 165, at para VIII.  
186 TN/DS/W/40, above ch 1, n 55, at 5. 
187 Yenkong, above n 169, at 16. 
188
 Virachai Plasai “Compliance and Remedies against Non-Compliance under the WTO System: Towards a More 
Balanced Regime for All Members” (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2007) at 20. 
189 Ibid, at 20. 
190 Grané, above n 50, at 769-770. 
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Summary 
Numerous studies highlight the shortcomings and harms of retaliation, such as the notion 
that a complaining state is “shooting itself in the foot” when imposing retaliatory measures on a 
violator state. Furthermore, the Article 22.6 case studies provided us with an insight into several 
significant implementation issues; for instance the fact that, even though authorisation to retaliate 
may be granted, complaining states are either not utilising their right, or when they impose their 
right to retaliate, non-compliance continues or the inconsistent measure remains.  
 
Because of these problems and shortcomings, retaliation is deemed ineffective in 
inducing compliance. Accordingly, several commentators, scholars and WTO Members have 
submitted various proposals to reduce the high cost of retaliation and to enhance its capacity as 
an effective enforcement device. However these proposals are also not free from criticisms and 
disapproval. These reform proposals were discussed in the third part of this chapter. 
 
The subsequent chapter aims to assess the question of the effectiveness of retaliation 
from another perspective or angle:  the purpose of retaliation. What the significance of 
identifying the purpose of retaliation is, what the purpose of retaliation is and how to find it are 
the main issues of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE QUEST TO DISCOVER THE PURPOSE(S) OF RETALIATION 
 
“In other words, it is not completely clear what role is to be played by the suspension of obligations in the DSU and 
a large part of the conceptual debate that took place in these proceedings could have been avoided if a clear "object 
and purpose" were identified.”1 
 
“Determining whether a trade sanction is effective requires specification of its objectives.”
2
 
 
Overview 
As pointed out in the previous chapters, some commentators believe that WTO retaliation 
works in a frustrating way in non-compliance disputes, because even after the retaliating state 
has imposed the authorised retaliatory measures, the inconsistent measures still remain. 
Therefore, they have argued that retaliation is ineffective because it does little or nothing to 
induce compliance.
3
 
 
The central point of this chapter lies in the question of effectiveness and the purpose(s) of 
retaliation. What does “effective” mean? Does effective have a similar meaning to compliance? 
When can an instrument be considered an effective device? Answering these questions is the first 
task in this chapter. The second task concerns the question of what the purpose(s) of retaliation 
is. Does retaliation aim solely on forcing the recalcitrant state to comply? Regardless of the 
answer, we know that the suspension has the effect of rebalancing mutual trade benefit.
4
  
 
                                                             
1 US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 12, at [6.4]. 
2 Charnovitz “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions”, above ch 2, n 17, at 808. 
3 McGivern, above ch 1, n 49, at 152-153; Udombana, above ch 1, n 39, at 1187-1188; Gabriel L Slater “The 
Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations under TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating against Technology-
Exporting Countries in the World Trade Organization” (2009) 97 Geo L J 1365 at 1371; Spandano, above ch 1, n 
140, at 512. Similarly, the arbitrators in the US – Gambling dispute stated that “the thrust of the „effectiveness‟ 
criterion empowers the party seeking suspension to ensure that the impact of that suspension is strong and has the 
desired result, namely to induce compliance”. Put differently, if the impact of the suspension (cross-retaliation) is 
not strong and does not induce compliance, in arbitrators‟ view, the suspension does not meet the “effectiveness” 
criterion. See US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 12, at [4.84]. 
4 A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, above ch 1, n 4, at 81. 
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As stated previously, one needs to identify the purpose of a rule or standard to measure 
the effectiveness of such a rule or standard. The examinations in this chapter demonstrate the 
relationship between the “effectiveness” and the “purpose”. Accordingly, in order to determine 
the effectiveness of WTO retaliation, we need to identify the purpose(s) of retaliation.    
 
To identify the purpose(s) of retaliation, this thesis undertakes the assessment through an 
interpretation of Article 22 of the DSU in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation. 
It assesses also remedies under public international law, academic debates and the decisions of 
arbitrators with regard to the purpose of retaliation.     
  
I Definition of Effectiveness and the Importance of the Purpose 
It is necessary to clarify the meaning of effectiveness in the first place, as sometimes 
people get confused by the terms compliance, implementation and effectiveness. Based on the 
Cambridge Advanced Learner‟s Dictionary, “effective” means successful or achieving the result 
that you want. In other words, something is effective if it is adequate to accomplish its purpose 
or objective.  
 
Effectiveness clearly is germane to the implementation and compliance discussion. In his 
foreword to a symposium on “implementation, compliance and effectiveness”, Alvarez states 
that these three are related but distinct phenomena.
5
 Jacobson and Brown Weiss provide clear 
definitions of the three. Implementation refers to a method or measures by which states 
transform international accords into acceptable rules within their domestic law. The authors 
explain that some accords are self-executing, that is, they do not need domestic legislation to 
become effective, but most accords need domestic legislation to become effective. Compliance 
goes beyond implementation. It refers to whether states abide by procedural and substantive 
international obligations, regardless of what their domestic legislation provides. Effectiveness is 
related, but not identical to compliance. It goes beyond implementation and compliance to 
                                                             
5 Jose E Alvarez “Foreword Why Nations Behave” (1998) 19 Mich J Int‟l L 19 at 304.  
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determine whether an international norm achieves its policy objective.
6
 Consequently, to respond 
to the question of whether retaliation is effective or not, it is necessary to identify the purpose of 
retaliation.  
 
A The Distinction between Compliance and Effectiveness  
People often assume that compliance can be equated with effectiveness. They perceive 
that a high level of compliance indicates the effectiveness of the rule, and vice versa. However, 
as previously stated, effectiveness goes beyond compliance, it is related but distinct. 
 
An international law and international relations scholar, Raustiala, provides a credible 
analysis relating to the complex relationship between them. He argues that a high level of 
compliance is not necessarily an indication of high effectiveness, and vice versa, both 
compliance and effectiveness must be distinguished from each other.
7
 When the rule or standard 
matches with the current practice in a given state, compliance is automatic, but it does not mean 
that the rule or standard is effective. Raustiala employs speed limits as an example. He explains 
that people could easily comply with, for example, a 65 miles per-hour speed limit, but if this 
speed limit did not reduce accidents, it cannot be claimed that it is effective. In contrast, although 
speed limits are very seldom complied with strictly, if it has sufficient influence on driving 
behaviour and reduces traffic accidents to a certain degree, it is an effective device.
8
 Raustiala 
concludes that it is the “effectiveness” that provides causal linkage between a legal rule and 
behaviour. Compliance does not speak about causality, it merely identifies the conformity 
between the rule and the behaviour.
9
  
 
                                                             
6 Harold K Jacobson and Edith B Weiss “A Framework for Analysis” in Edith B Weiss and Harold K Jacobson (eds) 
Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (MIT Press, 2000) 1 at 
4-5. See also Alvarez, above n 5. 
7 Kal Raustiala “Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation” (2000) 32 Case W Res J 
Int‟L L 387 at 388; Peter M Gerhart “Reflection: Beyond Compliance Theory – TRIPS as a Substantive Issue” 
(2000) 32 Case W Res J Int‟l Law 352 at 363. 
8 Raustiala, above n 7, at 395-396. 
9 Ibid, at 398. 
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B “Effectiveness” Definition Employed 
As described previously, “effectiveness” is a concept that specifies the degree to which a 
rule or standard or an instrument achieves its purpose. Therefore, Gerhart notes that it is 
necessary to specify the goal or goals the rule or standard is intending to achieve in order to 
assess its effectiveness.
10
     
 
Thomas Sebastian expressed a doubt that identifying the purpose would have a 
substantial implication in helping to resolve the issues faced by retaliation. He notes that the 
actual calculation method employed by the arbitrators does not rely on the purpose of retaliation, 
and that even identifying the purpose would not lighten the task of arbitrators as they would still 
encounter the practical difficulties of setting up the level of retaliation in accordance with the 
identified purpose.
11
 For instance, if retaliation has the purpose of inducing compliance, the 
arbitrators need information about the magnitude of the retaliatory measures that would be 
sufficient to force violator Members to comply, but this information is unattainable. Likewise, in 
order to rebalance the arbitrators need information about particular bilateral exchanges of 
promises between the violator and the retaliating state, and this information is not available 
simply because trade negotiations are not carried out in that type of bilateral bargain.
12
 
 
The uncertainty raised by Sebastian is reasonable. Nevertheless, this thesis pursues a 
different approach. Firstly, it does not agree with the concept that being “effective” means being 
able to eliminate all underlying problems. Secondly, it does not contend that identifying the 
purpose of retaliation is like finding a magic wand that would directly solve retaliation problems. 
Instead it argues that purpose is useful in assessing the degree of effectiveness. 
 
Articles written by Young and Levy, Raustiala and Gerhart are helpful in elucidating this 
standing point. They note that the most common understanding of effectiveness “solving the 
underlying problem”, presents a severe practical difficulty13 because “the factors that may 
                                                             
10
 Gerhart, above n 7, at 373. 
11 Sebastian “The Law of Permissible WTO Retaliation, above ch 2, n 44, at 124-125. 
12 Ibid, at 125. 
13 Raustiala, above n 7, at 393-394. 
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influence the solution to a complex international problem are myriad, and in many cases 
disentangling them is impossible”.14 Therefore, Raustiala states that many observers define 
effectiveness in more “modest” terms: as observable, desired changes in behaviour.15 
Effectiveness can be understood as the degree to which a rule induces desired changes in 
behaviour that further the goals or purposes of the rule.
16
 This thesis employs this meaning, and 
therefore, articulating the purpose of retaliation first is important so that effectiveness can be 
measured objectively.  
 
C  The Importance in Identifying the Purpose of Retaliation and the Quest to Discover it 
Arbitrators in US – Byrd Amendment observed that the conceptual debate relating to 
retaliation could have been avoided if the object and purpose of WTO retaliation were 
identified.
17
 As explained previously, Sebastian argues that even if the object and purpose were 
identified, they would not drastically simplify the task of arbitrators due to various practical 
difficulties that will still be encountered by the arbitrators.
18
 This thesis provides that identifying 
the purpose is not done to solve all problems but to measure and assess the degree of 
effectiveness objectively. Moreover, because the “effectiveness” and “purpose” have a close 
relationship, the discussion about the effectiveness in the previous part inevitably also involves 
the discussion about the purpose.    
 
To recap, why do we need to assess the purpose of retaliation? A rational explanation 
comes from international relations scholars, particularly those who are studying the compliance 
issue. They assert that identifying the purpose of a rule or standard is significant and helpful in 
determining the effectiveness of the rule or standard.
19
 Effectiveness is the degree to which a rule 
or standard achieves its policy objective. With this in mind, in order to determine the 
effectiveness of a rule or standard, one should determine first what the purpose or objective of 
                                                             
14 Ibid, at 394; Oran R Young and Marc A Levy “The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes” in 
Oran R Young (ed) The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanism (MIT Press, 1999) 1 at 4. 
15 Raustiala, above n 7, at 394. 
16
 Ibid, at 388; Gerhart, above n 7, at 363. 
17 US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 12, at [6.4]. 
18 Sebastian “The Law of Permissible WTO Retaliation”, above ch 2, n 44, at 124-125. 
19 Jacobson and Brown-Weiss, above n 6, at 4-5; Gerhart, above n 7, at 373. 
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that rule or standard is.
20
 States have an underlying purpose when they create and agree on 
international rules or treaties that will apply to them. As a result, to determine the effectiveness 
of such rules means to identify whether they achieve the underlying aim or intended purpose of 
the states. Furthermore, we can get a better picture about the importance of identifying the 
purpose from an analogy to a speed limit.
21
 Gerhart specifies that one would not know whether, 
for example, a 65-mile per hour speed limit was effective without knowing what its goal is. The 
answer would be different if the purpose of introducing this speed limit was to reduce speeding 
of 70 miles per hour, or for the purpose to reduce accidents or deaths, or to broaden the police‟s 
source of revenue.
22
  
 
As an initial conclusion, it is significant to identify or specify first what the purpose(s) 
WTO retaliation is, and what it intends to achieve before going on to the next question about 
whether or not WTO retaliation is effective. So, what is the purpose of WTO retaliation? Article 
22 of the DSU merely sets forth general principles and procedure that should be followed in 
order to perform retaliation. Put differently, the DSU does not state explicitly the purpose(s) of 
retaliation;
23
 and because of that, we need to look for it.  
 
In this thesis, I conduct the search firstly through the interpretation of Article 22 of the 
DSU in accordance with the customary rules of treaty interpretation. In so doing, I explain first 
the customary rules of interpretation and their relation to WTO law. Secondly, I look at the 
reference of the arbitrators to remedies under public international law. Finally, I carry out a 
search of the purpose of retaliation through academic writings and statements in Article 22.6 
arbitration reports. 
 
 
                                                             
20
 Gerhart, above n 7, at 363. 
21 Raustiala above n 7, at 395; Gerhart, above n 7, at 363. 
22 Gerhart, above n 7, at 373. 
23 See US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 12, at [6.2]. 
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II The First Quest: Interpretation of Article 22 of the DSU 
The drafters of WTO Agreements could not have foreseen all economic and political 
changes, as well as possible disputes that might arise in the future. As a result, the drafters may 
have deliberately used broad and ambiguous language in drafting the provisions.  The rules of 
interpretation play a significant role in clarifying ambiguities and filling the gaps in the WTO 
legal provisions. Article 3.2 of the DSU explicitly states that the existing WTO provisions are to 
be clarified “in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of international law.” So 
what are the customary rules of interpretation? And how do we conduct this interpretation? The 
subsequent part assesses these questions. Following the explanation of the customary rules of 
interpretation, I conduct the interpretation of Article 22 of the DSU. 
 
A The Customary Rules of Interpretation 
The customary rules of interpretation are mainly codified under Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), but these two articles do not exhaust the 
customary rules of interpretation of international law.
24
  
 
Article 31(1) of the VCLT provides that:  
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
 
While Article 31 sets up the primary rules of interpretation, Article 32 provides the 
supplementary means of interpretation such as the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of treaty conclusion.  
 
 
                                                             
24 Andrew D Mitchell Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 76 [Legal 
Principles in WTO Disputes]. 
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1 Good faith 
The good faith principle flows from the principle of pacta sunt servanda which provides 
that every treaty must be performed in good faith.
25
 It also correlates with the principle of 
“effective treaty interpretation”.26 The principle of “effective treaty interpretation” entails “the 
duty...to read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to all of them, 
harmoniously”.27 Therefore, the good faith principle requires interpreters to read a treaty or its 
particular sections as a whole and in such a way that would not “result in reducing whole clauses 
or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility”.28 Moreover, with regard to the good faith 
principle, the interpretation should not lead to an outcome that is deliberately absurd or 
unreasonable; therefore, the interpretation should be conducted in a reasonable, honest and fair 
way.
29
 
 
The WTO panels and the Appellate Body have applied, confirmed and made reference to 
the principle of good faith.
30
 For instance, the panel in US – Gambling considered good faith to 
be a “core principle of interpretation of the WTO Agreement”.31  
 
2 Ordinary meaning 
Article 31 of the VCLT requires the interpretation to be carried out in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning that is given to the terms of the treaty. The ordinary meaning is the normal 
or true meaning of the terms “taking into account all the consequences which normally and 
                                                             
25 Ibid, at 77; see also the VCLT, art 26. 
26 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services WTO DOC 
WT/DS285/R (2004) at [6.49] (Report of the WTO Panel) [US – Gambling (Panel)]. 
27 European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, Complaint by Brazil WTO DOC WT/DS266/R (2004) at 
[7.152] (Report of the WTO Panel). See also Asif H Qureshi Interpreting WTO Agreement: Problems and 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 13. 
28 Ibid, at [7.151]; Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports Certain Dairy Products WTO DOC 
WT/DS98/AB/R (1999) at [81] (Report of the Appellate Body); United States – Standard for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline WTO DOC WT/DS2/R (1996) at [12] (Report of the WTO Panel). 
29 US – Gambling (Panel), above n 26, at [6.49]; see also Ian McTaggarat Sinclair Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (Manchester University Press, 1984) at 120. 
30 United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” WTO DOC WT/DS108/AB/R (2000) at [101], 
[footnote 40] (Report of the Appellate Body). 
31 US – Gambling (Panel), above n 26, at [6.10]. 
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reasonably flow from the text.”32 Consequently, it is a textual approach to interpretation.33 
However, if the parties do not intend such terms to have their ordinary meaning, Article 31(4) of 
the VCLT provides that special meanings shall be given to the term.   
  
Though an interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning can be established in 
various ways, it has mainly led to the reference of dictionary definitions.
34
 Nonetheless, when 
having recourse to the dictionary definitions, the context of the term is also significant because 
the dictionary may provide more than one meaning that may displace or distract the real meaning 
of a particular term.
35
 The Appellate Body in US – Gambling, for instance, stated that: 36  
...dictionaries, alone, are not necessarily capable of resolving complex questions of 
interpretation, as they typically aim to catalogue all meanings of words – be those 
meanings common or rare, universal or specialized.  
 
Therefore, the reference to a dictionary meaning should also have regard to the context, 
and the object and purpose of a treaty.   
   
3 The context, and object and purpose 
Article 31(2) of the VCLT states that the context comprises the text, preamble and 
annexes; and any agreement and instrument made in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty; and that certain conditions shall also be taken into account. The context requires the text 
of the treaty to be read as a whole, and not that paragraphs, articles, sections, chapters or parts be 
read separately.
37
 
  
Furthermore, Article 31(1) of the VCLT asserts that interpretation should be in 
accordance with the object and purpose of a treaty. However, to identify the object and purpose 
                                                             
32 Sinclair, above n 29, at 121.  
33 Mitchell Legal Principles in WTO Disputes, above n 24, at 78. 
34 Ibid. 
35
 Qureshi, above n 27, at 17. 
36 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services WTO DOC 
WT/DS285/AB/R (2005) at [164] (Report of the Appellate Body) [US – Gambling (AB)]. 
37 Sinclair, above n 29, at 127. 
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is not a simple task. Sinclair argues that “most treaties have no single, undiluted object and 
purpose but a variety of differing and possibly conflicting objects and purposes.”38 The preamble 
is often utilised to discern this matter, because it normally stipulates the scope, background, 
object and purpose of a treaty. Thereby the preamble may contain both the context and the object 
and purpose of a treaty. The WTO panels and Appellate Body often refer to the preamble of 
various WTO agreements in the course of their interpretation.
39
 
 
4 Relevant rules of international law 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT provides that “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in relations between the parties” shall also be taken into consideration in interpreting a 
treaty. This means that the interpreters shall also take into account any relevant rules of 
international law.
40
 Nevertheless, the panel in EC – Biotech Products noted that they are not 
required to take into account other rules of international law that are not applicable to one of the 
parties to the dispute.
41
 The WTO panels and Appellate Body, with regard to Article 31(3)(c), 
have referred to a number of non-WTO rules in interpreting the WTO Agreement.
42
 For instance 
in US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body, in interpreting the chapeau of Article XX, made a reference 
to the principle of good faith and the doctrine of abus de droit as general principles of 
international law.
43
 McLachlan states that a textual analysis of Article 31(3)(c) demonstrates 
several aspects such as:
44
 
It refers to „rules of international law‟ thus emphasizing that the reference for 
interpretation purposes must be to rules of law, and not to broader principles or 
considerations which may not be firmly established as rules.  
 
                                                             
38 Ibid, at 130. 
39 Mitchell Legal Principles in WTO Disputes, above n 24, at 81. 
40 The panel in EC – Biotech Products stated that “Article 31(3)(c) mandates a treaty interpreter to take into account 
other rules of international law”, see European Communities – Measuring Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, WTO DOC WT/DS291/R; WT/DS291/R; WT/DS293/R (2006) at [7.49] (Report of the WTO 
Panel) [EC – Biotech Products (Panel)]. 
41 Ibid, at [7.71]. 
42
 Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, above ch 1, n 112, at 268. 
43 US – Shrimp (AB), above ch 1, n 3, at [158].  
44 Campbell McLachlan “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention” 
(2005) 54 Int‟l&Comp L Q 279 at 290. 
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Mitchell points out that this approach suggests that any principles of customary 
international law or general principles of law are excluded from Article 31(3)(c) because they are 
“principles” rather than “rules”.45 Customary international law is only included to the extent that 
it encompasses “rules” rather than “principles”.46   
 
The panel in EC – Biotech stated that “rules of international law” seems too broad to 
include:
47
 
...all generally accepted sources of public international law, that is to say, (i) international 
conventions (treaties), (ii) international custom (customary international law), and (iii) 
the recognized general principles of law.  
 
However, in the panel‟s view, treaties and all customary international law are within the 
“rules of international law”. The panel also referred to the Appellate Body decision in US –  
Shrimp that although the recognised general principles of law are less self-evident from the text 
of Article 31(3)(c), such principles are to be taken into account in the interpretation of WTO 
provisions.
48
 It seems from this decision that panels and the Appellate Body do not provide a 
clear distinction between “rules” and “principles”. Mitchell attempts to bridge these two 
approaches by stating that Article 31(3)(c) provides a legal basis for panels and the Appellate 
Body to interpret WTO provisions in the light of both principles of customary international law 
and the general principles of law to the extent that such principles are reflected in the “rules of 
international law”.49   
 
5 Supplementary means of interpretation 
Article 32 of the VCLT states that recourse to supplementary means of interpretation is 
permitted either “to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31” or when 
the interpretation under Article 31 “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure” or “leads to a 
                                                             
45 Mitchell Legal Principles in WTO Disputes, above n 24, at 83. 
46
 Ibid. 
47 EC – Biotech Products (Panel), above n 40, at [7.67]. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Mitchell Legal Principles in WTO Disputes, above n 24, at 84. 
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result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable”. Accordingly, recourse to supplementary 
means of interpretation is not mandatory.
50
 Even though Article 32 stipulates that supplementary 
means includes the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, it does 
not define those supplementary materials exhaustively.
51
 In a number of cases, panels and the 
Appellate Body have utilised several documents from various negotiating rounds to confirm the 
meaning from the application of Article 31.
52
  
  
A Contracting In: The Customary Rules of Interpretation 
Not only does the DSU recognise the customary rules of interpretation, but also the 
panels and the Appellate Body often utilise the customary rules of interpretation of international 
law in interpreting the WTO treaty. Although not all WTO Members are parties to the Vienna 
Convention, the rules of interpretation still apply for two reasons. Firstly, the rules of 
interpretation retain the status of customary international law, and secondly, the WTO itself 
verifies these customary rules of interpretation of international law.  
 
Panels and the Appellate Body in a number of cases have confirmed the customary status 
of treaty interpretation stipulated in Article 31 and 32 of the VCLT. For instance, the Appellate 
Body in US – Gasoline provided that Article 31(1) of the VCLT “had attained the status of a rule 
of customary or general international law”.53 The Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages also confirmed that Article 32, supplementary means of interpretation, means the 
customary rules of international law.
54
  
 
Furthermore, Article 3.2 of the DSU explicitly makes reference to the rules of 
interpretation, and panels and the Appellate Body have deliberately engaged in how to apply 
                                                             
50 Qureshi, above n 27, at 24. 
51 The Appellate Body in EC – Computer Equipment included the historical background examination with regard to 
the circumstances of the conclusion of a treaty. See European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain 
Computer Equipment WTO DOC WT/DS62/AB/R WT/DS67/AB/R WT/DS68/AB/R (1998) at [86] (Report of the 
Appellate Body) [EC – Computer Equipment (AB)]; Qureshi, above n 27, at 24. 
52 For instance, the Appellate Body in US – Gambling noted recourse to preparatory work as supplementary means 
of interpretation. See US – Gambling (AB), above n 36, at [236]; Mitchell Legal Principles in WTO Disputes, above 
n 24, at 85. 
53 US – Gasoline (AB), above ch 1, n 120, at [869]. 
54 Japan – Alcohol Beverages (AB), above ch 1, n 132, at 10. 
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these rules of interpretation in the correct way.
55
 For instance, the Appellate Body in India – 
Patents (US) provided that the principles of treaty interpretation “neither require nor condone the 
imputation into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts 
that were not intended”.56 In EC – Chicken Classifications, the panel understood that:57  
The primary purpose of treaty interpretation is to identify the common intention of the 
parties and that the rule contained in Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have 
been developed to help assessing, in objective terms, what was or what could have been 
the common intention of the parties to a treaty.  
 
Therefore, interpretation is not about creating new rules but merely about providing 
meaning to rules of law; consequently, interpretations contra legem are not permitted.
58
 
 
In sum, the rules of treaty interpretation are rules of international law, which panels and 
the Appellate Body have made reference to in several cases when dealing with WTO treaty 
interpretation.  
 
B Interpretation of Article 22 of the DSU in Accordance with the Customary Rules of 
Interpretation 
The panel in Japan – Alcohol stated that the starting point of an interpretation of an 
international treaty is the wording of the treaty.
59
 The panel explained that the wording should be 
interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole; 
subsequent practice and agreements should be also taken into account.
60
  
 
                                                             
55 Anja Lindroos and Michael Mehling “Dispelling the Chimera of „Self-Contained Regimes‟ International Law and 
the WTO” (2006) 16(5) EJIL 857 at 868. 
56 India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Agricultural Chemical Products WTO DOC WT/DS50/AB/R 
(1998) at [45] (Report of the Appellate Body).  
57 European Communities – Custom Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cut (Complaint by Thailand) WTO 
DOC WT/DS286/R (2005) at [7.94] (Report of the WTO Panel). 
58 Joost Pauwelyn “The Role of Public International Law in the WTO” 95 Am J Int‟l L (2001) 535 at 554 [“The 
Role of Public International Law”] at 573. 
59 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages WTO DOC WT/DS8/R WT/DS10/R WT/DS11/R (1996) at [6.9] (Report 
of the WTO Panel). 
60 Ibid. 
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1 Multiple purposes from the context of Article 22 of the DSU 
As stated previously, the text of Article 22 of the DSU does not state expressly the 
purpose(s) of retaliation. Therefore, it is necessary to interpret the wording of Article 22 in its 
context and in the light of the objective and the purpose to have an appropriate legal analysis. 
There are several portions of the wordings of Article 22 that may indicate the purpose of 
retaliation. They are as follows: 
 
(a) The suspension “shall be temporary” under Articles 22.1 and 22.8 of the DSU  
There are two paragraphs under Article 22 of the DSU that state the temporary nature of 
retaliation. Firstly, paragraph 1 as the general provision provides that both compensation and the 
suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary measures. Secondly, paragraph 8 
particularly states that the suspension of concessions shall be temporary.  
 
Temporary in nature signals one purpose of retaliation: inducing compliance. The United 
States in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) stated that the temporary nature indicates 
that the purpose of retaliation/countermeasures is to induce compliance. The United States‟ 
statement was confirmed subsequently by the arbitrators.
61
 Article 22.1 adds another sentence 
that also specifies the temporary nature of retaliation: neither compensation nor the suspension is 
preferred to full implementation of a recommendation.
62
 This sentence clearly establishes a 
connection between the temporary nature of retaliation and pending compliance.
63
 Therefore one 
purpose that retaliation needs to achieve is inducing compliance.      
 
In short, the temporary nature of suspension of concessions indicates that the DSU has a 
strong preference for compliance and that retaliation is an alternative measure applied until 
compliance occurs.
64
  
                                                             
61 EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), above ch 1, n 12, at [6.3]. 
62 The DSU, art 22.1.  
63
 The arbitrators in Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada) provided that “Article 22.1 of the DSU is 
particularly clear as to the temporary nature of suspensions of concessions or other obligations, pending 
compliance.” See Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada), above ch 1, n 13, at [3.105].  
64 Jackson “To Comply or Option to „Buy-Out‟”, above ch 1, n 57, at 116. 
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(b) The level of the suspension “shall be equivalent” to the level of the nullification 
or impairment under Article 22.4 of the DSU  
 The arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) defined the ordinary 
meaning of the word “equivalence” as follows: “equal in value, significant or meaning”, “having 
the same effect”, “having the same relative position or function”, “corresponding to”, 
“something equal in value or worth”, also “something tantamount or virtually identical”.65 The 
arbitrators also emphasised that the concept of “equivalence” embodied in Article 22.4 of the 
DSU means that retaliation cannot be imposed in a punitive manner.
66
 
  
Non-punitive or limited sanction seems to be incompatible with the purpose of inducing 
compliance; because when non-compliance occurs, obviously a tougher sanction is needed in 
order to have the effect of inducing compliance. The arbitrators in US – Byrd Amendment 
(Article 22.6 – US) also considered this inconsistency between the purpose of inducing 
compliance and the equivalent level requirement. They stated that:
67
  
By relying on „inducing compliance‟ as the benchmark for selection of the most 
appropriate approach we also run the risk of losing sight of the requirement of Article 
22.4 that the level of suspension be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. 
 
The wording of equivalent under Article 22.4 indicates retaliation has more a 
compensatory, rather than punitive, nature.
68
 By merely compensatory in nature, Article 22.4 
acknowledges another competing purpose of retaliation that is to restore the balance of 
concessions resulting from the continuation of a non-compliance measure, or in short, the 
purpose of rebalancing. 
 
 
 
                                                             
65
 EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), above ch 1, n 12, at [4.1]. 
66 Ibid, at [6.3]. See also US – 1916 Act (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 12, at [5.8].  
67 US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 12, at [3.74]. 
68 Ibid, at [6.3]. See also Schwartz and Sykes, above ch 1, n 64, at S189. 
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(i) “Equivalent” standard in relation to the “appropriate” standard under the SCM 
Agreement  
The terms “equivalent” and “appropriate” should not be treated as excessively 
distinctively.  The word “equivalent” refers to the basic character of trade concessions that is 
reciprocal. Reciprocity is one of the basic principles in the WTO. The word “appropriate” refers 
to the character of export subsidies and it is also to differentiate prohibited from actionable 
subsidies. Export subsidies are prohibited regardless of the adverse effects described in Article 5, 
whereas domestic subsidies require the existence of the adverse effects to be actionable. 
Moreover, because domestic subsidies are only illegal to the extent they cause those stated 
adverse effects, the adverse effect should be regarded as the upper limit on countermeasures.
69
 
Therefore, the countermeasures should be commensurate with the degree and nature of the 
adverse effects.
70
 In contrast, prohibited subsidies are illegal regardless of the existence of the 
adverse effects. In the absence of adverse effects as a ceiling, the countermeasures should be 
appropriate. What is “appropriate”? Footnotes 9 and 10 of the SCM Agreement only explain that 
it is “not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the 
subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited.”  
 
The SCM Agreement and other WTO provisions say nothing about the proportionality of 
countermeasures. Nonetheless, the ILC Draft Articles provide the benchmark of proportionality. 
Article 51 of the ILC Draft Articles states that “[c]ountermeasures must be commensurate with 
the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and its 
harmful effects on the injured party.” The commentary of Article 51 further explains that:71 
…disproportionate measure may well be judged not to have been necessary to induce the 
responsible state to comply with its obligations but to have had a punitive aim and to fall 
outside the purpose of countermeasures enunciated in article 49.   
 
In other words, countermeasures are not proportional if they are aimed to be punitive.  
                                                             
69 Howse and Neven, above ch 1, n 103, at 111. 
70 The SCM Agreement, art 7.9. 
71 The ILC Draft Articles, commentary (7) art 51. 
94 
 
Moreover, if we look back at the negotiating history of the ITO,
72
 we can find 
interpretative notes which explained that the word “appropriate” should be read as providing 
relief no more than compensation,
73
 and that “the nature of the relief to be granted is 
compensatory and not punitive.”74 Moreover, in the only GATT case regarding suspension, the 
Working Party, in determining the “appropriate” level of suspension, provided that the level of 
suspension was determined “having regard to its equivalence to the impairment suffered by the 
Netherlands as a result of the United States restrictions”.75  
 
Nonetheless, in explaining the relationship between “appropriate” (Article XXIII) and 
“substantially equivalent” (Article XIX and XXVIII), the GATT Legal Adviser stated that the 
wording “appropriate created a wider leeway in calculating retaliatory measures in Article XXIII 
than in Article XIX or XXVIII.
76
 Moreover, the “substantially equivalent” standard seems less 
strict than the “equivalent” standard under Article 22.4 of the DSU.77   
 
In the light of the above assessment, it appears that the “appropriate” level of 
countermeasure is more flexible than the “equivalent” standard. The “appropriate” 
countermeasures might fall within the “equivalent” level or go beyond that. Nonetheless, the 
“appropriateness” has the upper ceiling that is the non-punitive level.  
 
 
                                                             
72 See subsequent part below (interpretation of Article 22 of the DSU). 
73 Sub-Comittee on chapter VIII (Settlemnt of differences-interpretation) Notes of the Seventeenth Meeting E/Conf. 
2/C.6/W.102 (16 February 1948).  
74 Havana Conference Reports of the Committee and Principal Sub-Committees UN Doc ICITO1/8 (September 
1948) at 155.  
75
 US – Suspension of Obligations, above ch 2, n 20, at [2].  
76 GATT Council Minutes of Meeting – Held in the Center William Rappard on 4 May 1988 GATT DOC C/M/220 
(8 June 1988) at 35. 
77 Pauwelyn “Calculation and Design of Trade Retaliation”, above ch 1, n 60, at 45. 
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(c) The suspension shall only be applied until the inconsistent measure “has been 
removed” or the violator member “provides a solution to the nullification” or “a 
mutually satisfactory solution is reached” under Article 22.8 of the DSU  
Article 22.8 provides three situations in which retaliatory measures have to be terminated. 
They are: the removal of the inconsistent measure, a solution to the nullification or impairment 
provided, or a mutually satisfactory solution reached. Article 22.8 demonstrates not only when 
retaliatory measures have to be terminated but also what retaliation can achieve in the end. Put 
differently, Article 22.8 also reflects the goal that retaliation intends to pursue.   
 
The removal of the inconsistent measure clearly supports the purpose of inducing 
compliance. Nonetheless, Article 22.8 does not stop its provision with the wording of removal of 
inconsistent measure, but it provides further other goals that retaliation can achieve that are a 
solution to the nullification or impairment, or a mutually satisfactory solution.
78
 A mutually 
agreed solution is one form of settlement provided for in the DSU,
79
 and therefore it is an 
integral part of the WTO dispute settlement system.   
 
In general, the notion that the wording and the text in Article 22 specifies several 
purposes that retaliation might serve is also supported by an Article 22.6 arbitration decision. 
The arbitrators in US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US) reached a similar conclusion when 
they questioned whether inducing compliance was the only objective pursued by the DSU. The 
arbitrators stated that “we are not persuaded that the object purpose of suspension of concessions 
or other obligations pursuant to Article 22 would be exclusively to induce compliance.”  
 
 
 
                                                             
78 For efficiency reason, I consider a solution to the nullification or impairment as a part of mutually satisfactory 
solution. 
79 The DSU, art 3.7. 
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2 Multiple purposes in the light of the object and purpose of WTO dispute settlement  
According to the customary rules of interpretation, a provision should be interpreted not 
only in accordance with the wording taken in their context but also in light of the object and 
purpose of the agreement. The panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act expressed the importance of 
“text, context, and object and purpose” elements and stated that:80 
...the elements referred to in Article 31 – text, context and object-and-purpose as well as 
good faith – are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence 
of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. 
 
Therefore, we must interpret the wording of Article 22 not only from the context, but also 
in the light of the object and purpose of WTO dispute settlement. Article 3.2 of the DSU states 
that the central objective of the WTO dispute settlement is to provide security and predictability 
to the multilateral trading system. The Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II stated 
the “security and predictability” sought for in the multilateral trading system by the Members 
will be achieved through the establishment of the dispute settlement system.
81
 Moreover, the 
panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act noted the importance of the concept of “security and 
predictability” and provided that:82 
...the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and 
predictability of the multilateral trading system...DSU provisions must, thus, be 
interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most 
effectively enhance it.  
 
In protecting the “security and predictability”, firstly the object and purpose of the 
dispute settlement is to settle disputes through multilateral processes (recourse to and abiding by 
the rules and procedures of the DSU), and not through unilateral action.
83
 Secondly, the aim of 
                                                             
80 United States – Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 WTO DOC WT/DS152/R (1999) at [7.22] (Report of 
the WTO Panel) [US – Section 301 Trade Act (Panel)]. 
81 Japan – Alcohol Beverages (AB), above ch 1 n 132, at [31]. 
82 US – Section 301 Trade Act (Panel), above n 80, at [7.75]. 
83 The DSU, art 23. 
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the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute (settlement through 
a mutually acceptable solution).
84
 
 
(a) Security and predictability: settlement of disputes through multilateral procedures 
and not through unilateral action  
Article 23 of the DSU requires all Members to settle disputes through multilateral 
procedures, and prohibits unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. In US – Section 
301 Trade Act the panel held that Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes “a general duty of a dual 
nature.”85 It imposes a duty on all Members to use the multilateral process set out in the DSU 
when they seek to redress a WTO inconsistency, and because of that, recourse to any other 
system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement is excluded.
86
 Prohibition on making 
unilateral determinations under Article 23.2(a) is often read together with Article 23.1.
87
 
Furthermore, the prohibition on taking unilateral action is also applied to the imposition of 
retaliatory measures.
88
 
 
The suspension of concessions under Article 22 is a bilateral action under the auspices of 
a multilateral procedure. This means that even though the suspension is a member-to-member 
retaliation or countermeasure, it cannot be imposed unilaterally. The WTO provides the injured 
Member with the right to retaliate against the violator Member in the case of non-
implementation, but in doing so, it cannot be imposed in an arbitrary way. Members are 
prohibited from imposing retaliation without a relevant DSB authorisation. This obligation is 
stipulated explicitly in Articles 22.6 and 23.2(c), but not in Article 3.7 of the DSU. Nonetheless, 
in US – Certain EC Products the Appellate Body considered that:89  
                                                             
84 Ibid, art 3.7. 
85 US – Section 301 Trade Act (Panel), above n 80, at [7.43]. 
86 Ibid. 
87
 Ibid at [7.59]. 
88 The DSU, art 23.2(c).  
89 United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities WTO DOC 
WT/DS165/AB/R (2000) at [120] (Report of the Appellate Body) [US – Certain EC Products (AB)].  
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...if a Member has acted in breach of Articles 22.6 and 23.2(c) of the DSU, that Member 
has also, in view of the nature and content of Article 3.7, last sentence, necessarily acted 
contrary to the latter provision.      
 
Consequently, regardless of their intended purpose(s) retaliatory measures should not be 
imposed contrary to the object and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system to protect 
“security and predictability” through the multilateral processes. For instance, a state cannot 
impose retaliation unilaterally even though such retaliatory measures are intended to force the 
violator state to bring its inconsistent measures into conformity. Put differently, whatever 
purposes WTO retaliation intends to achieve, such purpose or purposes should not transform 
retaliation into an arbitrary measure.  
 
(b) Security and predictability: settlement of disputes through a positive solution  
Articles 3.2 and 3.7 tell us that the WTO dispute settlement system serves two main 
functions to protect security and predictability. Firstly is an adjudication function that is “to 
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements” and “to clarify 
the existing provisions”. Secondly is a settlement function to “secure a positive solution to a 
dispute”. 
 
Interestingly, Article 3.7 states explicitly that “a solution mutually acceptable to the 
parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.” This 
means that the main objective of WTO dispute settlement system is not to make rulings; rather 
the priority is to settle disputes, preferably through a mutually agreed solution.
90
     
 
In US – Shirts and Blouses, the Appellate Body by referring to Article 3.7 clarified that 
the basic aim of dispute settlement in the WTO is to settle disputes.
91
 The Appellate Body 
                                                             
90 A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, above ch 1, n 4, at 6. 
91 United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India WTO DOC 
WT/DS33/AB/R (1997) at [19] (Report of the Appellate Body) [US – Shirts and Blouses (AB)].  
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explained further that the aim is affirmed elsewhere in the DSU, for example Article 3.4 of the 
DSU.
92
 Article 3.4 of the DSU states that: 
Recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory 
settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this 
Understanding and under the covered agreements. 
 
There are three points that highlight settlement as the primary aim of dispute settlement. 
Firstly, the WTO requires consultation as the first stage of any dispute. Secondly, only when the 
consultation fails to settle the dispute, can parties enter the adjudication stage by requesting the 
establishment of a panel. Thirdly, bilateral settlement always remains possible or open to the 
parties at any stage.
93
  
 
Retaliation is part of the WTO dispute settlement system. It is the last resort of remedy 
provided by the DSU to the Members invoking the dispute settlement procedure. As explained 
previously, WTO dispute settlement has the function of adjudication and settlement, and the 
primary purpose is to settle the disputes. This broader purpose of WTO dispute settlement 
provides retaliation with the possibility to achieve more than one goal. This also explains why 
Article 22.8 provides three situations in which retaliation should be terminated, because Article 
22.8 sustains the two functions (adjudication and settlement) of WTO dispute settlement. The 
wording of “measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed” 
maintains the adjudication function whereas “a solution to the nullification” and “a mutually 
satisfactory solution” support the settlement function.   
 
In the end, there are two main conclusions with regard to the interpretation of the purpose 
of retaliation in the light of the object and purpose of WTO dispute settlement. Firstly, security 
and predictability provides a limitation on retaliation so that it might not become an arbitrary 
measure even in pursuing its purposes. Secondly, in light of the object and purpose of WTO 
dispute settlement, retaliation can have more than one purpose to pursue.  
                                                             
92 Ibid.  
93 The DSU, arts 3.7 and 11. See also A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, above ch 1, n 4, at 6. 
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3 The assessment of remedies provisions under the ITO Charter and the GATT 1947 as 
supplementary means of interpretation 
Supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the VCLT has been employed 
in fewer WTO cases than Article 31. The panels and Appellate Body in several cases referred to 
negotiating history, custom classification practice, and working documents of the GATT 
Secretariat as supplementary means of interpretation.
94
 There is no mandatory requirement to 
make a reference or resort to supplementary means of interpretation. It is not the intention of this 
thesis to enter into the debate about the importance of resorting to supplementary means of 
interpretation. The assessment of the remedies provisions under the ITO Charter and the GATT 
1947 aims to confirm the meaning of interpretation of Article 22 of the DSU in accordance with 
Article 31 of the VCLT (text, context, object and purpose) that have been discussed above.   
  
(a) “Settlement of Differences” provision under the ITO Charter 
In the post World War II era, the International Trade Organisation (ITO) was envisioned 
as the international organisation that regulated and supervised international trade.
95
 The proposal 
to establish an international trade organisation was initiated by the United States in 1945. 
Nonetheless, the proposal was considered too ambitious for that time and 5 years later the United 
States Department announced that the ITO was dead, killed by the US Congress.
96
  
 
The ITO Charter (Havana Charter) provided provisions to resolve disputes. Articles 92-
97 of the Havana Charter, entitled “Settlement of Differences”, governed dispute resolution 
under the ITO.
97
 The Provisions provide a four-step procedure for dealing with disputes. Firstly, 
parties to a dispute could resolve that dispute or matter through direct consultation, or if they 
                                                             
94 United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies WTO DOC WT/DS194/R (2001) at [8.64] 
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wished to do so, they could submit the dispute to arbitration upon terms agreed between them.
98
 
If the dispute was not satisfactorily resolved, it could be referred to the Executive Board.
99
 
Subsequently, the decision of the Executive Board could be brought before the Conference. The 
Conference could confirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the Executive Board, and in serious 
cases, it could release the injured or affected Member(s) on a compensatory basis from 
obligations or the grant of concessions to any other Member(s).
100
 Finally, the decision of the 
Conference could be also referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a review.
101
    
 
During the negotiations of the ITO Charter, the government delegations proposed diverse 
approaches related to the bringing of disputes before the ICJ. The United States delegations 
required “the Conference consent” in order to bring a case to the ICJ.102 The United States 
delegations explained the reasons behind the introduction of these words were to avoid a 
crowded ICJ docket and to maintain the prestige of the ITO.
103
 Meanwhile, the delegates of the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Cuba and Australia argued that the right of appeal to the ICJ should not 
be restricted by the Conference‟s consent.104 The Netherlands delegation, for instance, noted that 
as the representatives of their governments, the decisions of the Conference might be political 
rather than objective.
105
 The United Kingdom delegation subsequently submitted a memorandum 
arguing that the Organisation must be expert in its own area and this could not occur if all its 
disputes were subject to appeal to an outside body.
106
 The United Kingdom delegation raised a 
concern regarding the danger of the Organisation‟s affairs being dealt with too legalistically, 
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E/PC/T/C.6/W.77 (14 February 1947) at 1. 
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arguing that the provisions in the Charter require “the exercise of discretion and economic 
judgement rather than precise interpretation of the terms of Charter.”107  
 
Hudec writes that to solve this consent issue, it was agreed that a legal question could be 
appealed before the ICJ as a matter of right and such appeals would take the form of a request by 
the ITO itself to the ICJ for an advisory opinion.
108
 Consequently, the enforcement would still be 
in the jurisdiction of the ITO.
109
 
 
(b) “Appropriate and compensatory” remedy provision under the ITO Charter  
 The significant work on the ITO remedy provisions was started in the Second Session of 
the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
110
 The 
First Session of the Preparatory Committee was held in London from 15 October to 26 
November 1946. Its report was distributed as document E/PC/T/33. The provision concerning the 
settlement of disputes in the Report of the First Session did not govern any remedy issue.
111
 In 
the Report of the Second Session, the Preparatory Committee provided the power to authorise 
the suspension of obligations in addition to the power to give a ruling on the matter to the 
Conference.
112
  
 
As regards the suspension of obligations, the drafting subcommittee on Chapter VIII 
dealt with the issue on whether suspension was to serve as a sanction, or compensation for the 
injury suffered.
113
 While in the subcommittee‟s ninth meeting, some delegations suggested that 
both sanction and compensation for nullification or impairment of the benefit be included,
114
 the 
Report submitted by the Working Party concerning Articles 89 and 90 of the Chapter VIII, 
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provided the text that recommended “appropriate and compensatory” to the benefit of which has 
been nullified or impaired.
115
 Interpretative notes of the text proposed by the Working Party 
explained that “appropriate” should be read to provide a relief no more than compensation.116 
Subsequently in the Reports of the Havana Conference, the Committee described more clearly 
the nature of suspension of obligations by stating that “the text provides that the nature of the 
relief to be granted is compensatory and not punitive.”117 
  
In his assessment of the ITO preparatory work, Hudec makes one interesting point that, 
although the Working Party agreed that the remedy should be “appropriate and compensatory‟; 
these words were not included in the Charter itself. Nevertheless, it only stated “in the form of an 
ambiguous text plus interpretative note.”118 In Hudec‟s view, the reason behind this drafting 
decision was to strike a balance between two issues: “a duty to adhere to the rules” and “a duty 
to pay for damage done” (limitation to the sanction).119 Hudec notes that the draftsmen 
encountered the difficult problem that on the one hand they wanted the ITO legal obligations to 
be treated and enforced effectively, but on the other hand, they were unwilling to endorse 
punitive sanction remedies due to the fact that governments would not accept the notion of being 
punished by an international authority.
120
 Claire Wilcox has a similar point of view to Hudec. 
Wilcox states that:
121
 
Such release [suspension of obligations or concessions] is regarded as a method of 
restoring a balance of benefits and obligations...it is nowhere described as a penalty to be 
imposed on members who may violate their obligations or as a sanction to insure that 
these obligations will be observed.  
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However, Wilcox also adds that “even though it is not so regarded, it will operate in fact 
as a sanction and a penalty”.122  
 
(c) Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1947 
The only dispute settlement provisions under GATT 1947 were Articles XXII and XXIII. 
The limited nature of these procedural rules was due to the fact that it was anticipated that the 
ITO Charter, which contained detailed dispute settlement rules, would soon apply.
123
 A 
nullification and impairment provision itself was copied verbatim from the Geneva draft of the 
ITO Charter.
124
 The ITO was abandoned in 1950 after the United States failed to ratify it; 
therefore these two provisions have underpinned the GATT dispute settlement system for nearly 
50 years. Article XXII.1 simply requires contracting parties to accord sympathetic consideration 
and afford adequate opportunity for consultation. If the matter is not resolved through 
consultation under the first paragraph, Article XXII.2 provides that the contracting parties acting 
together, at the request of a contracting party, consult with other parties concerning the matter. 
 
Moreover, Article XXIII.1 provides pre-retaliation consultation procedures.
125
 If the 
consultation under Article XXIII.1 fails and the circumstances are serious enough, Article 
XXIII.2 justifies the contracting parties in authorising the complaining party to suspend the tariff 
concessions or other GATT obligations.  
 
(d) “Appropriate” remedy provision under the General Agreement  
Akin to the ITO Charter, the General Agreement also contains the provisions of 
remedies. Nonetheless, whereas the ITO Charter provided the Conference with the authority to 
release the injured Member from obligations to any other Member in the case of the existence of 
nullification or impairment;
126
 in the GATT, it is the Contracting Parties acting together in 
                                                             
122 Ibid. 
123 Palmeter and Mavroidis, above ch 1, n 18, at 7. 
124
 Robert E Hudec The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (2nd ed, Butterworth Legal Publishers, 
1990) at 52 [The GATT Legal System]. 
125 Dam, above ch 2, n 1, at 353. 
126 The Havana Charter, art 95.3. 
105 
 
authorising an injured state to suspend the application of such concessions or other obligations to 
any other contracting party.
127
  
 
Another difference in the remedies provisions in the text of the ITO Charter and the 
General Agreement is that while the ITO Charter provided such suspension should be 
“appropriate and compensatory” to the benefit which has been nullified or impaired, the General 
Agreement only specified the term “appropriate”.128 Neither the GATT nor the ITO Charter 
provided the terms “retaliation” or “sanction”.129  What does “appropriate” mean? Does it go 
beyond compensatory remedy? There is only one case in the GATT dispute settlement, where 
the “appropriate” standard was observed, that is the United States dairy quota case. Interestingly 
the Chairman of the Working Party of the case stated that in his view:
130
  
...the test of appropriateness under Article XXIII was the different concept from mere 
reasonableness, in that account must be taken of the desirability of limiting such action to 
the best calculated in the circumstances to achieve the objective.  
 
So the word “appropriateness” meant more than just “reasonable”.131 In the US – 
Suspension of Obligations case, when the Working Party was instructed by contracting parties to 
investigate the appropriateness of the measure which the Netherlands government proposed to 
take, it provided that the level of suspension was determined “having regard to its equivalence to 
the impairment suffered by the Netherlands as a result of the United States restrictions”.132 
 
From the above assessments we can conclude that, even though in the drafting process 
several delegations proposed the insertion of punitive sanctions in the text provisions, neither the 
ITO Charter nor the GATT 1947 provisions provide a punitive punishment for non-compliance. 
Non-punitive sanctions sustain the character of “settlement of disputes through a positive 
                                                             
127 The GATT 1947, art XXIII.2. 
128 Charnovitz “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions”, above ch 2, n 17, at 801. 
129 Ibid. 
130
 Summary Record of the Seventeenth Meeting held at the Palais des Nations Geneva on Monday 10 October 1952 
at 10am GATT DOC SR 7/17 (18 November 1952).  
131 Hudec The GATT Legal System above n 124, at 196. 
132 US – Suspension of Obligations, above ch 2, n 20, at [2].  
106 
 
solution”. Put differently, the aim of dispute settlement either in the ITO or the GATT or the 
WTO is not to punish the violator but to settle the disputes.  
 
Summary 
In the first quest for the purpose of retaliation, I interpreted Article 22 of the DSU in 
accordance with the customary rules of treaty interpretation. The rules of treaty interpretation 
require the wording to be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose 
of the treaty as a whole. I emphasised several potions of the wording in Article 22 that may 
indicate the purpose of retaliation. Firstly, the wording “shall be temporary” in Article 22.1 
indicates the purpose of inducing compliance. Secondly, the wording of equivalent under Article 
22.4 reflects the purpose of rebalancing. Thirdly, the wording under Article 22.8 demonstrates 
other purposes that retaliation may achieve: a solution to the nullification or impairment, or a 
mutually satisfactory solution. I also assessed the term “appropriateness” under the SCM 
Agreement and argued that both the standard of “equivalence” and “appropriateness” should not 
be treated excessively distinctive.  
  
Subsequently, I interpreted the wording and the context of Article 22 in the light of the 
object and the purpose of WTO dispute settlement. Article 3.2 of the DSU highlights “security 
and predictability” as the central objective of the WTO dispute settlement. In protecting the 
“security and predictability”, the primary object and purpose of WTO dispute settlement is to 
settle disputes through multilateral process and to secure a positive solution to a dispute. 
Accordingly, I provided two main conclusions with respect to the interpretation of the purpose of 
retaliation in the light of the object and purpose of WTO dispute settlement. Firstly, in pursuing 
its purposes, retaliation should not become an arbitrary measure. Secondly, the objective of 
WTO dispute settlement offers retaliation the possibility to pursue more than one purpose.    
 
Finally, I examined the remedies provisions under the ITO Charter and the GATT 1947 
and concluded that settlement of disputes was the aim of dispute settlement either in the ITO or 
in the GATT.  
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II The Second Quest: Reference to Remedies under the ILC Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility  
The WTO is part of public international law. This means that absolute separation between 
international law and WTO law is not feasible. The question is to what extent may panels or the 
Appellate Body apply the rules and principles of public international law? One view is that 
panels and the Appellate Body can only apply the rules that are expressly stipulated under the 
covered agreements.
133
 Another view is that states can “contract out” of one or more rules of 
international law (other than jus cogens), but they cannot contract out of the system of 
international law.
134
 The answer may lie somewhere in the middle, but it is not the intention of 
this thesis to solve this debate. 
 
This thesis aims to identify the purposes of WTO retaliation. The arbitrators in Brazil – 
Aircraft referred to the ILC Draft Articles and stated that the purpose of “countermeasures” is, 
inter alia, to induce compliance.
135
 The question is whether the arbitrators‟ conclusion regarding 
the purpose, by referring to the term countermeasure under the ILC Draft Articles, is reasonable. 
This part provides the assessments of this question. In so doing, firstly, this part elaborates on the 
remedies under the ILC Draft Articles. Secondly, it looks at the relationship between WTO 
remedies and remedies under the ILC Draft Articles and whether the arbitrators made the right 
reference with regard to the purpose of countermeasures.  
 
A Remedies under the ILC Draft Articles 
The basic rules and general principles of international law in the field of state 
responsibility are codified by the ILC under the ILC Draft Articles. Under the ILC Draft 
Articles, every internationally wrongful act (action or omission) conducted by a state entails 
international responsibility. Besides the basic rules and principles, the ILC Draft Articles also 
regulate the legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act, generally known as remedies 
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under international law. The subsequent part explains the remedies under the ILC Draft Articles 
and whether those remedies also exist in WTO law. 
 
1 Cessation and non-repetition 
Article 30 of the ILC Draft Articles provides that the foremost legal consequence of an 
internationally wrongful act is the cessation of the wrongful act and an assurance and guarantee 
of non-repetition.  This means that the violator state must immediately terminate its illegal act, 
and that it is prospective in nature. Cessation aims to put an end to the violation of international 
law and to safeguard the validity and effectiveness of the primary rule.
136
 The arbitration tribunal 
in Rainbow Warrior noted two conditional requirements for cessation to arise. Firstly, the 
wrongful act must have a continuing character and, secondly, the obligation breached must still 
be in force at the time in which the order is issued.
137
 The latter requirement is related to the law 
of treaties, for instance the legal consequence of the breach is the termination of the treaty 
because of its material breach.
138
   
 
Cessation also exists in WTO remedies. It is referred to as “the withdrawal” of the 
inconsistent measure in violation cases.
139
 There is no obligation of withdrawal in cases of non-
violation. The recommendation of withdrawal is only made in cases of violation.  In most cases, 
the withdrawal has a prospective effect. Withdrawal may also apply to the application of the 
measure or regulation. For instance the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp applied the “application-
oriented chapeau test” and noted that it is the application of the regulation that constitutes 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.
140
  
 
Recommendation of non-repetition is not a common practice in WTO dispute settlement, 
but nothing in the DSU precludes the complainant party from seeking an assurance of non-
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repetition.
141
 In Norway – Trondheim, due to the fact that the inconsistent measure had been 
applied in the past, the panel requested that Norway accepts the illegality of its act and that it 
provides a guarantee of non-repetition.
142
 
 
2 Reparation 
The second legal obligation or consequence of an internationally wrongful act is 
reparation to the injured party. The Permanent Court of International Law (PCIJ) in Chorzów 
Factory stated that:
 143
 
...reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed.  
 
The ILC Draft Articles provide three forms of reparation: restitution, compensation and 
satisfaction; they are offered either singly or in combination.
144
  
 
(a) Restitution  
Restitution is the first form of reparation available to the injured state.
145
 The ILC Draft 
Articles employ a narrow definition of restitution which states that it is intended to re-establish 
the status quo ante, the situation that existed prior to the occurrence of the wrongful act.
146
 
Therefore, restitution is a retroactive form of reparation.  
 
There are very few cases in GATT and WTO dispute settlement where panels have 
provided the remedy of restitution.
147
 As explained in chapter two, retroactive remedies are not 
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common practice in GATT/WTO dispute settlement. Cho asserts that they are regarded as the 
exception rather than the rule because both GATT and WTO give priority to the withdrawal of 
inconsistent measures, which is prospective in nature.
148
 
 
(b) Compensation 
Together with restitution, compensation is one of the main forms of reparation. In the 
commentary of the ILC Draft Articles, the ILC noted that even though restitution is the primary 
form of reparation, it is often unavailable or inadequate. Therefore, compensation has a role in 
filling the gaps and ensuring full reparation for damage suffered.
149
 In other words, 
compensation is feasible when restitution to the injured party is inadequate. It covers any 
financially assessable damage including the loss of profit; compensation generally constitutes a 
pecuniary matter.
150
  
  
The elements of the compensation provisions provided under the DSU are mainly tariff 
or trade compensation. Nonetheless, this does not mean that WTO dispute settlement precludes 
the application of financial compensation. US – Copyright Act and US – Cotton are two cases 
where financial compensation was offered and agreed to. So, although WTO compensation in 
theory is not a pecuniary matter; in practice, parties to the dispute may agree on some sort of 
monetary compensation as a temporary settlement.  
 
Moreover, the injured state or complainant cannot directly opt for a compensation 
remedy; it is non-compliance with the DSB recommendations that gives rise to the option of 
compensation. In contrast, the law of state responsibility provides that an injured state is entitled 
to compensation for a wrongful act of state for the damage caused. Furthermore in the case of 
non-violation complaints, compensation “may be part of a mutually satisfactory adjustment as 
final settlement of the dispute”.151 In regard to violation cases, compensation is a temporary 
remedy. Other important elements of WTO compensation are that it is a “voluntary offer”, 
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“mutually acceptable” and “consistent with the covered agreements” including the basic 
principle of the most favoured nation (MFN). All these elements distinguish WTO compensation 
from compensation under the law of state responsibility. 
 
(c) Satisfaction 
Satisfaction is usually referred to as the additional form of reparation. This means that 
satisfaction may be required when the two other forms (restitution and compensation) do not 
provide full reparation.
152
 Article 37.2 of the ILC Draft Articles states that satisfaction may be in 
the form of an “acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal of apology, or 
another appropriate modality”. In contrast to compensation, satisfaction is not financially 
assessable.
153
  
 
Shadikhodjaev points out that in GATT/WTO, satisfaction can come in two forms: 
assurance of non-repetition and acknowledgement by a violator state.
154
 Satisfaction is not 
regulated explicitly in the DSU; however, like assurance of non-repetition, nothing prohibits the 
complainant state from seeking satisfaction and nothing precludes the respondent or violator 
state from voluntarily acknowledging its violation action and providing satisfaction.  
 
3 Countermeasures 
The ILC Draft Articles explain that the term “countermeasures” is quite similar to the 
traditional term “reprisals”. Both are a self-help response to a breach. However, while the term 
“reprisals” has been limited to the action taken in the international armed conflict, 
“countermeasures” cover a type of reprisal outside the context of armed conflict.155 The right to 
countermeasures emerges when the violator state refuses to negotiate and settle the dispute 
amicably.
156
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155 The ILC Draft Articles, chapter II countermeasure commentary (3). 
156 Mavroidis “Between a Rock and a Hard Place”, above ch 1, n 90, at 772. 
112 
 
Article 51 of the ILC Draft Articles states that the “countermeasures must be 
commensurate to the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the international wrongful 
act and the rights in question.” In short, it must be proportional to the damage suffered and to the 
gravity of the illegal act. The ILC Draft Articles also provide limitations on the objectives of 
countermeasures by stating that countermeasures are not intended to be a form of punishment but 
that it is supposed to induce compliance.
157
 
  
Unlike the DSU, the SCM Agreement adopted the term “countermeasures” for 
retaliation. Although both of the DSU and the SCM Agreement have terminological differences, 
the arbitrators noted that the term “countermeasures” in Article 4 of the SCM Agreement may 
include suspension of concessions or other obligations.
158
 Even though the arbitrators in Canada 
– Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada) also recognised that “there is no restriction on the types of 
countermeasure”,159 the fact is that in practice the form of countermeasures in all Article 4.11 
arbitration cases is the suspension of concessions or other obligations. Moreover, while the ILC 
Draft Articles set up a proportional requirement, Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement requires 
appropriateness and the DSU provides an equivalence requirement. By providing such level of 
limitation, it is obvious that the WTO countermeasures/retaliation is not meant to be punitive. 
  
Countermeasures/retaliation in the WTO is also a self-help instrument; however, it is 
subject to surveillance and to approval by the DSB. Therefore it is not a unilateral reprisal. The 
SCM Agreement and the DSU do not state explicitly the objective of a 
countermeasures/retaliation. The figure placed below provides a general comparison between 
remedies under public international law and under the WTO.  
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Figure 1 comparison between remedies under public international law and under the WTO 
Remedies under Public International Law  
(the ILC Draft Articles) 
Remedies under the WTO  
(the DSU/SCM Agreement) 
1. Cessation of illegal act 
 prospective 
1.1. Assurance of non-repetition  
1. The withdrawal of inconsistent measure  
 prospective in nature 
1.1 Not common practice but injured state may 
seek for the assurance of non-repetition 
2. Reparation: 
 Restitution  
 retroactive in nature 
 Compensation 
 feasible when restitution is inadequate 
 generally in monetary form 
 Satisfaction 
 additional form of reparation 
 acknowledgement of the breach, an 
expression of regret, a formal of apology 
and so forth 
 not financially assessable 
2. Reparation/restitution remedy is not a 
common practice in the WTO. Only a few 
numbers of cases where panels 
recommended restitution.  
 Compensation 
 cannot opt directly for compensation 
 temporary in nature and prospective 
 not a pecuniary concept 
 voluntary offer in terms of additional trade 
concessions or market access 
 Satisfaction  
 not stated explicitly in legal text but 
nothing in the DSU precludes the 
complainant state from requesting or 
seeking a  satisfaction remedy 
 can be in the form of assurance of non-
repetition and acknowledgement by a 
violator state 
3. Countermeasure 
 emerge when the violator state refuses to 
negotiate and settle the dispute amicably 
 proportional to the damage suffered and to 
the gravity of the illegal act 
 not intended to be a form of punishment 
 objective is to induce compliance 
3. Countermeasure/Retaliation 
 emerge when non-compliance is taking 
place   
 appropriate/equivalent to level of 
nullification or impairment 
 non-punitive sanction 
 not stipulated explicitly in the legal text 
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B Contracting Out of Remedies under State Responsibility 
To identify whether a WTO remedy is contracting out of remedies under state 
responsibility, it is significant to determine to what extent the WTO remedies can exclude the 
application of remedies under state responsibility. Put differently, it must be determined whether 
WTO remedies are lex specialis in relation to the remedies under state responsibility. 
  
The principle of lex specialis is derived from the latin maxim lex specialis derogate lex 
generali, which means that a specific rule prevails over a general rule. Article 55 of the ILC 
Draft Articles elaborates on the principle of lex specialis as follows:
160
  
These articles do not apply where and to extent that the conditions for the existence of an 
internationally wrongful act or to the content or implementation of the international 
responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law.   
 
In other words, the ILC Draft Articles provide that the specific rules of a treaty can 
modify the content or implementation or effects of the international rules of state responsibility, 
and that the specific rules will apply to the extent of this modification as provided by the specific 
rules. Consequently, where specific rules do not modify or deviate, general international law still 
applies.  
 
Under Article 19.1 of the DSU, a panel or the Appellate Body, in terms of the violation 
found, shall recommend the violator Member to bring the measure into conformity with the 
covered agreements. Accordingly, the DSU confirms the general international law of cessation as 
a WTO remedy. Nonetheless, it does not verify other remedies of general international law.
161
 
Compensation and retaliation remedies available under Article 22 of the DSU are different in 
type and scope from those stipulated in the ILC Draft Articles.  
 
Commentary (3) Article 55 of the ILC Draft Articles concerning lex specialis provides 
the DSU as a specific example of a rule that has contracted out of general international law in 
                                                             
160 The ILC Draft Articles, art 55. 
161 Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, above ch 1, n 112, at 219.  
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terms of remedies (compensation and countermeasures/retaliation). In the footnote, the ILC Draft 
Articles state that “for WTO purposes, „compensation‟ refers to the future conduct, not past 
conduct, and involves a form of countermeasure.”162 It also states that the WTO dispute 
settlement focuses on “cessation rather than reparation”.163   
  
WTO rules are lex specialis in several aspects of general international law on remedies 
such as the timing, multilateral surveillance and authorisation, nature and permissible level of 
countermeasures, and three levels of retaliation.
164
 The above assessment, therefore, leads to the 
conclusion that WTO has contracted out of remedies under general international law.  
 
C Reference to the ILC Draft Articles to determine the Purpose of WTO retaliation in 
Brazil - Aircraft: Sound or Unsound Approach?  
The arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil) stated that “the purpose of 
„countermeasures‟ is, inter alia, to induce compliance.”165 There are two points that we need to 
consider regarding the arbitrators‟ statement. Firstly, the arbitrators draw a parallel between the 
term “countermeasures” used in the SCM Agreement and those employed in the work of ILC on 
state responsibility. Secondly, they refer to the purpose of countermeasures in Article 47 of the 
Draft Articles in deciding that the purpose of “countermeasures” under the SCM Agreement is to 
induce compliance.       
 
However, the arbitrators ignored one important fact in deciding the purpose of 
countermeasures: WTO law has contracted out of the rules of international law in terms of 
remedies. By merely making reference to the ILC Draft Articles without further explanation why 
this is relevant, the arbitrators indirectly applied the concept of something that WTO has 
contracted out of.  
 
                                                             
162 The ILC Draft Articles, at footnote 818. 
163
 Ibid, at footnote 431 
164 Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, above ch 1, n 112, at 233; Shadikhodjaev, above ch 2, 
n 7, at 45. 
165 Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), above ch 1, n 13, at [3.44].  
116 
 
This is an unsound approach. The arbitrators made the reference to the ILC Draft Articles 
merely because both the SCM Agreement and the ILC Draft Articles provide the same term 
“countermeasures” but they did not consider whether both refer to the same concept. Moreover, 
after making the correlation with regard to the term and purpose, the arbitrators employed an 
irrelevant benchmark. The arbitrators ignored the benchmark of proportionality provided under 
public international law, even though they made the reference to, and employed the purpose of, 
countermeasures under the ILC Draft Articles. The arbitrators decided that “when dealing with a 
prohibited export subsidy, an amount of countermeasures which corresponds to the total amount 
of the subsidy is „appropriate‟.”166 The arbitrators provided that “the total amount of subsidy” 
benchmark is set at this level in order to cause the countermeasures to have an inducing effect.
167
 
In contrast, Article 51 of the ILC Draft Articles provides the “proportionality to the injury 
suffered” benchmark.168 As a result, the arbitrators did not support their finding on the proper 
benchmark.  
 
So in short, why is this approach unsound? Firstly, the arbitrators referred to the ILC 
Draft Articles, and indirectly adopted the purpose of countermeasures on the ground that both the 
SCM Agreement and the ILC Draft Articles have the same term “countermeasures” without 
considering the fact that WTO has contracted out of the remedies under public international law. 
Secondly, when they applied the purpose of countermeasures in their decision, they employed a 
different benchmark from the one provided under public international law. This thesis does not 
argue that inducing compliance is not the purpose of WTO retaliation. But, it is nonetheless 
relevant to demonstrate the arbitrators‟ unsound reference in determining the purpose of inducing 
compliance.  
 
In conclusion, in the quest or search for the purposes of retaliation, we might make a 
reference to the purpose of remedies under public international law; however, in doing so we 
need to have strong reasons to argue that the reference is relevant because the WTO has 
                                                             
166 Ibid, at [3.60]. 
167
 Ibid, at [3.58]. The arbitrators stated that the equivalent to the level of nullification requirement would limit the 
efficacy of countermeasures in the case of prohibited subsidies.  
168 Article 51 of the ILC Draft Articles states that “countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, 
taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and its harmful effects on the injured party.” 
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contracted out of general international law on remedies. Thus, the WTO has its own rules, 
procedures, principles, and purposes with regard to the remedies.     
 
III Third Quest: Academic Debates Regarding the Purpose of Retaliation 
The standpoint of this chapter is to search the purpose of retaliation. There are various 
academic writings arguing about the purpose of retaliation. However, these writings mostly 
promote a single purpose of retaliation: either inducing compliance or rebalancing. This “single 
purpose” standpoint has resulted the disagreements and long debates amongst scholars and 
commentators. For instance, Jackson is the strong proponent of the purpose of inducing 
compliance, while Sykes and Bello advocate the purpose of rebalancing. 
 
Most commentators and scholars perceive that retaliation serves only single purpose. This 
part assesses two major schools of thought about WTO retaliation purpose, first, inducing 
compliance and second, rebalancing.  
 
A The Purpose of Retaliation: Inducing Compliance v Rebalancing 
Article 22 does not explicitly state the purpose of retaliation. Consequently, different 
views have emerged. For instance, Jackson and Sykes have different opinions as to whether 
WTO Members are legally obligated to bring their measure into conformity with the 
recommendations made by WTO panels or the Appellate Body, or whether they have an option 
to remain in violation and pay “damages”. Jackson argues that the DSU text clearly establishes a 
preference for the obligation to perform, and thus such an opting-out solution is not supported by 
the text of the DSU. He also disagrees that rebalancing and the efficient breach policy are central 
to, or even operative in, the normal dispute settlement process. Thus, he strongly disagrees with 
the view from some commentators that retaliation is intended as a tool to “buy-out” of 
obligations.
169
 
 
                                                             
169 Jackson “Obligation to Comply or to Buy Out”, above ch 1, n 57, at 115-122.  
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In contrast, Sykes refers to the WTO as an incomplete contract in economic parlance, 
because of the difficulties of anticipating all future contingencies and the complexity of relations 
amidst the Members. Therefore, efficient breach is possible and the damages option facilitates it. 
Sykes does not dispute that there is a “preference” for compliance implicitly stated in the system, 
but he argues that “its existence by no means excludes the possibility that Members have the 
legal right to opt for paying damages”.170 
 
Below, I classify the academic debate into two main schools of thought and provide the 
main points of arguments from each camp. 
 
1 Inducing compliance 
Not only have the arbitrators in numerous Article 22.2 arbitral proceedings recognised 
inducing compliance to be the purpose of WTO retaliation, but many commentators or scholars 
also support this proposition in their writings. Although the arbitrators in their ruling never 
explained in detail the reason why they selected inducing compliance,
171
 many commentators or 
scholars provide the arguments as to why inducing compliance should be the purpose of WTO 
retaliation. The general arguments presented by the proponents are as follows. 
 
(a) It is in line with the DSU textual context and WTO rules as international law 
obligations 
Jackson is the first scholar who provided an analysis on this matter. In his rebuttal to 
Bello‟s argument, he identifies several clauses of the DSU that demonstrate the preference for an 
obligation to perform the recommendation.
172
 Arguably, amongst others, the legal clauses that 
are deemed to indicate a strong preference for inducing compliance are: securing the withdrawal 
                                                             
170 Alan O Sykes “The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: 
Damages or Specific Performance?” in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick (eds) New Directions in International 
Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (Kluwer Law International, 2000) 347 at 350 (“Damages or 
Specific Performance?”). 
171
 The arbitrators referred to the United States‟ argument that the temporary nature of retaliation demonstrates that 
the purpose of retaliation is inducing compliance, see EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6), above ch 1, n 12, at 
[6.3]. 
172 Jackson “Misunderstandings of the Nature of Legal Obligations”, above ch 1, n 8, at, 63. 
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under Article 3.7, bringing the measure into conformity and promptly complying with the 
recommendation or ruling under Article 19.1, and the temporary nature of compensation or 
suspension of concession under Article 22.8 of the DSU.
173
 Jackson‟s arguments are cited and 
supported subsequently by many scholars.
174
 
 
Furthermore, proponents of a purpose of inducing compliance view WTO rules as 
binding international legal obligations. Therefore, they believe that when the DSB finds a breach 
of WTO rules, the Member in question should be deemed to be breaching its obligations under 
international law, and accordingly, should be required to bring its inconsistent measure into 
compliance.
175
  
    
(b) The “equivalent” requirement does not mean that retaliation cannot induce 
compliance  
The “equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment” requirement is often 
considered to be contrary to the purpose of inducing compliance, because the equivalence 
requirement seems to make the effect of retaliation more compensatory or rebalancing, rather 
than giving retaliation the effect of inducing compliance. Therefore, rebalancing proponents 
often employ the “equivalent” requirement as the key counter argument to the “inducing 
compliance” proponents. 
 
Nevertheless, Spamann argues that due to the method of calculation employed by the 
arbitrators, there is no “equivalence” or “rebalancing” in the level of suspension and 
nullification.
176
 By using an economic approach, Spamann notes that the arbitrators were 
comparing incommensurate values (lost trade and affected trade) in their level of nullification or 
impairment calculations.
177
 The loss of trade is often less than affected trade; consequently, the 
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174 Cho, above ch 1, n 25, at 770; McGriven, above ch 1, n 49, at 144; Charnovitz “Last Resort against 
Noncompliance”, above ch 1, n 8, at 3. 
175
 Jackson “Misunderstandings of the Nature of Legal Obligations”, above ch 1, n 8, at 60; Pauwelyn “Enforcement 
and Countermeasures”, above ch 1, n 84, at 341. 
176 Holger Spamann “The Myth of „Rebalancing‟ Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice” 9(1) JIEL 31. 
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level of suspension reached by the arbitrators is lower than the level of nullification or 
impairment suffered by the injured state.
178
  
 
Retaliation itself is already destructive to trade and contrary to the principle of 
liberalising trade, therefore, a limitation needs to be set on it. This does not mean that the 
limitation would necessarily undermine the “inducing compliance” purpose. Pauwelyn argues 
that even though an equivalent suspension does not seem strong enough to induce compliance, 
this formal remedy is actually backed-up by informal remedies such as the cost to a state‟s 
reputation. The formal cost of suspension combined with informal remedies explains the high 
compliance rate in WTO dispute settlement.
179
  
 
(c) Complainant demanding compliance not rebalancing  
For a complainant state, the paramount purpose for entering into dispute settlement is to 
ensure the withdrawal of the inconsistent measure. This aim can be seen from the strategy of 
complainant when they impose the sanction of retaliation. Shaffer and Ganin, after assessing the 
implementation of retaliatory measures in EC – Bananas III, EC – Hormones and US – FSC, 
conclude that the complainant governments, in imposing retaliatory measures, “selectively 
targeted politically-significant exporters in the non-complying Member with little or no regard to 
reciprocal rebalancing in terms of the affected sectors”.180 Shaffer and Ganin argue that this 
selective retaliation on highly political sectors or products is obviously aimed at putting 
maximum pressure on scofflaw governments to comply with rulings.
181
      
 
 
                                                             
178 Ibid, at 46. 
179 Pauwelyn “Calculation and Design of Trade Sanction”, above ch 1, n 60, at 10-14.  
180 Gregory Shaffer and Daniel Ganin “Extrapolating Purpose from Practice: Rebalancing or Inducing Compliance 
in Chad P Bown and Joost Pauwelyn (eds) The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute 
Settlement (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 73 at 81 [“Extrapolating Purpose from Practice”]. 
181 Ibid, at 82. However, the complainants also tried to select the sectors or products that have minimum impact or 
harm to complainants‟ domestic constituencies.  
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2 Rebalancing 
Bello was the pioneer of this school of thought. She argues that a state is not required to 
comply with a WTO ruling but instead that the only binding WTO obligation is to maintain a 
balance of concessions amongst Members. Therefore a Member can choose to comply, or pay 
compensation, or suffer retaliation in order to balance concessions.
182
  
 
There are two Article 22.6 arbitral proceedings that pointed out the possibility of the 
existence of other purposes of retaliation. Even though “inducing compliance” proponents 
strongly oppose this purpose, some well-known scholars such as Sykes, Palmeter, Schwartz and 
Davey are strong proponents of the “rebalancing” purpose. The general arguments provided by 
the “rebalancing” proponents are as follows.  
 
(a) No obligation to comply with the ruling 
Bello notes that the WTO depends on voluntary compliance, or, in other words, nothing 
can force a Member to comply with a ruling. Members can deviate from their obligations as long 
as they are willing to pay compensation or suffer retaliation. “Inducing compliance” proponents 
obviously disagree with this view. In contrast Sykes, analysing the matter from an economic 
perspective, supports Bello‟s point of view and states that her view is analogous to “the duty to 
perform or to pay damages” from the private contract law theory introduced by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.
183
  
  
Moreover, Sykes examines several clauses in the DSU that were argued by Jackson as 
being “inducing compliance” clauses in a different way. For instance, he points out that the 
adjective “usually” in Article 3.7 of the DSU implies that “to secure the withdrawal” is not 
always the objective, so in his view this clause opens up the possibility of the application of other 
                                                             
182 Bello, above ch 1, n 80, at 418. 
183 Sykes “Damages or Specific Performance?”, above n 170, at 348; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes “The Path of 
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objectives.
184
 Overall, Sykes argues that nothing in the DSU states that a Member which chooses 
compensation or retaliation rather than compliance is in violation of the WTO rules.
185
  
  
(b) Equivalent level requirement favours rebalancing purpose 
“Rebalancing” proponents employ the “equivalent level” requirement under Article 22.4 
of the DSU as their standing point. The logic for them is that if the aim of retaliation is inducing 
compliance, the WTO should not have “equivalent to the harm done” as the ceiling level for the 
suspension. Therefore, Palmeter and Alexandrov state that the purpose of inducing compliance is 
not consistent with the equivalence requirement.
186
  
 
Moreover, Sykes argues that “equivalent to the harm done” resembles the expectation 
remedy under private contract law, and by excluding more coercive sanctions, he argues that 
retaliation serves the duty of paying damages.
187
 Palmeter argues in a similar way, stating that 
considering the various economies and power sizes of the Members, and the fact that the WTO 
encourages the Members to make more concessions, the purpose of rebalancing should be 
deemed to be the purpose of retaliation.
188
  
 
(c) “Rebalancing” purpose is necessary to secure future commitments   
“Inducing compliance” proponents strongly criticise the notion that the “rebalancing” 
purpose allows deviation as long as the violator is willing to pay the damages. However, 
“rebalancing” proponents argue that this is significant in keeping the system running. Dam states 
that a system that does not allow any deviation (withdrawal) would tend to discourage the 
making of concessions in the first place.
189
 This is why, from the perspective of “rebalancing” 
proponents, the DSU introduced the “equivalent” requirement so that retaliation would not 
become too coercive or punitive, and threaten the future commitments of the Members. Palmeter 
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notes that punishing non-compliance severely will risk upsetting the balance that governments 
have already reached. He recalls Chayes‟ words: “treaties with teeth are will-o‟-the-wisp.”190 
  
Sykes also points out that, even though compliance seems preferable, the system has 
carefully designed a non-compliance option coupled with a sanction similar to expectation 
damages.
191
 This efficient adjustment will bring a benefit to Members that cannot perform 
because the cost of performance is too high, by providing them room to restore political balance 
through compensation or retaliation.
192
 
 
IV Fourth Quest: Article 22.6 Arbitrators Statements With Regard to the 
Purpose of Retaliation 
In every Article 22.6 arbitral proceedings, the arbitrators have made statements or 
references to the purpose of retaliation. Nonetheless, there are gradual changes in their decisions 
regarding the purpose. For instance, at first in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), the 
arbitrators stated that inducing compliance is the purpose of WTO suspensions.
193
 Later in US – 
FSC (Article 22.6 – US) and Canada – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Canada),194 the arbitrators 
provided rulings which amounted to punitive sanctions. Afterwards in US – Byrd Amendment 
(Article 22.6 – US), the arbitrators ruled that the purpose of retaliation is not clear and might be 
to achieve some form of temporary compensation.
195
 This section examines the purpose stated in 
the Article 22.6 arbitrators‟ reports and shows that there are gradual changes in the decisions of 
the arbitrators with respect to the purpose of retaliation. 
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A The Purpose of “Inducing Compliance” with “Equivalent” Level Requirement  
EC – Bananas III (Article 22.6 – EC) was the first WTO Article 22.6 arbitration 
proceeding on suspension. It was the very first dispute in which the arbitrators made the 
statement regarding the purpose of retaliation.  
 
The arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) confirmed that “the 
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations is a temporary measure pending full 
implementation by the Member concerned.” They further agreed with the United States that “this 
temporary nature indicates that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce compliance.”196 
However, in the subsequent statement, the arbitrators set a limitation on the purpose by stating 
that it (the purpose of inducing compliance) does not mean that the DSB should grant the 
authorisation to suspend beyond what is equivalent.
197
 The arbitrators held the view that:
198
  
...there is nothing in Article 21.1 of the DSU, let alone in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 
22, that could be read as a justification for countermeasures of a punitive nature. 
 
The arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) similarly stated that 
“the object and purpose of Article 22...is to induce compliance”.199 The purpose of inducing 
compliance was also confirmed subsequently in EC – Hormones (Article 22.6 – EC) and later in 
US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US) and US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US).200 
 
There are several interesting points raised in EC – Bananas III (Article 22.6 – EC).  
Firstly, the statement of the arbitrators regarding the purpose was an assertion; the arbitrators did 
not provide any further explanation or reference to the text of the WTO agreements.
201
 The 
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arbitrators merely stated that they agreed with the United States that the temporary nature 
indicates that the purpose of countermeasures is to induce compliance.
202
  
 
Secondly, the arbitrators‟ first statement regarding the purpose and second statement 
regarding the equivalent level do not support each other. Put differently, the arbitrators set up an 
ambitious purpose, but that purpose is not supported by or enabled by a similarly ambitious 
instrument.
203
 The arbitrators put a limitation on the retaliation instrument by stating that 
suspension cannot go beyond what is equivalent. Consequently, the stated purpose does not fit 
into the limited instrument, and vice versa, the limited instrument does not support the intended 
purpose.    
 
B The Purpose of “Inducing Compliance” with “Appropriate” Level Requirement 
The arbitrators provided the standard of “appropriate” countermeasures in the retaliation 
disputes related to prohibited subsidies under the SCM Agreement. Brazil – Aircraft (Article 
22.6 – Brazil) is the first retaliation dispute under the DSU and the SCM Agreement. In this case, 
the arbitrators concluded that “a countermeasure is „appropriate‟ inter alia if it effectively 
induces compliance.”204 The arbitrators went further by stating that the concept of nullification or 
impairment is absent from Article 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement and that an “equivalent” 
requirement would limit the efficacy of the countermeasures.
205
 Therefore, the arbitrators 
decided that “an amount of countermeasures which corresponds to the total amount of the 
subsidy is „appropriate‟”,206 even though such an amount goes beyond the “equivalent” trade 
effects caused by the violation. 
 
The arbitrators in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) also confirmed that the purpose of 
countermeasures is to induce compliance. However, the arbitrators adopted a different approach 
to the arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft in determining the “appropriateness” and the level of 
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countermeasures. The arbitrators in US – FSC went further by taking into consideration the 
gravity of the breach. The arbitrators considered that:
 207
 
...in assessing the “appropriateness” of such countermeasures – in light of the gravity of 
the breach –, a margin  of appreciation is to be granted, due to the severity of the breach. 
 
So in carrying out the “appropriateness” test, the arbitrators considered not only the trade 
effects but also the gravity of the breach (the violation).  
 
In Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada), the arbitrators recognised the purpose of 
inducing compliance. Moreover, because of Canada‟s statement that it did not intend to 
withdraw its inconsistent measures, the arbitrators considered that it was appropriate to add 
another 20 per cent of the amount of the subsidy to the total amount of the subsidy to cause 
Canada to comply.
208
   
 
Interestingly, even though the arbitrators argued that their approach in assessing the 
“appropriateness” does not make the countermeasures punitive,209 we can observe that the 
arbitrators have provided tougher sanctions in prohibited subsidies disputes than in other 
disputes, and in Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada) the additional 20 per cent 
constitutes, or has the character of, a punitive sanction. 
   
C Inducing Compliance is “not the Only Purpose” Pursued by Retaliation 
The arbitrators started to acknowledge that retaliation may have other purposes in US – 
1916 Act (Article 22.6 – US).210 Nonetheless, the arbitrators did not clarify or list these purposes, 
but confirmed the previous arbitrators‟ statements that inducing compliance is the key purpose of 
retaliation.
211
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It was the arbitrators in US – Byrd Amendment (Article 22.6 – US) that questioned the 
exclusivity of inducing compliance as the purpose of retaliation. The arbitrators stated that:
212
 
Having regard to Article 3.7 and 22.1 and 22.2 of the DSU as part of the context of 
Article 22.4 and 22.7, we cannot exclude that inducing compliance is part of the 
objectives behind suspension of concessions or other obligations, but at most it can be 
only one of a number of purposes in authorizing the suspension of concessions or other 
obligations. By relying on „inducing compliance‟ as the benchmark for the selection of 
the most appropriate approach we also run the risk of losing sight of the requirement of 
Article 22.4 that the level of suspension be equivalent to the level of nullification or 
impairment. 
 
The arbitrators also explained the reason why the DSU does not explicitly state the 
purpose of retaliation. In their view, it is because “what may induce compliance is likely to vary 
in each case”213. The arbitrators argued that “[i]n some cases, even a very high amount of 
countermeasures may not achieve compliance, whereas in some others a limited amount may.”214 
The arbitrators noted that there are two implied purposes: firstly, suspension is intended to 
“induce compliance”, and secondly, it is only “a means of obtaining some form of temporary 
compensation”.215 So even though the arbitrators in this case were not convinced that inducing 
compliance is the only purpose of retaliation, in the end the arbitrators left this problem 
unanswered by merely stating that the purpose of WTO retaliation is “not clear” and that “a large 
part of the conceptual debate that took place in these proceedings could have been avoided if a 
clear “object and purpose” were identified.”216  
 
To sum up, I provide a figure that describes the gradual changes of the arbitrators‟ 
statements with respect to the purpose of retaliation. 
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Figure 2 Article 22.6 arbitrators’ statements with regard to the purpose of retaliation  
 
 
Summary 
The starting point of this chapter was the question of what “effective” means? This thesis 
adopted the meaning of effectiveness as the degree to which a rule or standard achieves its 
objective or purpose. This means that to determine the effectiveness of retaliation, it is 
significant first to identify the purposes of retaliation.  
 
The main aim of this chapter has been to search for the purpose of retaliation. To achieve 
this, I conducted four main types of analysis. Firstly, I interpreted Article 22 of the DSU in 
accordance with the general rules of interpretation. This interpretation demonstrated that 
retaliation can have multiple competing purposes. Secondly, I looked at the reference to the 
remedies of public international law made by the arbitrators in Brazil - Aircraft. I argued that the 
arbitrators ignored the fact that WTO law has contracted out of the rules of international law in 
terms of remedies. By merely referring to the purpose of countermeasures under public 
international law, only because both the SCM Agreement and the ILC Draft Articles provide the 
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same term “countermeasures”, without further explanation as to whether or not this is relevant, 
the arbitrators indirectly applied the concept of something that the WTO has contracted out. 
Thirdly, I conducted an assessment of competing academic perspectives. This part provided two 
schools of thought regarding the purpose of retaliation: inducing compliance and rebalancing. 
Fourthly, I examined Article 22.6 arbitrators‟ statements concerning the purpose of retaliation. 
This part demonstrated the gradual changes of the arbitrators‟ statements regarding the purpose. 
 
 To sum up, this chapter‟s key conclusions are: retaliation can have more than one 
purpose, the arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft made unsound reference to the purpose of 
countermeasures under public international law, inducing compliance and rebalancing are the 
two most competing purposes of retaliation argued by the commentators, and there are gradual 
changes in the arbitrators‟ statements regarding the purpose of retaliation.  
 
Furthermore, although many commentators as well as the arbitrators have stated and 
argued about the purpose of retaliation, they provide merely the arguments of single purpose: 
either the purpose of inducing compliance or rebalancing. The interpretation of Article 22 which 
I undertook in this chapter demonstrates that there are several parts of the wording of Article 22 
of the DSU that indicate the purposes of retaliation. Put differently, Article 22 indicates multiple 
purposes that retaliation can pursue, and they are: inducing compliance, rebalancing and reaching 
a mutually satisfactory solution. Consequently commentators‟ debates and disagreements (in 
advocating one purpose against another purpose of retaliation) are unnecessary. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THREE LEVELS OF ASSESSMENT TO ARTICULATE THE MULTIPLE 
PURPOSES OF RETALIATION 
 
“Although it is understandable why the DSU seems to give primacy to compliance, I believe that we should go in the 
direction of accepting compensation and suspension of concessions as full alternative to compliance”.
1
 
 
Overview 
In the previous chapter, I argued that to determine the effectiveness of retaliation, it is 
important to first identify its purposes. The problem is that the DSU does not state explicitly 
what the purpose(s) of retaliation is. Therefore, I conducted a search through interpretation, the 
arbitrators‟ reference to the remedies of public international law, academic debates and Article 
22.6 arbitrators‟ statements in chapter three. From the previous quest and search, I concluded 
that WTO retaliation has multiple purposes.  
 
Moreover, I noted in chapter one that the parties determine their goals and how these 
goals are achieved when they design their contract. I also illustrated the WTO as a “contract 
organisation”. Accordingly, in this chapter I seek to analyse and argue the multiple purposes of 
retaliation from the design of WTO treaty. 
 
There are three phases of contract design: firstly, the parties define the entitlements or 
exchanged commitments between them (a bundle of mutual rights and obligations); secondly, the 
parties define how the entitlements should be protected (protection rules); thirdly, the parties 
determine the enforcement rules in case of contractual defection.
2
 
 
In this chapter, I establish three levels of assessment to analyse the design or structure of 
WTO treaty. The first level examines the nature of WTO entitlements, particularly dispute 
                                                             
1 Pieter Jan Kuyper “Remedies and Retaliation in the WTO: Are They Likely to be Effective? The State Perspective 
and the Company Perspective” (1997) 91 Am Soc‟y Int‟l L Proc 282 at 284. 
2 Schropp “Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement”, above ch 1, n 131, at 42-47.  
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settlement and retaliation entitlements, whether they are owned to the international community 
as a whole (erga omnes), or owed to the entire membership (erga omnes partes), or owed only 
reciprocally between Members (bilateral). The second level provides the assessment on how 
WTO entitlements are protected. The discussion focuses on the transferability of WTO 
entitlements, for instance whether they can be taken unilaterally as long as compensation is 
provided or whether they can be transferred only through “re-negotiation”. The assessment on 
this level refers to the protection rules model developed by Calabresi and Melamed. Finally, the 
third level of assessment provides an elaboration on the enforcement capacity in case of 
violation.  
 
All of these assessments aim to demonstrate that the WTO treaty is designed in such a 
way as to support and accommodate the multiple purposes of retaliation. 
 
I First Level of Assessment: Identifying the Nature of WTO Dispute Settlement 
Entitlements  
The WTO is certainly a multilateral agreement, but whether the entitlements are 
exchanged on a bilateral basis between Members, or are given on a non-reciprocal basis, is 
different issue. Scholars and commentators have offered different arguments concerning this 
question. Some of them support the idea that WTO entitlements constitute a set of collective 
interests, and they are exchanged beyond reciprocal basis. Carmody, for example, by referring to 
the MFN principle under Article I of the GATT, argues that the WTO is a set of collective 
obligations owed to all WTO Members. Therefore, WTO obligations are easily understood as 
obligations erga omnes partes.
3
 There is also an article which supports the notion of indivisible 
(or erga omnes) obligations applying to the WTO obligations.
4
 Additionally, the arbitrators in 
US – FSC ruled that the obligation concerning prohibited subsidies is an erga omnes obligation.5 
 
                                                             
3 Chios Carmody “WTO Obligations as Collective” (2006) 17(2) EJIL 419 at 420-422.  
4 Gazzini “The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations”, above ch 1, n 102, at 723-727. 
5 US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), above ch 1, n 13, at [6.10].  
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In contrast, there are other commentators who support the notion that WTO entitlements 
are allocated on a reciprocal or bilateral basis. For example, Pauwelyn asserts that the WTO is a 
multilateral treaty “of reciprocating type”. He argues that MFN is not an obligation of the 
integral type; rather it is a collection of equivalent bilateral legal relationships in respect of which 
no discrimination is permitted to take place.
6
 Furthermore, Howse and Neven reject the 
arbitrators‟ erga omnes obligation notion. They base their arguments on the fact that the primary 
stake in a given dispute settlement proceeding belongs only to individual Members. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is a community interest in compliance, dispute settlement 
rulings are binding between parties to disputes and not legally binding on the Members as a 
whole.
7
 
 
The allocation (reciprocal or non-reciprocal basis) or type of the entitlements correlates to 
the type of the obligations, or vice versa. If an entitlement is given non-reciprocal and its type is 
non-transferable, the type of the obligation is absolute. It means that no derogation from the 
obligation is allowed. To understand the type of WTO obligations first is important because this 
type (integral or reciprocal) of obligations provides different consequences. If type of WTO 
obligations is integral or indivisible, then the obligations are absolute and require specific 
performance. It also means that the entitlements are not transferable; thus, no derogation is 
allowed. So in case of violation, the primary purpose of retaliation is to induce compliance. In 
contrast, if the type of WTO obligations is reciprocal in nature, a Member might be allowed to 
derogate or withdraw from the obligations as long as it provides compensatory adjustment. 
Therefore, in case of violation, some sorts of alternative settlement can be agreed between parties 
to dispute. Consequently, inducing compliance would not be the sole purpose that retaliation can 
pursue. 
 
The concept of obligations erga omnes, erga omnes partes, multilateral and bilateral 
obligations is developed under the sphere of public international law. It has been observed and 
discussed in several decisions of the ICJ, the ILC‟s works, and scholars‟ writings. Moreover, it is 
                                                             
6 Joost Pauwelyn “A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in 
Nature?” (2003) 14(5) EJIL 907, at 927-928 [“A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations”]. 
7 Howse and Neven, above ch 1, n 103, at 118. 
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generally known that the WTO is part of public international law and that WTO law is not a self-
contained regime. So it is still appropriate and useful to look at the concept erga omnes or erga 
omnes partes obligations under public international law as a reference in assessing the type of 
WTO obligations. 
           
A The Concept of Obligations Erga Omnes   
The literal definition of erga omnes is “towards all”, “as oppose to all”, “against all”.8 
However international law scholars argue that the literal definition of erga omnes suffers from a 
terminology imprecision. This is because the term “omnes” has a double meaning: it can refer 
either to all collectively or to each other individually.
9
 It is not the intention of this thesis to 
argue this issue in detail. Nonetheless, the present study examines the concept of obligations 
erga omnes from the context of International Court of Justice‟s decisions. 
 
When discussing the concept of obligations erga omnes, one frequently refers to the 
judgment in the Barcelona Traction case (Second Phase).
10
 The two paragraphs in this judgment 
explain the concept of obligations erga omnes as follows: firstly, it is the obligations of a State 
“towards the international community as a whole” and this should be distinguished from “those 
obligations arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection”. Secondly, the 
nature of the obligations is “concern all States”. Thirdly, in view of “the importance of the 
rights” involved, “all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection”.11 Fourthly, 
the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law and 
are conferred by international instruments of a “universal or quasi-universal character”.12 The 
Court also stated that such “obligations [erga omnes] derive from contemporary international 
law” and from “principles and rules concerning the basic rights of human person”. The Court 
provided examples of the obligations, such as the act of aggression, genocide, slavery, and racial 
                                                             
8 P G W Glare (ed) Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1982) at 615-616; 1248-1249 [Oxford Latin 
Dictionary].  
9 Ibid, („omnis‟). See Christian J Tams Enforcing Obligation Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) at 101.  
10
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 1970 
at 32 [Barcelona Traction case].  
11 Ibid, at 33.  
12 Ibid, at 34. 
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discrimination.
13
 From these two paragraphs, it is clear that the concept of obligations erga 
omnes in the Barcelona Traction case confers the “legal interest” of all states (standing) and the 
“corresponding rights of protection” (countermeasures).  
 
Furthermore, the concept of obligations erga omnes was not outlandish prior to 
Barcelona Traction Dictum. In the Wimbledon case, the Permanent Court concluded that an 
artificial waterway connecting two open seas (Suez, Panama, or Kiel Canal) has been 
“permanently dedicated to the use of the whole world”.14 The concept of obligations erga omnes 
also appeared in the Aaland Island dispute. The point of the judgment that related to obligations 
erga omnes was in respect of the demilitarisation obligation. The Committee of Jurists stated that 
any state “in possession of the Islands” must conform to the obligation of non-fortification.15 
Tams and Ragazzi state that such an obligation is related to obligations erga omnes because it 
was beyond mere consideration of reciprocity and broadened the circle of states bound by the 
treaty obligation.
16
 
 
The International Court in the 1996 Genocide case provided a new characterisation of 
obligations erga omnes. The Court noted that the “rights and obligations enshrined by [the 
Genocide] Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes” and that the “obligation each State 
thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the 
Convention”.17 The concept of erga omnes in the 1996 Genocide case neither points out the legal 
standing and enforcement like the one in the Barcelona Traction case, nor broadens the circle of 
states as what confirmed in traditional context (prior to the Barcelona Traction dictum). By 
being erga omnes, in the 1996 Genocide case sense, an obligation does not have territorial 
limitation, thus it is directly imposing a high degree of accountability on States.
18
   
 
                                                             
13 Ibid. 
14 SS “Wimbledon” (UK, France, Italy, Japan v Germany) (Judgment) [1923] PCIJ (Series A No 1) 15 at 28.  
15 Maurizio Ragazzi The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford University Press, 1997) at 33.  
16
 Tams, above n 9, at 105-106; Ragazzi, above n 15, at 33. 
17 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary 
Objection (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia) (Judgment) [1996] ICJ Rep 595 at 616 (emphasis added). 
18 Tams, above n 9, at 112.  
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B The Concept of Multilateral and Bilateral Obligations in the Work of the International 
Law Committee on the Law of Treaties and State Responsibility  
This part briefly reviews the concept of multilateral and bilateral obligations from the 
work of the ILC on the codification of the law of treaties and state responsibility submitted by 
the UN special rapporteur. 
 
1 Multilateral or integral type of obligations 
In the Third Report on the Law of Treaties, Gerald Fitzmaurice, the ILC special 
rapporteur, writes that a treaty of the “integral” type is a treaty “where the force of the obligation 
is self-existent, absolute and inherent for each party, and not dependent on a corresponding 
performance by the others.”19 In short, integral obligations are the obligations not only toward 
particular parties to the treaty but toward the whole world. A clear example of the treaty of an 
integral type is the 1948 Genocide Convention and Torture Convention.   
 
Another special rapporteur, James Crawford, provides the explanation about the concept 
of multilateral obligations in the ILC Third Report on state responsibility. Crawford writes that 
multilateral obligations are obligations owed not individually to a particular State but to a 
collective, a group of States, or even to the international community as a whole.
20
 He splits 
multilateral obligations into: (i) obligations to the international community as a whole (erga omnes), 
with the consequence that all States in the world have a legal interest in compliance with the 
obligation. These obligations are virtually coextensive with peremptory obligations (arising under 
norms of jus cogens); (ii) obligations owed to all the parties to a particular regime (erga omnes 
partes). He states that this type concerns “obligations which are expressed (or necessarily implied) 
to relate to matters of the common interest of the parties”. Crawford provides examples of such 
obligations that arise in the fields of the environment (for example, in relation to biodiversity or 
global warming) and disarmament (for example, a regional nuclear free zone treaty or a test ban 
treaty).
21
 
                                                             
19 Gerald Fitzmaurice Third Report on the Law of Treaties UN doc. A/CN.4/115 (1958), art 19.  
20 James Crawford Third Report on State Responsibility A/CN.4/507 (2000) at 106. 
21 Ibid. 
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The ILC Draft Articles also provide the notion of erga omnes and erga omnes partes 
obligations. By referring to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in the Barcelona 
Traction case, the commentary on Article 1 of the ILC Draft Articles states that erga omnes is an 
obligation towards the international community as a whole. The commentary also differentiates 
erga omnes obligations from bilateral obligations, which are concerned only with the relations of 
the responsible State and injured State inter se. Furthermore, the ILC Draft Articles refer to erga 
omnes partes as an obligation owed to a group and state that the obligation must have been 
established for the protection of a collective interest.
22
 There are legal consequences that follow 
from multilateral obligations. Following the breach of multilateral obligations, responsibility can 
be invoked by any party to the multilateral treaties (erga omnes partes) or by any state (erga 
omnes).
23
 
 
2 Bilateral type of obligations 
According to Fitzmaurice, a treaty of the “reciprocating” type is a treaty “providing for a 
mutual interchange of benefits between the parties, with rights and obligations for each involving 
specific treatment at the hands of and towards each of the others individually.”24 Furthermore, 
Crawford distinguishes between bilateral obligations and multilateral obligations. He states that 
bilateral obligations can arise from various sources, including general international law, bilateral 
or multilateral treaties or unilateral acts. He also refers to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations as an example of a multilateral treaty with “bilateral” obligations.25 
 
With regard to a breach of bilateral obligations, the ILC Draft Articles provide that the 
one who is entitled to invoke the responsibility is the individual injured state.
26
 This 
responsibility, amongst other things, distinguishes bilateral obligations from multilateral 
obligations. 
 
                                                             
22 The ILC Draft Articles, commentary of art 48.  
23
 Ibid, arts 42 and 48. 
24 Third Report of the Law of Treaties, art 18. 
25 Third Report on State Responsibility, at 99-100. 
26 Ibid, art 42.  
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C Obligations Erga Omnes in Relation to Obligations Erga Omnes Partes 
It is undeniable that one often gets confused between the concept of obligations erga 
omnes and erga omnes partes. The terms of obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes, 
although quite similar terms, indicate independent concepts.
27
 Arangio-Ruiz, UN special 
rapporteur in the work on codification of state responsibility, first distinguished the concept of 
obligations erga omnes partes from obligations erga omnes. He writes in his fourth report that:
28
  
This legal structure [erga omnes obligations] is typical not only of peremptory norms, but 
also of other norms of general international law and of a number of multilateral treaty 
rules [erga omnes partes] obligations.  
 
Subsequently, the ICTY referred to Arangio-Ruiz‟s remark in its judgment in the Blaskic 
case.
29
 The ICTY stated that Article 29 of the ICTY statute does not create bilateral relations, in 
the sense that it imposes an obligation on Members towards all other Members; therefore, it is a 
valid erga omnes partes obligation.
30
  
 
From here, one can point out that the first difference between these two obligations is the 
source that gives rise to the obligations. Obligations erga omnes are derived from general 
international law, whereas obligations erga omnes partes are derived from a multilateral treaty.
31
 
It is also noteworthy that international treaties often protect obligations erga omnes under their 
regimes.
32
  
 
Furthermore, as they are derived from international treaties, obligations erga omnes 
partes are more numerous and more diverse than obligations erga omnes.
33
 Another important 
                                                             
27 Ragazzi, above n 15, at 203; Tams, above n 9, at 124. 
28 Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz Fourth report on State responsibility A/CN.4/444/Add.1-3 (1992) at 92 (emphasis added). 
29 Appeal Chambers Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial 
Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic) [1997] ICTY Case No IT-95-14-AR at footnote 33 
(emphasis added).  
30 Ibid, at 26.  
31
 Linos-Alexander Sicilianos “The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of 
International Responsibility” (2002) 13(5) EJIL 1127 at 1136.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Tams, above n 9, at 125. 
138 
 
difference is the content of both obligations. The obligations obtain or retain their status as erga 
omnes obligation depending on the importance of specific obligations and/or their non-reciprocal 
structure; whereas to obtain obligations erga omnes partes, a treaty must recognise a general 
legal interest or confer a specific right to protection.
34
 In other words, an obligation becomes a 
valid erga omnes depending on the intrinsic value of the obligation itself. In contrast, the 
existence of obligations erga omnes partes is granted by the treaty itself. Therefore, as Tams 
states, the “right to react against treaty breaches exists because the respective treaties say so, not 
because of some special status of the obligation breached.”35 Several commentators also refer to 
obligations erga omnes partes as collective obligations.
36
 
 
D Obligations Erga Omnes in Relation to Norms of Jus Cogens 
Jus cogens is a peremptory norm of general international law. It is so fundamental and 
important that Article 53 of the VCLT states that a treaty is void if it conflicts with norms of jus 
cogens. Article 53 also provides that jus cogens is a norm that is accepted and recognised by the 
international community as a whole and as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified by a subsequent norm having the same character. One might be already 
aware that erga omnes is an obligation, and jus cogens is a norm, but because of their similarity 
in character, an overlap between these two concepts is inevitable. In other words, it is difficult to 
provide a clear-cut distinction between them. 
 
 The International Court in the Barcelona Traction case referred to the words “the 
importance of the rights involved” in order to decide what constitutes a valid erga omnes 
obligation.
37
 Thus, an obligation obtains the status of erga omnes because it protects important 
rights (the quality of the rights), not because it is breached in a serious way or because the 
particular right requires protection.
38
  
It has been noted previously that norms of jus cogens protect important or fundamental 
values, and no state may derogate from them. Because those peremptory norms are so important, 
                                                             
34 Ibid.  
35
 Ibid. 
36 Pauwelyn “A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations”, above n 6; Carmody, above n 3. 
37 Barcelona Traction Case, above n 10, at 33.  
38 Tams, above n 9, at 136-137. 
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third states also have a legal interest in securing such fundamental norms. Therefore, a treaty that 
conflicts with a peremptory norm would breach an obligation erga omnes, and this concerns all 
states (not only parties to the treaty). Third states may request that a treaty conflicting with 
norms of jus cogens be declared void.
39
 In other words, the existence of a general legal interest in 
the erga omnes concept is presupposed from jus cogens protection.
40
    
 
To sum up, it can be stated that the norms of jus cogens give rise to obligations erga 
omnes. 
 
E The WTO Dispute Settlement and Retaliation Obligations: Integral or Reciprocal in 
Nature 
This part examines the issue of whether WTO dispute settlement and retaliation 
obligations are erga omnes, erga omnes partes (collective) or bilateral obligations. Firstly, this 
part elaborates on whether or not WTO obligations in general are obligations erga omnes. 
Secondly, this part examines the WTO dispute settlement obligations including retaliation 
obligations in relation to collective or bilateral obligations.  
 
1 WTO obligations are not obligations erga omnes 
With respect to the arbitral panel decision in US – FSC that prohibited subsidies are 
obligations erga omnes, it can be argued that the arbitral decision misrepresents the legal 
framework and the legal concept of obligations erga omnes under public international law. The 
WTO fundamental obligations, such as market access and liberalisation of trade, are not the type 
of obligations erga omnes mentioned previously. WTO obligations are not owed to the 
international community as a whole, and yet they are not absolute obligations, in the sense that 
                                                             
39 The VCLT, art 53; Barcelona Traction case, above n 10. For example, Article 36 of the VCLT provides that a 
treaty does not create any rights or obligations for a third state without its consent. But when the jus cogens norm is 
affected, it gives rise to the rights of non-state parties or even all states to request the application of Article 53 of the 
VCLT to declare that treaty void. See Alexander Orakhelashvili Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at 134-135.  
40 Tams, above n 9, at 149.  
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states cannot derogate from such obligations. Several reasons why WTO obligations are not 
obligations erga omnes are as follows: 
 
(a) WTO obligations do not qualify as obligations erga omnes 
First and foremost, it is clear that WTO obligations derive from WTO covered 
agreements, whereas obligations erga omnes derive from general international law. Secondly, the 
application of WTO obligations and the consequences of the legal act are limited to specific 
states: the Members of the WTO. Thirdly, WTO obligations are not owed to the international 
community as a whole; therefore, non-WTO Members do not have any obligations to comply 
with WTO rules. Fourthly, the WTO allows its Members to modify, re-negotiate or withdraw the 
concessions.
41
 This is something that is not permitted if the WTO rules are obligations erga 
omnes.  
 
(b) WTO rules do not fall into the ambit of peremptory norm that give rise to 
obligations erga omnes 
As described previously, an obligation obtains an erga omnes status because it protects 
important rights, and one practical way to determine the importance of the rights is by evaluating 
obligations erga omnes in relation to the norms of jus cogens. Therefore, in order to assess 
whether WTO norms should be valid erga omnes, one significant question that should be 
answered is whether WTO norms are a part of peremptory norms. The International Court in 
Nuclear Weapons pointed out that “the question whether a norm is part of jus cogens relates to 
the legal character of the norm.”42 In addition, Article 53 of the VCLT provides that jus cogens 
are norms from which no derogation is permitted.  
 
The norms and rules of the WTO do hold a degree of importance. They are necessary and 
significant as a ground for states to conduct and observe the rules of the game in the international 
trade sphere. However, they do not obtain peremptory status. States do not have obligations to 
                                                             
41 The GATT 1994, art XXVIII.  
42 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons International Court of Justice (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ 
Rep 226 at 83. 
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the international community as a whole to liberalise their trade. Put differently, WTO law allows 
its Members to have protectionist measures such as tariff protection, safeguards, anti-dumping 
and so forth. 
 
2 Various WTO obligations are granted the status of obligations “erga omnes partes” 
Since its inception, the WTO has not been merely a body concerning itself with tariff 
concessions or market access. It has developed its subject matters so that they include non-
market access concessions and minimum standards obligations. These subject matters do not 
depend on a reciprocal promise between or amongst Members. For instance every WTO Member 
has to adjust its regulation to adhere to the minimum standards provided under the TRIPS 
Agreement. The character of these obligations might resemble obligations erga omnes partes. 
Several academic writings note the indivisible nature of WTO obligations as the source giving 
rise to obligations erga omnes partes;
43
 nonetheless, this part points out that the erga omnes 
partes status of various WTO obligations is granted by the covered agreements itself.  
 
Unlike the Human Rights or the Genocide Convention, the WTO treaty does not create, 
adopt or take up any „international law obligations that are owed to the international community 
as a whole‟ or obligations erga omnes into its provisions. Several obligations such as the 
minimum standards under TRIPS Agreement or other requirements provided under the SPS, 
TBT and SCM Agreements are obligations erga omnes partes, as the WTO treaty provides that 
they are not brought under a bundle of bilateral relations.  
 
A treaty might grant and recognise a general legal interest or specific rights of protection 
of its members, irrespective of whether the performance of the obligations is owed to all 
members of the treaty. The status “erga omnes partes” of those obligations is obtained from the 
WTO treaty itself, not because they are of an indivisible nature or because they protect 
fundamental values. Therefore, although the WTO treaty recognises the obligation to apply those 
minimum standards or other requirements to all WTO Members, those obligations do not result 
                                                             
43 Carmody, above n 3, at 420-422; Gazzini “The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations”, above ch 1, n 102, at 723-
727. 
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from peremptory norms or obligations erga omnes. As explained previously, the concept of 
obligations erga omnes partes is not the same as obligations erga omnes. An obligation becomes 
a valid erga omnes obligation depending on the intrinsic value of the obligation itself. In 
contrast, the existence of obligations erga omnes partes is granted by the treaty itself.   
    
3 WTO dispute settlement and retaliation constitute bilateral obligations 
The WTO is a multilateral system. The roles of the DSB in dispute settlement 
demonstrate this multilateral nature. However, it can be argued that the WTO dispute settlement 
reflects bilateral obligations. First, the decision of the panel or the Appellate Body or the 
arbitrators is only binding on the parties to the dispute. Only parties to the dispute can request an 
appeal, and only the complainant can request an authorisation for suspension of concessions or 
other obligations.
44
 Second, suspension of concessions under Article 22 of the DSU is a member-
to-member retaliation or countermeasure.
45
 Suspension is a trade restriction, thus there is no 
MFN requirement in imposing this countermeasure. It is merely the right to retaliate imposed by 
the winning party on the losing party in a non-compliance case. Trachtman provides a similar 
consideration stating that if the settlement took the form of the complainant imposing barriers 
against the respondent‟s goods, Article I does not require that such treatment be accorded to third 
parties.
46
 Third, the bilateral nature of the WTO dispute settlement can be seen from the 
settlement between parties to the dispute. The WTO does not require negotiations with third 
states in connection with bilateral settlement between two parties to the dispute. Nonetheless, 
third parties or states can bring a complaint against such settlement if it affects their rights to 
trade. 
 
The bilateral nature of WTO dispute settlement, consequently, provides a possibility to 
the complainant and respondent to settle the dispute between them through bilateral settlement. 
This means that the parties may opt for other kinds of settlement as long as they agree on a 
mutual solution and it does not result in any adverse effects to other parties‟ trade. 
 
                                                             
44 Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, above ch 1, n 112, at 76. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Joel P Trachtman “The WTO Cathedral” (2007) 43 Stan J Int‟l L 127 at 149 [“WTO Cathedral”]. 
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Summary 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the first level of assessment. 
Firstly, obligations erga omnes are derived from general international law, and they are 
obligations not only towards particular parties to the treaty but also towards the whole world 
(owed to international community as a whole). Put differently, the structure of obligations erga 
omnes is non-reciprocal. WTO obligations, in contrast, are derived from the WTO Agreements. 
WTO trade concessions retain a reciprocal character. Moreover, the WTO provides some 
flexibility under its regime. For instance, a Member may modify or renegotiate its concessions 
under Article XVIII of the GATT. As a result, we can conclude that WTO obligations do not fall 
within the ambit of obligations erga omnes under public international law.   
 
Secondly, the WTO has developed its subject matters not only regarding trade 
concessions or reciprocal market access but also subject matters that do not depend on reciprocal 
promises amongst Members, such as minimum requirements under the SPS, TBT and TRIPS 
Agreements. Consequently, some WTO obligations can be categorised as obligations erga omnes 
partes. Nonetheless, the status of obligations erga omnes partes is granted by the WTO treaty 
itself, and not because these obligations are indivisible in nature or protecting fundamental 
values. This is one thing that distinguishes the obligations of erga omnes from those erga omnes 
partes. 
 
Thirdly, although some WTO rules are erga omnes partes, the WTO dispute settlement 
and retaliation obligations are bilateral in nature. The bilateral obligations are evident firstly from 
the fact that the decision of the panel or the Appellate Body or the arbitrators is only binding on 
the parties to the dispute. Only parties to the dispute can request an appeal, and only the 
complainant can request an authorisation for suspension of concessions or other obligations. 
Secondly, a suspension of concessions under Article 22 of the DSU is a member-to-member 
retaliation or countermeasure. It is merely the right to retaliate imposed by the winning party on 
the losing party in a non-compliance case. Thirdly, the bilateral nature of the WTO dispute 
settlement can be seen from the settlement between parties to the dispute. The WTO does not 
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require negotiations with third states in connection with bilateral settlement between two parties 
to the dispute. 
 
The main consequence of this bilateral nature is that even though the WTO has a high 
preference for compliance (withdrawal of inconsistent measure), its bilateral nature provides 
parties to the dispute with the possibility of agreeing on other forms of settlement to settle the 
disagreement between them, for instance through a mutually agreeable solution. Similar to the 
first phase of contract design, the first level of assessment aims to define the entitlements of the 
WTO. The conclusion is that the WTO entitlements are not absolute or erga omnes. However, 
some entitlements are allocated collectively or erga omnes partes, and others, particularly 
dispute settlement and retaliation are given on a bilateral basis. This discussion is important 
because if the entitlements are absolute, there is no point to enter the subsequent discussion on 
the transferability and protection of the entitlements (the second phase of contract design).  
 
II Second Level of Assessment: Determining the Protection Rules 
The second level of assessment aims to examine the transferability of WTO entitlements. 
It is the question of how the WTO entitlements are protected under the WTO Agreement: 
whether or not the WTO provisions allow Members (entitlements holder) to take or transfer the 
entitlements, or whether the entitlements can be transferred unilaterally as long as compensation 
provided, or the entitlements can only be taken by consent of entitlements holder through 
renegotiation. The applicability of the second level of assessment is also related to the first level 
of assessment. Put differently, the discussion of the transferability of entitlements would be 
unnecessary if WTO obligations were obligations erga omnes.   
 
The second level of assessment looks at the flexibility in the WTO treaty (intra-treaty 
commitments). It also functions as a bridge to the third level (extra-treaty 
commitments/violations). For instance, if the WTO entitlements can only be taken or transferred 
by renegotiation, then there is a strict obligation to respect the initial entitlement, which means 
that Members have a duty to perform. Therefore, there is a stricter sanction in case of violation 
(extra-treaty commitments). Consequently, the purpose of inducing compliance is the primary 
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purpose of retaliation. In contrast, if WTO entitlements can be taken unilaterally as long as 
compensation is provided, then Members do not have the duty to perform but to compensate in 
case of violation. Therefore, at the enforcement level, some sorts of compensatory solution are 
preferable, and thus, inducing compliance is not the sole purpose of retaliation. 
 
This part examines the transferability of WTO entitlements by drawing an analogy to the 
protection rules model developed by Harvard professors, Calabresi and Melamed, in 1972.
47
 
Although Calabresi and Melamed‟s protection rules model was developed in connection with 
domestic law, various scholars have made reference to this framework in their discussions in the 
field of WTO law or international law.
48
 Pauwelyn asserts that one of the main attractions of this 
model is that it uses “the law and economics criteria of welfare maximization and rational 
action”; and by making several assumptions, the model can offer useful insights into 
international law.
49
 Furthermore, Trachtman provides that an economic analysis of law, by 
focusing on incentives and consequences, is helpful in enhancing understanding of not only 
contract and tort, but also other areas of law.
50
 He compares the WTO Agreement to a contract,
51
 
and Calabresi and Melamed‟s protection rules model is useful in understanding the incentives 
provided by remedies for breach of the contract and possible consequences.
52
  
 
In general, Calabresi and Melamed distinguish three types of protection for domestic 
legal entitlement. The first type is an inalienable rule and is not transferable. The second type is a 
property rule that the entitlement can be transferred but with the consent of the entitlement‟s 
holder. The third type is a liability rule that the entitlement can be taken without consent as long 
as compensation is provided to the entitlement‟s holder. The liability rule is often referred to as 
                                                             
47 Guido Calebresi and A Douglas Melamed “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089. 
48 For instance, Schwartz and Sykes, above ch 1, n 64; Trachtman “WTO Cathedral”, above n 46; Joost Pauwelyn 
Optimal Protection of International Law: Navigating between European Absolutism and American Voluntarism 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) [Optimal Protection of International Law].  
49 Several assumptions are as follows: the actor is state; the term of welfare maximisation is not limited on monetary 
term; the preference of states is assumed to be political welfare. See Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of International 
Law, above n 48, at 27-30. 
50
 Trachtman “WTO Cathedral”, above n 46, at 145. 
51 It is widely acknowledged that the WTO is an international agreement. See Japan – Alcohol Beverages (AB), 
above ch 1, n 132. 
52 Trachtman “WTO Cathedral”, above n 46, at 145. 
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the theory of efficient breach.
53
 However, it is important to note that the nomenclature of 
“efficient breach” in this context is somewhat misleading. The term “breach” suggests the 
violation or breach of rules (extra-treaty commitments/violation), but there is no breach here 
because it is permissible under the rule or the contract to deviate from the obligation if you pay 
compensation (intra-treaty behaviour). Only if the taker fails to pay the compensation will the 
extra-contractual violation emerge.
54
  
 
The subsequent part provides a more detailed elaboration on the three types of protection 
rules developed by Calabresi and Melamed. 
 
A Inalienability, Property and Liability Rules 
Calabresi and Melamed‟s framework suggests in which manner the entitlements are 
protected and whether the individual is allowed to transfer or trade the entitlements.
55
 The 
problem of “entitlement”, according to Calabresi and Melamed, is “the first issue which must be 
faced by any legal system”.56 They explain that at a domestic level a state is presented with the 
conflicting interests of two or more people, or two or more groups of people and have to decide 
whose interests prevails, whether it grants an entitlement to make noise or an entitlement to have 
silence, an entitlement to have children or to prohibit them, an entitlement to pollute or to have 
clean air, and so forth.
57
 Similar to domestic law, international treaties must also allocate the 
entitlements, for example an entitlement to freely trade or to restrict trade, to tolerate slavery or 
to respect human rights, and so forth.
58
  
 
After the entitlements are selected, the next question is how to protect those entitlements. 
Calabresi and Melamed provide three types of entitlements protection: inalienability, property 
rules, and liability rules.   
 
                                                             
53 For instance Schwartz and Sykes, above ch 1 n 64, at S180. 
54 Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of International Law, above n 48, at 14. 
55
 Calabresi and Melamed, above n 47, at 1092. 
56 Ibid, at 1090. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of International Law, above n 48, at 31.  
147 
 
1 Inalienability 
If the initial entitlement is absolute and a taking or transfer of the entitlement is 
prohibited, inefficient or immoral; such an entitlement is inalienable. Inalienability requires 
specific performance, where the derogation from the performance is not permitted. In contract 
parlance, inalienability obliges unconditional specific performance of the contractual rules, no 
matter what contingencies may occur in the course of contract performance.
59
  
 
Inalienability derives its justification and appropriateness from significant externalities, 
moralisms and paternalism.
60
 All three are based on economic efficiency, respectively, the 
impossibility of efficient breach, inappropriateness of monetisation, and the long term benefits of 
hand-tying.
61
  
 
Significant externalities refer to a very high-cost that no buyer would be willing to pay; 
for example, avoiding pollution is cheaper than paying its cost. Moralisms, in Calabresi and 
Melamed‟s view, are external costs that do not lend themselves to collective measurement which 
is acceptably objective and non-arbitrary.
62
 For example, if someone is willing to sell him/herself 
into slavery or sell his/her kidney, one (state) could intervene by valuing the external cost of such 
an action to the society as high, and thus, stop this action and force the buyer (slave-owner or 
kidney-owner) to pay that cost. Any monetisation of freedom or a kidney is out of question, 
because the state decided to make the entitlement of freedom from slavery or prohibition from 
selling a kidney, inalienable.
63
   
 
The last is paternalism which consists of self-paternalism and true paternalism. Calabresi 
and Melamed state that self-paternalism explains why Ulysses tied himself to the mast or why 
individuals pass a bill of rights or constitutional safeguards “so that they will be prevented from 
                                                             
59 Simon A B Schropp “Revisiting the „Compliance -vs.- Rebalancing‟ Debate in WTO Scholarship: Towards a 
Unified Research Agenda” (HEI Working Paper No 29, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007) at 28 
[“Revisiting the „Compliance -vs.- Rebalancing‟ Debate”]. 
60
 Calabresi and Melamed, above n 47, at 1111-1115. 
61 Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of International Law, above n 48, at 35. 
62 Calabresi and Melamed, above n 47, at 1111-1112. 
63 Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of International Law, above n 48, at 35. 
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yielding to momentary temptations which they deem harmful to themselves”.64 It is similar to 
explaining why contracts entered into when drunk or under coercion are invalid. True 
paternalism refers to prohibitions on a whole range of activities by minors.     
 
2 Property rules 
The entitlement is protected by a property rule when no one can take the entitlement 
unless the holder sells it willingly. Under property rules, both parties are under a “specific 
performance duty”, that is a strict obligation to respect the initial entitlement. In this case, the 
taker has to perform, and a failure to do so is punished so severely that he would never prefer 
violating the compliance with his obligation. However, a potential taker can buy off the owner‟s 
entitlement through renegotiations. He can still avoid his commitments by securing permission 
from the owner, usually by paying for it. Whenever the parties come to an agreement, the owner 
cedes their entitlement and sells it to the taker – the transfer is thus bilateral.65 
 
3 Liability rules 
The owner of the entitlement that is protected by a mere liability rule cannot object to the 
action of the transfer of the entitlement, but must accept the payment of damages. In order to 
operate, liability rules require the availability of a court to determine the value of the damages.
66
 
There are three reasons to replace a property rule with a liability rule: (i) hold-outs; (ii) free-
loaders or free-riders; and (iii) transaction costs.
67
  
 
Firstly, liability rules resolve a hold-out problem, that is, where the sale of entitlements is 
efficient (the buyer values the entitlement higher than the seller), certain sellers, or holders of the 
entitlement, may refuse to sell at their “normal” price in the hope of capturing more of the 
premium that the buyer is willing to pay. Calabresi and Melamed provide the example where the 
owners of land may hold-out with the purpose of getting a higher price from the town authority 
                                                             
64
 Calabresi and Melamed, above n 47, at 1113. 
65 Schropp “Revisiting the „Compliance -vs.- Rebalancing‟ Debate”, above n 59, at 45-47. 
66 Trachtman “WTO Cathedral”, above n 46, at 147. 
67 Calabresi and Melamed, above n 47, at 1006-1110. 
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wanting to build a park. Although the park is Pareto desirable (that is, the town‟s citizens value a 
park more than the land-owners value their land), with enough hold-outs, the park will not be 
built. Under liability rules, the town can simply take the land and compensate its owners at an 
objectively determined value.
68
  
 
Secondly, liability rules solve the free-rider problem, which occurs on the buyer side. For 
example, although the town‟s citizens may each value the land at a price that makes the sale 
Pareto desirable, some citizens may try to free-ride. That is, they may claim that the park has less 
value, although the true value is higher. For instance, they claim that the park is only worth $50 
to them or even nothing at all, when in fact the “true” value of the park is $100. They would do 
so in the hope that other citizens will admit to a higher desire and buy the land with their money, 
even though, subsequently, everyone would benefit from the park. With enough free-riders 
unwilling to pay, the park may not materialize, even though it is Pareto desirable. As with the 
hold-out problem, liability protection may then offer a way out: “if society can value collectively 
each individual citizen‟s desire to have a park and charge him a “benefits” tax based upon it, the 
freeloader problem is gone”. In other words, where the entitlement of citizens to their money is 
protected by liability rules, the town can simply take the citizens‟ money (that is, impose a tax) 
and compensate them with the creation of a park.
69
 
 
Thirdly, liability rules can resolve the problem of high transaction costs. A transaction 
cost is a cost connected with a process of transaction, such as the cost of information gathering, 
cost of bargaining, post-contractual litigation, enforcement and so forth. Calabresi and Melamed 
note that:
70
  
...perhaps the most common [reason], for employing a liability rule rather than a property rule 
to protect an entitlement is that market valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient, that 
is, it is either unavailable or too expensive compared to a collective valuation.  
 
                                                             
68 Ibid, 1106; Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of International Law, above n 48, at 43. 
69 Ibid, at 1107; Ibid, at 45. 
70 Ibid, at 1110 (emphasis added). 
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Hence, instead of forcing risk-takers to negotiate ex ante a deal with all potential victims 
(for example accidental injury), in domestic law, the risk-taker can simply take the entitlement 
(cause an accident) but will have to compensate the victim.
71
 
 
B An Analysis of Protection Rules in WTO Law  
The choice or allocation of entitlement in the first place can have crucial implications for 
the protection rules in the second place.
72
 For instance where the allocation of entitlements was 
made on a reciprocal basis (bilateral agreement), a liability rule may be appropriate to protect the 
entitlements. In contrast, where the entitlements were made on a non-reciprocal basis or 
allocated with regard to collective interests, a form of inalienability protection may be 
appropriate.
73
  
 
As a treaty, the WTO should define and assign the primary rules (the entitlements) to 
each other Member State. The assignment of entitlements in the WTO is based on the 
concessions exchanged amongst its Members. Due to the fact that most of the rights and 
obligations under the WTO are related to trade opportunities and interests, it can be remarked 
that generally the main entitlements of WTO are market access, plus the standards of protection 
that are stipulated under covered agreements.  
 
The second major question following the allocation of entitlements is about the protection 
rules of WTO entitlements. How are such entitlements protected? Can they be transferred or 
taken? If they can be transferred or taken, are they protected under property or liability rules? 
 
Drawing an analogy from the protection rules model, this part seeks to examine whether 
the WTO allows only specific performance (inalienability rule) or permits a certain degree of 
flexibility (a property or a liability rule). 
    
                                                             
71 Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of International Law, above n 48, at 47. 
72 Ibid, at 40. 
73 Ibid, at 41. 
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1 WTO entitlements are not inalienable 
There are two types of international law entitlements that cannot be taken or transferred. 
First are peremptory norms of general international law or jus cogens, and second are treaties 
that set out collective obligations (for instances human rights and labour conventions).
74
 The 
previous chapter of this thesis explained that WTO law is part of international law. Therefore, 
are there WTO obligations that can be considered inalienable? 
 
With regard to peremptory norms of general international law, as explained previously, 
none of WTO obligations can be considered as obligations erga omnes and the norms embraced 
under WTO law are not norms of jus cogens. The Genocide Convention, as a comparison, clearly 
aims to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. The Convention resembles norms of jus 
cogens, because conducting genocide, whether committed during war or peace time, is a crime 
against international law. These norm entitlements cannot be transferred or derogated from, for 
example by providing financial compensation for those who suffer because of such derogation. 
Therefore, the provisions embodied are inalienable and absolute.
75
  
 
Violation of a WTO rule, in contrast, does not constitute a “crime” against the whole 
WTO membership. The WTO also does not provide punitive remedies; instead, it provides 
equivalent or appropriate ones. Withdrawal or modification of concessions is also permissible 
under the WTO.  
 
This part also argues that any proposal or view to make WTO entitlements inalienable 
can risk the future trade commitments in the WTO. Members would think twice about making or 
offering their commitments if they knew that no withdrawal is allowed or punitive sanction is 
provided for non-performance. Put differently, the stricter the system is, the more likely 
Members will be to opt-out of the system. Non-WTO Members would also find the system 
unattractive and that would negatively affect their desire to join the system.  
 
                                                             
74 Ibid, at 110. 
75 See Joost Pauwelyn “How Strongly We Protect and Enforce International Law” (Duke Law School Faculty 
Scholarship Series NELLCO, 2006) at 34-38. 
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Davey states that international trade law is more concerned with promoting the making of 
agreements, whereas international law is concerned with assuring commitments made are carried 
out. Therefore, by making the withdrawal of concession impossible (inalienable), it would 
discourage the making of the concession in the first place.
76
 By referring to Dam, Davey notes 
that:
77
  
It is better that one hundred commitments should be made and that ten should be 
withdrawn than that only fifty commitments should be made and that all of them should 
be kept.  
 
Pauwelyn also suggests that the inalienability of WTO obligations would result in a loss 
of contractual freedom to address wide diversities and prevent welfare maximisation.
78
 From the 
above assessment, we can conclude that WTO entitlements are not inalienable.   
  
2 The debate over protection rules of WTO entitlements: property or liability rules 
By providing textual analysis of the WTO Charter and the DSU, Jackson argues that 
WTO law clearly establishes a preference for an obligation to perform the recommendations of 
the DSB. Compensation shall be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is 
impracticable. He also adds that several scholars‟ suggestion that the DSU text gives Members 
an option to comply with and conform to the ruling or to “buy-out” of its obligations to conform 
(opting-out solution), is not supported by the text of the DSU.
79
 Jackson‟s arguments 
demonstrate that entitlements under WTO law are protected by a property rule. His view is 
supported by other commentators, such as Nzelibe,
80
 and to some extent, Trachtman.
81
  
 
                                                             
76 Davey “Compliance Problems”, above ch 1, n 16, at 293. 
77 Ibid, at 293. 
78 Pauwelyn states that “if welfare maximization is the objective then it may be better to permit countries to contract 
out of WTO obligations for as long as they do not affect third party rights”. See Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of 
International Law, above n 48, at 125-126. 
79 Jackson “Obligation to Comply or to Buy Out”, above ch 1, n 57, at 115-116. See Jackson “Misunderstanding on 
the Nature of Legal Obligation”, above ch 1, n 8, at 63.  
80 Jibe Nzelibe “The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the World Trade 
Organization‟s Dispute Resolution Mechanism” 6 (2005) Theo Inq L 215.  
81 Trachtman “WTO Cathedral”, above n 46. 
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Trachtman agrees with the legal text analyses provided by Jackson, Nzelibe and others; 
that is, WTO law is mandatory law and states are not permitted to violate it even if they agree to 
suffer retaliation. However, he also suggests that it is important to distinguish between the law as 
legislated and the law in action; accordingly, he states that:
82
 
...as a matter of fact and practice, if not as a matter of legal doctrine, the WTO legal 
system is best characterized as employing a liability rule, rather than a property rule. 
 
Schwartz and Sykes, in contrast, argue that renegotiation and modification of concessions 
in the WTO are protected by a liability rule.
83
 Article XXVIII:3 of the GATT states that 
Members may withdraw concessions unilaterally where the MFN compensatory adjustment 
negotiation fails. Moreover, Article XXI of the GATS provides that WTO Members may re-
negotiate the schedules by reaching an MFN compensatory adjustment agreement, and in the 
event that no agreement can be achieved, the WTO Member requesting the change can enact it 
unilaterally, but subject to a “compensatory adjustment” set by arbitration or the suspension of 
“substantially equivalent” concessions or benefits by other Members. Other provisions for 
“escape” in specific areas are the safeguards provisions of Article XIX of GATT and the 
compulsory licenses provision of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
84
 
 
Schwartz and Sykes argue that under the MFN principle, trade concessions must extend 
to all WTO Members, therefore a Member would encounter a holdout problem as well as high 
transaction costs under a property rule, because it would require negotiations with each WTO 
Member.
85
 The liability rule approach prevents this problem. Schwartz and Sykes also argue that 
the rules of the DSU are protected by a liability rule, because the provisions allow violations to 
continue as long as the violator is willing to pay the price.
86
  
 
                                                             
82 Ibid, at 146, 149. 
83 Schwartz and Sykes, above ch 1, n 64, at S183-S188. 
84
 Trachtman “WTO Cathedral”, above n 46, at 148; Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of International Law, above n 48, 
at 135. 
85 Schwartz and Sykes, above ch 1, n 64, at S187. See also Trachtman “WTO Cathedral”, above n 46, at 149. 
86 Ibid, at S188-S189. 
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3 WTO law accommodates some amount of intra-contractual flexibility, yet WTO 
entitlements are protected by a property rule 
Various commentators have suggested that international trade agreements are incomplete; 
in the sense that it does not stipulate all possible contingencies in advance.
87
 This incompleteness 
is a result of the uncertain conditions that the drafters encountered.
88
 Accordingly, the drafters 
may be expected to have included provisions that allowed them to adjust the bargain when it 
becomes mutually disadvantageous.
89
 
 
In the WTO, the provisions for modifying tariff schedules through renegotiation in 
Article XXVIII of the GATT and for modifying scheduled services commitments in Article XXI 
of the GATS provide such intra-contractual flexibility. In other words, these provisions offer 
WTO Members a certain amount of flexibility to adjust the bargain without amounting to a 
breach of obligation.
90
 For that reason, WTO entitlements under the rules for renegotiation and 
modification of tariff and services schedules, as well as the rules on safeguards, are protected by 
a liability rule. Other than these specified rules, all WTO entitlements are protected by a property 
rule, and such protection is provided under the dispute settlement system.
91
 WTO law provides a 
high preference for compliance; whereas, compensation and retaliation are intended as temporary 
measures. 
 
The fact that rules of renegotiation and modification are protected by a liability rule, 
demonstrates the presence of a certain amount of (intra-contractual) flexibility in the WTO 
Agreement. Zimmermann describes that such flexibility plays an important role in ensuring that 
                                                             
87 For instance, Henrik Horn, Giovanni Maggi and Robert W Staiger “The GATT/WTO as an Incomplete Contract” 
(Mimeo, 2006); Lawrence, above ch 1, n 76. 
88 Pauwelyn, for instance, notes that it is difficult or impossible for the drafters to predict and foresee all future 
economic and political developments both domestically and internationally. See Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of 
International Law, above n 48, at 137. 
89
 Schwartz and Sykes, above ch 1, n 64, at S184. 
90 Claus D Zimmermann “Toleration of Temporary Non-Compliance: The Systemic Safety Valve of WTO Dispute 
Settlement Revisited” 3(2) (2011) Trade L & Dev 382, at 384. 
91 Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of International Law, above n 48, at 139. 
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WTO Members remain to make generous concessions in future rounds, and therefore serving the 
long-term interest of the international trading system.
92
   
 
As noted above, the WTO entitlements (other than those protected by a liability rule) are 
protected by a property rule; so theoretically speaking, these entitlements should be backed-up 
by stricter sanctions at the extra-contractual level. Nonetheless, the suspension of concessions 
under the DSU and the countermeasures under the SCM Agreement are non-punitive measures. 
The WTO provides the standard of “equivalence” and “appropriateness” to limit its sanctions. As 
a result, a paradoxical situation emerges. On the one hand, the DSU specifies high preference for 
compliance; but on the one hand, the remedies provided under the DSU do not seem strong 
enough to force the recalcitrant state to comply (the weak back-up enforcement). The third level 
of assessment aims to examine this issue. 
  
Summary  
The second level of assessment examined the transferability of the WTO entitlements and 
how these entitlements are protected. It addressed the questions whether or not WTO 
entitlements can be transferred (inalienability), whether they can be taken unilaterally as long as 
compensation is provided (liability rules) or whether they only can be only transferred through 
the consent of the entitlements holder (property rules).  
 
This part has argued that, firstly, WTO entitlements are not inalienable and that 
withdrawal or modification of concessions is permissible under the WTO. Secondly, WTO 
entitlements are protected by a property rule. The DSU established a preference for the 
withdrawal of the inconsistent measure (compliance with the DSB recommendations or rulings). 
Thirdly, the rules of renegotiation or modification tariff and services schedules as well as the 
rules on safeguards are protected by a liability rule.  
 
 
                                                             
92 Zimmermann, above n 90, at 397-398. 
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The rules of modifying tariff and services schedules demonstrate an intra-contractual 
flexibility in WTO Agreement. As noted earlier, the WTO covers various trade interests, areas, 
and issues, so it is not possible for trade negotiators to predict and foresee all future economic 
and political developments. This explains why there are provisions in the WTO Agreement 
(intra-contractual level) that are allowing Members to adjust or to deviate from their obligations. 
A certain degree of intra-contractual flexibility also plays a significant role to secure future 
commitments given by WTO Members. 
 
Finally, the first level assessment discerned that WTO obligations are not erga omnes and 
that dispute settlement and retaliation obligations are bilateral. The second level of assessment 
provides that WTO entitlements are not inalienable, and WTO entitlements are protected by a 
property rule, even though there is intra-contractual flexibility offered under the rules of 
modification tariff and services schedules. This brings us to one paradox that will be assessed in 
the third level of assessment. On the one hand, the WTO has a high preference for compliance, 
but on the other hand, it provides a lower level or weak back-up enforcement (non-punitive and 
equivalent standard suspension). 
 
III Third Level of Assessment: Back-Up Enforcement Level in Relation to the 
WTO Preference for Compliance     
The first level of assessment gives us an understanding of the fact that parties to the 
dispute have the possibility of agreeing on other forms of settlement to settle the disagreement 
between them because of the bilateral nature of dispute settlement and retaliation. Meanwhile, 
the second level of assessment leaves us with the paradox that WTO entitlements are protected 
by a property rule (high preference for compliance); nonetheless, the sanction provided under the 
WTO is non-punitive. The third level of assessment attempts to explain this paradox which in the 
end leads to the argument that inducing compliance is not the sole purpose of retaliation. 
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A High Preference for Compliance and Limitation of Sanction  
The rules of the DSU indicate a strong preference for compliance. Article 3.7 of the DSU 
states that “the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the 
withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of 
any of the covered agreements.” Article 19.1 of the DSU also provides that “where a Panel or the 
Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall 
recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity...”. Moreover, Article 
21.1 of the DSU stipulates that prompt compliance with the DSB‟s recommendations and rulings 
is essential. 
 
The WTO, even though it has a preference for compliance, merely relies on the 
Members‟ willingness to comply, and in the case of non-compliance, the DSU provides remedies 
which are limited in character and nature, such as the equivalence requirement under Article 22.4 
of the DSU for suspension of concessions or other obligations. This scheme allows a system of 
“breach and pay”; therefore, economic analysis of the law argues that the dispute settlement 
system is designed to encourage efficient breach.
93
 This thesis does not support this notion. The 
WTO dispute settlement system is not designed to accommodate efficient breach. The DSU 
clearly states that the central objective of the WTO dispute settlement is to provide security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system. Facilitating the theory of efficient breach in 
WTO dispute settlement would threaten the DSU‟s stated objective.94 Moreover, as pointed out 
by Collins and Zimmermann, due to the absence of retroactive damages under the DSU and the 
inexactness of damages calculations, it is very likely that some WTO breaches are not efficient at 
all.
95
 In the subsequent part, this thesis argues that the rules of the DSU including a system of 
“breach and pay” are designed to provide members with adequate extra-contractual flexibility.    
 
As noted earlier, WTO entitlements are protected by a property rule. Interestingly, at the 
enforcement level, the WTO provides remedies that do not seem strong enough to support a 
property protection. It is reasonable that a high level of protection requires strong back-up 
                                                             
93 See chapter one part III.  
94 David Collins “Efficient Breach, Reliance and Contract Remedies at the WTO” 43 (2009) JWT 225, at 231. 
95 Ibid, at 229-238; Zimmermann, above n 90, at 397-398. 
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enforcement. Property rules require specific performance and failure to do so is punished 
severely. Nonetheless, as described in the previous chapter, there is no punitive sanction in the 
WTO. Consequently, the enforcement provided under WTO law seems somehow insufficient to 
back-up the entitlements protected by a property rule.  
 
One might claim that in export subsidy cases, the arbitrators have crafted a property rule 
by calculating the level of suspension of concessions so as to compel compliance. In Canada – 
Aircraft II, the panel added 20 per cent to the amount of the subsidy as a punitive sanction in 
order to induce compliance. By providing for a punitive sanction, the arbitrators appeared to 
create a huge distinction between “appropriateness” and “equivalence”. Unfortunately, in doing 
so, the arbitrators did not furnish a strong explanation for their interpretation.
96
 The arbitrators in 
Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada), by taking into account the arbitrators‟ reasoning in 
US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), preferred the term “proportional” to “equivalence” in order to 
explain “appropriateness”. What proportional means, in the arbitrators‟ view, is that it is likely to 
induce compliance.
97
 Therefore, the arbitrators decided to adjust the level of countermeasures 
calculated on the basis of the total amount of the subsidy by an amount of 20 per cent in Canada 
– Aircraft II.98 
 
Nonetheless, the arbitrators‟ interpretation of appropriateness and level of nullification 
seems to clash with their reference to the ILC Draft Articles and to some cases in international 
law.
99
 Article 51 of the ILC Draft Articles provides the proportionality provision as a guideline 
principle so that a countermeasure does not become excessive. Thus, no matter how effective the 
countermeasure is in inducing compliance, if it is not proportional, it will not be appropriate.
100
 
Under Article 51 of the ILC Draft Articles, a countermeasure is proportional when it is 
commensurate with the injury suffered. In contrast, in the 1952 Netherlands case the Working 
Party stated that when applying the appropriateness standard in Article XXIII, an equivalence 
                                                             
96 Palmeter and Alexandrov, above ch 1, n 63, at 650-655. 
97
 Canada – Aircraft II (Article 22.6 – Canada), above ch 1, n 13, at [3.47]-[3.51].  
98 Ibid, at [3.119]-[3.122]. 
99 Palmeter and Alexandrov, above ch 1 n 63, at 655. 
100 Ibid, at 655. 
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standard was adopted.
101
 Thus, the distance between “appropriate” and “equivalent” under 
GATT actually may not have been immense.
102
 
 
I therefore suggest that one of the reasons why WTO law provides a non-punitive level of 
enforcement mechanism is to accommodate other purposes when the main purpose, inducing 
compliance, cannot be achieved. 
 
B A Non-Punitive Level of Enforcement Mechanism: the Current Design of Dispute 
Settlement Accommodating Other Purposes of Retaliation than Inducing Compliance 
By becoming Members of the WTO, states gain reciprocal benefits from WTO trade 
agreements and enjoy a high level of compliance through an effective dispute settlement 
mechanism. However, there are exogenous changes that might alter the cost and benefits of 
compliance, and the complexity or high political cost of compliance might lead a Member to not 
comply fully with its obligations.  
 
The question is why the WTO drafters or negotiators designed a non-punitive 
enforcement mechanism (the weak back-up enforcement), but at the same time had a high 
preference for compliance. Some commentators have provided several answers to this question. 
Pauwelyn argues that mere compensation and proportional countermeasures (seemingly weak 
back-up enforcement) are sufficient as back-up enforcement for a property rule. These formal 
sanctions, together with community costs such as reputation, will provide sufficient incentive to 
comply with dispute settlement reports.
103
 Zimmermann also notes that the seemingly weak 
back-up enforcement, with its de facto toleration of temporary non-compliance, serves as a 
valuable systemic safety valve.
104
 Without discarding these arguments, this thesis argues that the 
non-punitive level of enforcement is designed to accommodate other purposes of retaliation 
besides inducing compliance.  
 
                                                             
101
 US – Suspension of Obligations, above ch 2, n 20, at 2. 
102 Trachtman “WTO Cathedral”, above n 46, at 136. 
103 Pauwelyn Optimal Protection of International Law, above n 48 at 150-157.  
104 Zimmermann, above n 90, at 402-405. 
160 
 
At the intra-contractual commitments, WTO law offers several flexible rules under its 
provisions. Such flexible rules are provided due to the fact that in providing trade concessions, 
WTO Members have to deal with many complex issues such as domestic political sensitivity, the 
economic nature of concessions and unforeseen circumstances. At the extra-contractual 
commitments, Members still have to deal with various complexities in enforcing rulings, 
especially when the matter ruled on by the panel or the Appellate Body leads to high domestic 
political tension. In a situation where there is a high level of domestic political tension, a high 
level of enforcement (punitive sanction) would escalate the risk of a Member opting out of the 
system. Therefore, the DSU designs the enforcement level in such a way to keep Members 
within the WTO dispute settlement system. Hudec argues that all WTO Members are repeat 
players in the game, as they may have roles both as complainants and respondents.
105
 Therefore, 
Hudec has the view that:
106
 
The optimum legal system is not simply the strongest legal system. It is the legal system 
that will be most helpful in enforcing one‟s trade agreement rights as complainant, while 
at the same time preserving the desired degree of freedom to deal with adverse legal 
rulings against one‟s own behaviour. 
 
Having a weak back-up (non-punitive) enforcement mechanism does not undermine the 
WTO legal system. The fact that WTO dispute settlement enjoys a high level of compliance, 
despite having a non-punitive level of enforcement mechanism, shows basically that WTO 
Members are willing to comply with the DSB recommendations or rulings. The reasons for this 
phenomenon are that states are repeat players in the game (today‟s complainant may be 
tomorrow‟s respondent, or vice versa), and that they need to maintain their good reputation for 
future commitments. 
 
Hence, realising the significance of having certain degree of flexibility, WTO retaliation, 
even though it has a strong preference for inducing compliance, does not have inducing 
compliance as its sole purpose. When inducing compliance seems not attainable, retaliation can 
serve other purposes: rebalancing and inducing a mutually agreeable solution or settlement. 
                                                             
105 Hudec “Broadening the Scope of Remedies”, above ch 1, n 14, at 377. 
106 Ibid. 
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 As pointed out by Zimmermann, the rules of the DSU indicate a preference for 
compliance but not at any cost. The weak back-up enforcement tolerates de facto, temporary 
non-compliance (“breach and pay”).107 The de facto toleration of temporary non-compliance 
demonstrates an extra-contractual flexibility and constitutes an important systematic safety valve 
for scenarios where WTO Members find it impossible to comply with the DSB‟s 
recommendations or rulings within the reasonable period of time.
108
 Put differently, the weak 
back-up enforcement is designed to accommodate the “rebalancing” purpose of retaliation. 
However, a WTO dispute can be terminated by either specific performance (compliance) or a 
mutually agreed solution.
109
 Malacrida put it clearly: “while the immediate aim of WTO 
retaliation is rebalancing, its ultimate aim is to induce compliance.”110 In the next chapter, this 
thesis demonstrates that a mutually agreeable solution can also be the ultimate aim of WTO 
retaliation, as occurred in the EC – Hormones dispute. 
 
Summary 
The puzzle is almost complete. This thesis began by questioning the effectiveness and 
purposes of WTO retaliation in chapter two. Subsequently, chapter three conducted the search of 
the purposes of retaliation, and concluded that retaliation can pursue more than one purpose. 
Finally, chapter four assessed the multiple purposes of retaliation from the design of WTO treaty. 
In so doing, this chapter established three levels of assessment.  
 
The first level of assessment carried out the analysis with regard to the nature of WTO 
entitlements. This level concluded that the bilateral nature of WTO dispute settlement and 
retaliation obligations provides parties to the dispute with the possibility of agreeing on other 
forms of settlement. The second level of assessment examined the protection rules of WTO 
entitlements. This level argued that WTO entitlements are protected by a property rule (high 
preference for compliance); nonetheless, WTO law does not provide punitive sanction as is 
                                                             
107
 Zimmermann, above n 90, at 402. 
108 Ibid, at 404. 
109 The DSU, arts 3.6, 3.7, and 22.1. 
110 Malacrida, above ch 1, n 28, at 5. 
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required by a property rule. This led us to the third level of assessment, in which this thesis 
provided that a non-punitive level of enforcement is designed to accommodate other purposes of 
retaliation. In short, the assessments in this chapter have established that the WTO treaty is 
designed in such a way so that it can accommodate the multiple purposes of retaliation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RETALIATION TO INDUCE A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE SOLUTION: A 
POSITIVE SETTLEMENT REACHED IN THE EC – HORMONES 
DISPUTE 
 
“The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute”.
1
 
 
OVERVIEW 
The WTO gives its Members the discretion to select their own domestic health policies; 
however in so doing, Members should apply their policies consistently with their WTO 
obligations. The EC – Hormones dispute is a dispute related to the health policies of the 
European Communities. The European Communities enacted a Directive that prohibited the 
importation and sale of hormone-treated beef and beef by-products throughout the European 
Communities. The United States and Canada challenged this directive, arguing that the European 
Communities violated its obligations under the GATT, the SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement. 
Both the panel and Appellate Body concluded that the European Communities were acting 
inconsistently with the SPS Agreement because the ban was not based on a risk assessment as 
required by the SPS Agreement. The EC – Hormones dispute is one example to elucidate how 
difficult it is to achieve compliance when it is related with a domestic sensitive issue, such as 
public health. Consequently, when the cost of compliance outweighs the cost of deviation, 
Members may opt to maintain the inconsistent measure and restore the political balance through 
retaliation.    
 
This part discusses at first the implementation stage of the EC – Hormones dispute, 
particularly related to the retaliatory sanction against the failure of the European Communities to 
implement the recommendations or rulings. Subsequently, this part provides and elaborates on 
another purpose that retaliation can pursue. And finally, it responds to the question about the 
effectiveness of retaliation.   
                                                             
1 The DSU, art 3.7. 
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I EC – Hormones Dispute: Implementation Background 
In EC – Hormones, although the European Communities (the respondent) always 
affirmed its intention to comply with the report adopted by the DSB, it seemed that it never 
intended to withdraw its measure.
2
 The European Communities‟ effort to comply was 
demonstrated from the actions pursued by the Commission. 
 
After the decision of the DSB, the Commission immediately initiated a complementary 
risk assessment and funded several scientific studies and research projects on the six hormones 
involved in the dispute.
3
 The risk assessment conducted by the Scientific Committee on 
Veterinary Measures relating to Public Health (SCVPH) concluded that all six hormones have 
potentially adverse effects on human health, particularly for pre-pubertal children. However, the 
evidence is not equally conclusive for all hormones.
4
  
 
In May 2001, the Commission proposed new legislation amending Council Directive 
96/22/EC which suggests the complete ban of the use of oestradiol 17β.5 With regard to the other 
five hormones, although admitting that the current state of knowledge does not make it possible 
to give a quantitative estimate of the risk to consumers, the Commission proposed to continue to 
provisionally prohibit these hormones in accordance with Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. 
 
Despite any risk assessment conducted by the European Communities, the United States 
and Canada (the complainants) viewed that the withdrawal of the inconsistent measures (the ban) 
was the only way to implement the DSB recommendations or rulings. The United States went 
                                                             
2 Nicole C Lloyd “Beef Hormones Foster Animosity and Not Growth: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization 
Solving the United States‟ and European Communities‟ Beef Hormone Dispute” (2006) 25 Penn St Int‟l L Rev 557, 
798. See also: European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) WTO DOC 
WT/DS26/17/Add.4, WT/DS48/15/Add.4 (11 May 1999) (Status Report by the European Communities). 
3 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council Directive 96/22/EC 
concerning the Prohibition on the Use in Stockfarming of certain Substances Having a Hormonal or Thyrostatic 
Action and of Beta-agonists [2000] COM (2000)0320 at 2. 
4
 Report on the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Amending Council Directive 96/22/EC 
concerning the Prohibition on the Use in Stockfarming of certain Substances Having a Hormonal or Thyrostatic 
Action and of Beta-agonists [2001] EUR PARL DOC A5-0002/2001 at 14.  
5 COM (2000)0320, above n 3, at 6.  
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even further; infuriated by the European Communities‟ non-compliance, it adopted „carousel 
retaliation‟ in 2000.6 However, when the European Communities threatened to seek to retaliate 
against the United States in the FSC dispute, the United States decided not to implement the 
carousel retaliation.
7
    
 
In October 2003, the European Communities announced their new legislation to the DSB 
and claimed that the new scientific evidence justified its ban.
8
 The European Communities 
argued that by enacting this Directive, it has fully implemented with the DSB recommendations, 
and thus required the United States and Canada to terminate the sanctions. The United States and 
Canada disagreed and denied that the new directive was based on science or that it implemented 
the DSB recommendations. Both also rejected the European Communities‟ request to initiate a 
compliance proceeding under Article 21.5.
9
 In November 2004, after the negotiation failed, the 
European Communities requested consultations with the United States and Canada. When the 
consultations also failed, the European Communities requested the establishment of a panel in 
January 2005 on the continued suspension of obligations in the EC – Hormones. 
 
The following part addresses another purpose in pursuing retaliation – namely inducing a 
mutually agreeable solution. It explains the nature and features of this purpose and whether or 
not this purpose is feasible for WTO Members.   
                                                             
6 Trade and Development Act Pub L No 106-200, § 407 114 Stat 251. 
7 Taylor, above ch 1, n 40, at 366-367. 
8 Directive 2003/74/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 amending Council 
Directive 96/22/EC concerning the prohibition on the use in stock farming of certain substances which have a 
hormonal or thyrostatic action and of beta-agonists [2003] O J L 262/17; European Communities – Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) WTO DOC WT/DS26/22 WT/DS48/20 (28 October 2003) 
(Communication from the European Communities).  
9
 United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute WTO DOC WT/DS320/1 
G/L/713 (10 November 2004) at [2] (Request for Consultations by the European Communities). See also: Dispute 
Settlement Body Minutes of Meeting held on 7 November 2003 WTO DOC WT/DSB/M/157 (18 December 2003) at 
28-33. 
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II Retaliation to Induce a Mutually Agreeable Solution as another Competing 
Purpose: The Settlement Reached in EC – Hormones 
The beef hormones dispute is one example of a conflict over compliance which lasted 
many years. The United States and Canada insisted on maintaining their retaliatory measures 
against certain EC products with the purpose of forcing the European Communities to comply 
with the WTO ruling by opening its market to hormone-treated beef. The European 
Communities, in contrast, insisted on maintaining its regulation banning hormone-treated beef, 
and on opening its market only to non-hormone-treated beef.    
 
The beef hormones dispute is a complex dispute because it interacts with various 
sensitive aspects, such as public health protection, social and cultural expectations, domestic 
policy issues, producer and consumer interests, and so forth. Those aspects played a significant 
role in generating the disagreement and the difficulties over compliance. The United States, for 
instance, argued that the United States‟ beef is from cattle that are treated with approved growth 
hormones, and hence, does not cause any risk to public health.
10
 In contrast, the European 
Communities claimed that there are potential risks to human health associated with hormone-
treated beef and beef products.
11
 However, the problem was that the European Communities‟ 
claim lacked an objective scientific risk assessment as required by the SPS Agreement. The ban 
was mostly derived from subjective domestic consumer fear and bad experiences in the past.
12
 
The fear and experiences of the past have established a social-cultural perspective. The European 
Communities producers and consumers have a preference for naturally produced foods. The 
United States producers and consumers generally accept technological interference with food. 
                                                             
10 Renee Johnson and Charles E Hanrahan “The US-EU Beef Hormone Dispute” (Congressional Research Service, 
2010) at 9. 
11 Ibid, at 7. 
12 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (Complaint by the United States) WTO DOC 
WT/DS26/R/USA (1997) at [8]-[9] (Report of the WTO Panel). In the history of events, the panel report described 
the illegal use of dethylstilboestrol (known as DES) in 1970 in veal production in France, and incidents in Italy 
where adolescent reportedly suffered from hormonal irregularity and the veal had been suspected as a possible 
cause.  
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This favours the United States because the SPS Agreement requires technological risk 
assessment to support the protection of public health.
13
 
 
 In May 2009 the European Union and the United States signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) implementing an agreement that promises to end this long-standing 
dispute.
14
 The memorandum sets up three phases in which the European Union agreed to expand 
its market access for the United States high quality beef, and the United States agreed to reduce 
its retaliatory duties levied on certain European Union exports.
15
 Hence, under this 
memorandum, the European Union would get to maintain its ban on the import of hormone-
treated beef, but concurrently would provide a new tariff-free import quota for high-quality beef 
from the United States.
16
  
 
The agreement itself received a positive response from the United States meat exporters. 
The United States Meat Exporter Federation, for instance, stated that the meat export activity 
under the new quota has been increasing very encouragingly and has had a positive impact on 
demand for high-quality US beef.
17
 During the DSB meeting, most WTO Members welcomed 
the European Union and the United States beef hormones solution agreement, even though most 
of the beef-exporting Members also demonstrated their fear regarding the definition of “high-
quality” beef as it might not provide equal market access to beef exporters, and therefore, could 
trigger another potential dispute under MFN treatment.
18
 The European Union, in responding to 
this concern, provided that this new quota would be “non-discriminatory” and “origin-neutral”.19 
                                                             
13 Isis Amelia Rose Sien “Beefing Up the Hormones Dispute: Problems in Compliance and Viable Compromise 
Alternatives” (2007) 95 Geo L J 565 at 575-579.  
14 The European Union was established when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force on 1 November 1993. The 
European Communities are one of the three pillars of the European Union. This thesis use these both terms (the 
European Union and European Communities) interchangeably. 
15 European Communities – Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Joint Communication 
from the European Communities and the United States WTO DOC WT/DS26/28 (30 September 2009).  
16 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development “New Issues Arise in EU-US Beef Trade Dispute” 
Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest Vol 13 No 23” (24 June 2009).  
17 US Meat Export Federation “International Market Development Activities for US Beef” Fourth Quarter FY09 (1 
July – 30 September 2009) at 7. 
18 Dispute Settlement Body Minutes Meeting 19 June 2009 – Held in Centre William Rappard on 19 June 2009 
WTO DOC WT/DSB/M/270 (28 August 2009) at 68. 
19 Ibid, at 76. 
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In this dispute, retaliatory sanctions imposed by the United States would be terminated 
not because the European Communities removed its inconsistent measure, but because both 
states have reached and agreed upon a mutually satisfactory settlement. In other words, 
retaliation imposed by the United States has not induced the withdrawal of the inconsistent 
measure (compliance) but a mutually agreeable solution. Does the DSU allow such a solution? 
Does this kind of solution undermine the WTO dispute settlement system? 
 
A Retaliation With the Purpose of Inducing a Mutually Agreeable Solution 
The DSU does provide the legal basis for a dispute to be settled by the reaching of a 
mutually agreeable solution, and nothing under the DSU prevents such a solution from being 
reached at any stage of the dispute settlement, including at the implementation level.
20
 Article 
22.8 of the DSU requires that retaliation shall be terminated upon the withdrawal of inconsistent 
measures, or upon the implementation of recommendations or rulings, or upon a mutually 
satisfactory solution being reached. Moreover, Article 3.7 of the DSU states that a solution 
mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is 
clearly preferable.  
 
“Consistent with the covered agreements” can be understood to mean that the measure 
should not violate WTO obligations stipulated under the covered agreements, and it should not 
nullify or impair the benefit of other WTO Members. This understanding enlightens the 
differences between “measure taken to comply” (compliance) and “mutually agreeable solution”. 
A “measure taken to comply” is usually disputed by the parties to the dispute as the complainant 
often believes the measure still violates the violator‟s WTO obligations, and such a complaint is 
then brought before the Article 21.5 arbitration proceedings (compliance proceedings). However, 
a “mutually agreeable solution” is usually disputed by other Members who perceive that the 
solution reached by parties to the dispute has nullified or impaired their benefit. Such a 
complaint is brought under a new proceeding. 
 
                                                             
20 The DSU, arts 3.6 and 3.7; see also Shadikhodjaev, above ch 2, n 7, at 24. 
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This is one of the issues in US Hormone Suspension, also known as Hormones II, where 
the European Communities, instead of initiating Article 21.5 arbitration proceeding, started a 
new proceeding to determine where there had been compliance with the DSB‟s ruling and 
recommendation in Hormones I.
21
 The Appellate Body stated that the European Communities 
could have brought the complaint under Article 21.5 arbitration proceedings because either the 
implementing Member or the suspending Member can initiate the compliance proceeding.
22
 
 
Therefore, the crucial thing for the parties to the dispute in reaching a mutually agreeable 
solution is to ensure that the solution does not nullify or impair other Members‟ trade interests. A 
measure that is consistent with WTO obligations but nullifies and impairs other Members‟ 
benefits is very much open to challenge. On the flip-side, WTO Members might be reluctant to 
initiate a proceeding for a measure that does not nullify or impair their benefit, even though the 
measure does not conform to WTO rules.   
 
Every Member has the right to bring complaints on violations, or non-violations, or any 
complaints (standing) under the covered agreements. There is no requirement to provide 
evidence of the existence of “legal or economic interests”, the presumed legal interest and 
economic interests are sufficient to initiate the proceedings. The Appellate Body in US – Wool 
Shirts and Blouses stated that “if any Member should consider that its benefits are nullified or 
impaired as result of circumstances set out in Article XXIII, then dispute settlement is 
available.”23 Marceau points out the decision in Korea – Dairy in which the panel rejected the 
notion that evidence of any economic or legal interest must be provided before WTO 
proceedings can be initiated;
24
 however, she also notes that in practice a Member must have 
some genuine interests to initiate the proceedings.
25
 This is understandable because the cost of 
initiating or having a dispute in the WTO is economically and politically substantial. A Member 
                                                             
21 Catherina E Koops “Suspensions: To Be Continued” (2009) 36(4) Legal Iss Econ Integ 353 at 358. 
22 US – Continued Suspension (AB), above ch 1, n 43, at 347.  
23 US –Shirts and Blouses (AB), above ch 3, n 91, at [13]. 
24 Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Import of Certain Dairy Products WTO DOC WT/DS98/R (2000) at 
[7.14] (Report of the WTO Panel). Likewise, the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III ruled that there is no “legal 
interest” requirement to have a standing before the WTO panel, see European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas WTO DOC WT/DS27/AB/R (1997) at [132] (Report of the 
Appellate Body).   
25 Gabrielle Marceau “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights” (2002) 13(4) EJIL 753 at 758. 
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would plausibly challenge a measure that inflicts a substantial adverse impact on its trade 
interests, or nullifies or impairs its benefits. 
 
Article 3.8 of the DSU provides a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse 
impact on other Members, and it is up to the respondent Member to rebut such a charge. This 
presumption is reasonable because it is hard to imagine that there is cheating in trade deals that 
would not hamper other Members‟ trade benefits, opportunities, or expectations. Therefore, 
“nullification or impairment of benefit” is a significant element and its existence is presumed to 
exist in every infringement.  
 
In sum, retaliatory measures can also be imposed with the purpose of achieving a 
mutually agreeable solution, and this action is possible under Articles 3.7 and 22.8 of the DSU. 
However the parties should design a solution that does not have a negative effect on, or 
discriminate against other Members‟ trade benefit, otherwise the solution will be able to be 
challenged in a new dispute. What happened in the EC – Hormones solution was that Members, 
in the DSB meetings, did not question the fact that the European Union still maintains its ban on 
hormone-treated beef without providing an objective risk assessment required by the SPS 
Agreement (non-withdrawal or non-implementation). Their concern was about whether the 
achieved solution would hurt their own trade benefits or interests. A mutually agreeable solution 
achieves a more politically sound rather than a legally sound settlement.  
 
B Retaliation Inducing a Mutually Agreeable Solution: Its Nature and Feature 
As with compliance, the achievement of a mutually agreeable solution terminates the 
retaliatory measures imposed by the retaliating state; however, an agreeable solution has a 
broader scope than compliance. Whereas inducing compliance under Article 19.1 of the DSU has 
the meaning of “bring[ing] the inconsistent measure into conformity”, a mutually agreeable 
solution may come in the form of compensation (not only withdrawal). Nevertheless it has 
distinctions from compensation under Article 22.2 of the DSU. A mutually agreeable solution is 
a final remedy, while Article 22.2 of the DSU compensation is a temporary one. In other words, 
compensation under Article 22.2 does not replace the full implementation of bringing a measure 
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into conformity. The memorandum between the United States and the European Union, which 
consists of three phases, offers a definitive solution that could be agreed upon under phase 3.
26
 It 
opens the possibility of making the arrangement permanent, including in the case of the WTO 
hormone-treated beef dispute.
27
 In other words, if the arrangement between the United States and 
the European Union is working then it could lead to a permanent solution or settlement between 
them. Such a mutually agreed solution, consequently, would replace the implementation under 
Article 19 of the DSU, of bringing the inconsistent measure into conformity.  
 
Furthermore, as long as the design would not result in a negative impact on other 
Members‟ trade interests, a mutually agreeable solution might reasonably be reached in various 
forms. The form of the arrangement offered by the EU in the beef hormones solution is a kind of 
compensation to offset the losses incurred due to its continuance of the prohibition on hormone 
treated beef. Therefore, a mutually agreeable solution paves the way for other forms of solutions 
to be reached in the future. Financial compensation is one possible form, although it might be 
less preferable than market access, because financial interests (in terms of cash) are not the major 
interests of the WTO Members. It is market access and fair treatment towards their products that 
are the main attractions for states in becoming part of the WTO system and rules. 
 
C Retaliation Inducing a Mutually Agreeable Solution: A Defeat for the Winning Party?  
Article 3.7 of the DSU clearly elucidates a preference for settling disputes through a 
mutually agreeable solution. Nonetheless, this preference is also followed by another 
requirement that the solution shall be consistent with the WTO covered agreements and shall not 
nullify or impair benefits of other Members accruing under the agreement.
28
  
 
                                                             
26 European Commission “WTO Dispute Settlement: Memorandum on Beef Hormones Dispute Signed with the 
United States” (Press Release, 14 May 2009).  
27 If both the United States and the European Union agree in phase 3 that the arrangement is working to their mutual 
satisfaction, it would lead to a final solution, in which the European Union would make permanent the 45,000 tons 
import quota for high-quality beef and the United States would remove the retaliatory duties, see International 
Centre for Trade Sustainable Development, “Truce Declared in Beef Hormone Dispute”, News and Analysis Vol 3 
No 2 (June 2009). 
28 The DSU, arts 3.5 and 3.7. 
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Parties to the dispute can reach a mutually agreeable solution through bilateral 
negotiation or with the assistance of dispute resolution mechanisms such as good offices, 
conciliation or mediation.
29
 Even though it is a prerequisite that the parties to a dispute enter into 
bilateral negotiations before requesting the establishment of the panel, nothing in the DSU 
prohibits the parties from reaching a mutually agreeable solution at any stage of the dispute 
settlement process. For instance, the parties to the dispute reached a mutually agreeable solution 
prior to the issuance of the interim report in US – DRAMS, or after the issuance but before the 
issuance of final report in EC – Scallops.30 In other cases, EC – Butter, the parties reached the 
solution after the issuance of the final report but before the circulation of the report to all 
Members.
31
 In Japan – Apples, the parties to the dispute reached a mutually agreeable solution 
after the issuance of the Article 21.5 panel report.
32
 As discussed above, recently, the European 
Union and the United States reached a mutually agreeable solution to end their long-standing 
dispute in EC – Hormones after the imposition of retaliation.   
 
Whereas reaching a mutually agreeable solution at the beginning of the dispute or prior to 
the issuance of the panel or Appellate Body final report would bring a win-win situation for both 
parties to the dispute, the benefit of achieving a mutually agreeable solution after the imposition 
of the retaliation measure is questionable from the side of the complainant or winning party side. 
The winning party seems not to obtain what is supposed to gain when winning the dispute. 
However, by ending a long dispute such as occurred in the EC – Hormones dispute, a mutually 
agreeable solution can be also perceived as bringing a positive result from the settlement of 
dispute point of view.  
 
 
                                                             
29 A Handbook of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, above ch 1, n 4, at 92. 
30
 Ibid, at 93. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Japan Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples WTO DOC 
WT/DS245/21 G/L/520/Add.1 G/SPS/GEN/299/Add.1 G/AG/GEN/50/Add.1 (2 September 2005).  
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Bello, Pelzman and Shoham state that while the DSU improved the GATT rules for 
settling disputes, compliance remains an elective choice.
33
 The best option for the institution and 
complainant would be to have the respondent abide by the decision and come into compliance by 
withdrawing the inconsistent measure.
34
 In contrast, the best option from the respondent‟s 
perspective may be to continue to maintain the measure and provide compensation to the 
complainant; and the second-best-option may be to suffer retaliation.
35
 
 
Whereas the best option for the institution and complainant would bring the dispute to an 
end, the best option for the respondent would prolong the dispute, as it would just provide 
compensation rather than resolving the dispute. However, a mutually agreeable solution, even 
reached after the threat of the imposition of retaliation, would bring a settlement of the dispute 
for both the complainant and respondent. The case of the EC hormone-treated beef demonstrates 
the reality that when compliance is not attainable, the best option for the complainant, the 
respondent, and even the institution, could be to reach a mutually agreeable solution to settle and 
end the dispute. That way neither party would retain the worse-off position any longer.   
 
In sum, a mutually agreeable solution does not worsen the position of the winning party. 
It provides an alternative outcome when withdrawal of the inconsistent measure is not attainable. 
Inducing a mutually agreeable solution makes the system more fruitful and provides Members 
with some flexibility in settling their disputes within the framework of the WTO. Without any 
flexibility, Members may choose to opt out of the system. A lack of settlement would obviously 
undermine the WTO dispute settlement system and the favourable position of the winning party.  
 
                                                             
33 Joseph Pelzman and Amir Shoham “WTO DSU – Enforcement Issues” in James C Hartigan (ed) Trade Disputes 
and the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO: an Interdisciplinary Assessment (Emerald, 2009) at 370. See 
also Bello, above ch 1, n 80, at 646-647. 
34 Ibid, at 370. 
35 Ibid. 
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III Room for Deviation: The Question about the Effectiveness of WTO 
Retaliation 
As explained in chapter three, the purpose of retaliation has to be within the context of 
the aim and purpose of WTO dispute settlement. The purpose of inducing a mutually agreeable 
solution supports the aim of the WTO dispute settlement system by providing security and 
predictability, an aim stipulated under Article 3.2 of the DSU. 
 
Several scholars such as Bello, Schwartz and Sykes argue that the respondent or violator 
state would maintain its inconsistent measure and pay compensation or suffer retaliation, rather 
than lose its domestic political credence by complying. They refer to suffering retaliation here 
for the purpose of rebalancing. The weakness of this scheme is that it prolongs the dispute. The 
lack of settlement would obviously undermine the security and predictability of WTO legal 
system and dispute settlement. A mutually agreeable solution provides a better solution for the 
system. They have the effect of adjustment, but, most importantly lead to the settlement of the 
dispute. When inducing compliance is too costly, retaliation can still be utilised as an instrument 
in bargaining a mutually agreeable solution.  
 
Many Members have welcomed the mutually agreeable solution reached by the European 
Union and the United States in EC – Hormones, because the agreement is believed to provide a 
way to settle a dispute that has tasted for over 20 years. That settlement would obviously 
contribute positively to the aim of dispute settlement in providing security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system.     
 
A mutually agreeable solution is the result of a diplomatic or negotiated approach; it 
offers some flexibility in settling the dispute, and in EC – Hormones case it provides room for 
“legitimate” non-compliance. The existence of mutually agreeable solutions is necessary in order 
to strike the balance between the WTO as a diplomatic or negotiation based system and the WTO 
as a rule-based system. If the rules are too rigid or strict, Members would lose their interest in 
complying with the rules, or they would even ignore the rules. Some flexibility is important to 
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keep Members in the system and to attract other non-Members to join the system. This explains 
why in the WTO there are no punitive sanctions. 
 
Moreover as explained previously, inducing compliance is not the sole purpose of 
retaliation. In fact, the DSU demonstrates a preference for mutually agreeable solutions. Not only 
does the DSU state it as the preferable settlement at the consultations stage (prior to panel stage), 
but also provides the retaliation provision to generate this solution at the non-implementation 
stage. Therefore with regard to the question of effectiveness, even though in some circumstances 
retaliation may not achieve the purpose of inducing compliance, its existence is still sufficient to 
force a violator state to sit down and negotiate another kind of solution. The imposition of 
retaliation brings about a behavioural change in the violator state either by stopping the violation, 
or providing some kind of compensation/rebalancing, or agreeing to a solution. 
 
As explained previously, although effectiveness and compliance are related concepts, the 
question of whether a rule is effective should be distinguished from the question of whether it is 
complied with. A rule can be effective even if the compliance with it is low.
36
 Gerhart explains 
further that effectiveness can be measured and assessed objectively, once the goals of the rule 
have been articulated; and that changes in behaviour can promote the goal of the rule.
37
 WTO 
retaliation contributes to changing the behaviour of the states so that they search for a positive 
settlement. No state wants to suffer retaliatory action for too long, no state wants to be labelled 
or to have a reputation as the “violator”, therefore Members will either withdraw their 
inconsistent measures, or in the case that compliance is too costly, they will prefer to enter into 
mutually agreeable solutions. The presence of such behavioural changes of the parties to a 
dispute as a response to retaliation action demonstrates that WTO retaliation can be said to 
perform reasonably well even when it does not always induce compliance. 
 
Finally, three disputes are presented here to illustrate the effectiveness of retaliation in the 
light of its multiple purposes. They are: Byrd – Amendment, US – Upland Cotton and EC – 
                                                             
36 Raustiala states that if the rule can bring the desired change in behaviour, it can be considered effective even 
though non-compliance with the rule does exist. See Raustiala, above ch 3, n 7, at 394-398. 
37 Gerhart, above ch 3, n 7, at 362-363. 
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Hormones disputes. In the Byrd – Amendment dispute, the United States passed the Deficit 
Reduction Act which repealed the Byrd Amendment as a respond to the retaliatory measures 
imposed by the European Communities, Japan, Canada and Mexico. The withdrawal of 
inconsistent measures is the evidence that retaliation has reached the purpose of inducing 
compliance. In the US – Upland Cotton dispute, retaliation (through its threat) has served the 
purpose of “rebalancing”. In this case, Brazil and the United States have reached a provisional 
agreement in which the United States has agreed to provide a fund to support technical assistance 
and capacity building of Brazil‟s cotton farmers. In return, Brazil would suspend temporarily the 
imposition of the countermeasures.
38
 Finally as explained previously, retaliation inducing a 
mutually agreeable solution has occurred in the EC – Hormones dispute. The European Union 
and the United States has signed a three-phases agreement designed to end the retaliatory 
measures and the long-standing dispute between them.
39
  
 
To sum up, I provide a figure that lists three purposes of retaliation as well as an example 
of the disputes in which retaliation has promoted these purposes. 
 
Figure 3 the multiple purposes of retaliation as achieved in practice 
Retaliation Purposes Nature Descriptions  
(the goals) 
Disputes 
(occurred in) 
Inducing compliance Final  Full implementation  (the 
withdrawal of the inconsistent 
measures) 
US – Byrd 
Amendment  
Rebalancing/Compensation Temporary Re-balancing or compensation 
(in the case of pending 
compliance) 
US – Upland 
Cotton 
A Mutually agreeable 
solution 
Final A mutual satisfactory solution 
reached between parties to end 
the dispute 
EC – Hormones 
                                                             
38 Schnepf, above ch 2, n 178, at 24-27.   
39 WT/DS26/28, above n 15. 
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IV Room for Improvement 
Even though this thesis posits arguments about the reasonable soundness of WTO 
retaliation in light of its multiple purposes, there is still room for improvement. On the one hand, 
the WTO has single retaliatory instrument, namely the suspension of concessions or other 
obligations. On the other hand, the WTO covers various trade issues and consists of many 
Members with different trade capacities. Single instrument, even though it can pursue more than 
one purpose, might prove problematic in several complex situations, such as inequalities or 
asymmetric power between states. 
  
The imposition of retaliation is known to be harmful to both complainant and respondent 
states, because retaliation in the form of suspension of concessions or other obligations is trade 
restrictive (which is why it is never preferred in the first place). Nevertheless, states with various 
trade areas (developed countries) can design retaliation to hit significant sectors or products of 
violator states, while not causing too much harm to its domestic producers or its trade. However 
for small developing or least-developed countries that only have one or limited trade sector, 
more problems will be faced in imposing retaliation measures.  
 
Why does the WTO centralise its retaliation measure on the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations? Tietje suggests that the rationale for this can be derived from the notion of a 
concession based on a mercantilism view, and that the GATT was established on this 
mercantilism thought: exchanging concessions, such as market access, reciprocally.
40
 
Mercantilism always attempts to maximise exports and minimise imports. Accordingly, those 
exchanging concessions have been concerned with the exporters‟ interests, and retaliation 
reverses this exporter-oriented view by closing its market to another party that has failed to 
perform its obligation to open its market.
41
  
 
                                                             
40 Christian Tietje “The WTO Sanctions Regime and International Constitutional Political Economy: a Comment on 
the Case against Reforming the WTO Sanctions Regime” (2008) 1 U Ill L Rev 383 at 384-385.  
41 Ibid, at 385. 
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The suspension of concessions or other obligations is the most credible sanction if the 
focus is on export group pressure. However, WTO law is not only about exchanging concessions 
and is no longer merely concerned with the exporters‟ interests. This explains why the 
suspension of concessions seems toothless in inducing compliance in several disputes related to 
public health concerns, such as in EC – Hormones, and social interests, such as in EC – Bananas 
III.
42
 The injured party might employ suspension as an instrument to rebalance the concessions; 
however it might not provide proper relief to the injured export groups. Put differently, the 
suspension alone cannot be expected to satisfy all interests and to solve all the underlying 
problems.  
 
So, even though WTO retaliation is an effective instrument in changing the behaviour of 
states which flout the law, one should not expect that it go beyond that, to be a perfect 
instrument, because the suspension alone is not sufficient. 
 
Summary  
This chapter introduced another purpose of retaliation that was reflected in the EC – 
Hormones dispute: inducing mutually agreeable solution. In assessing this purpose, firstly the 
chapter showed that Article 22.8 and 3.7 of the DSU provide a legal basis for this purpose to be 
pursued by the parties to the dispute. However the parties should design a mutually agreeable 
solution that does not adversely affect or discriminate against other Members‟ trade benefits, 
otherwise the solution would be able to be challenged in a new dispute. Secondly, I argued that 
this purpose is the best alternative or option for the parties to the dispute when the purpose of 
inducing compliance is not attainable, because it provides parties with some flexibility in settling 
their dispute (not prolonging the dispute).  
 
 
 
                                                             
42 Ibid, at 386. 
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With regard to the question of effectiveness, I concluded that although in some 
circumstances WTO retaliation might not achieve the purpose of inducing compliance, it does 
induce several changes in the behaviour of a violator state in seeking and pursuing the purposes 
or goals of retaliation including a positive settlement through a mutually agreeable solution. The 
presence of such behavioural changes of the parties to a dispute as a response to retaliation action 
demonstrates that WTO retaliation has a reasonably sound level of performance. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
Conclūdō: to make an end; conclude.
1
 
 
The maxim “Ubi jus ibi remedium” demonstrates the importance of having legal 
remedies in every legal system. Every dispute settlement system requires effective enforcement 
instruments and mechanisms, nevertheless “harmful” and “ineffective” may be the words that 
come to mind when someone hears the words “WTO retaliation”. 
 
This thesis began with the discontent of various commentators over the WTO remedies, 
particularly retaliation. In their view, imposing retaliation is like “shooting [oneself] in the foot”, 
and it does little or nothing to induce compliance. Therefore, they consider it ineffective 
(chapters one and two). 
 
It is often assumed that a high level of compliance indicates the effectiveness of the 
compliance rule. I nonetheless identified that compliance and effectiveness, although related, are 
distinct. Therefore simple compliance is not an adequate measure of effectiveness. I established a 
different standpoint in this thesis that a rule is considered effective if it can achieve its purposes 
or objectives. Consequently, the effectiveness of WTO retaliation should be assessed in the light 
of its purposes (chapter three). 
 
In seeking the purposes of retaliation, I conducted an interpretation of Article 22 of the 
DSU in accordance with the rules of treaty interpretation. This is consistent with Article 3.2 of 
the DSU which provides that the WTO Agreements are to be interpreted in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. The customary rules of 
interpretation are widely regarded as being codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.  
 
                                                             
1 Oxford Latin Dictionary, above ch 4, n 8, at 389-390. 
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The interpretation of Article 22 has two results: firstly, retaliation should not turn into an 
arbitrary measure in pursuing its objectives; secondly, retaliation can be used to pursue more 
than one purpose in the light of the object and purpose of WTO dispute settlement (chapter 
three).  
 
I also looked at the Article 22.6 arbitrators‟ statements in search of the purposes of 
retaliation. In most disputes, the arbitrators referred to inducing compliance as the purpose of 
retaliation, even though they employed different standards in calculating the level of retaliation 
for the prohibited subsidies disputes. There were two disputes in which the arbitrators questioned 
the exclusivity of the purpose of inducing compliance. Moreover, I assessed various academic 
writings with regard to the purpose of retaliation. These writings can be divided into two main 
schools of thought: the purpose of inducing compliance, and the purpose of rebalancing. Those 
who support the purpose of rebalancing have written that when the cost of political performance 
exceeds the benefit of performance (politically cost), the DSU allows a violator to continue a 
violation as long as the violator compensates or is willing to suffer retaliation. This thought is 
refuted by the proponents of inducing compliance (chapter three).  
 
The study in this thesis has demonstrated that commentators as well as the arbitrators 
endorse the single purpose of retaliation: either inducing compliance or rebalancing. 
Commentators have had in fact a long debate about the single purpose of retaliation. 
Interpretation of Article 22 which I undertook has demonstrated that there are multiple purposes 
of retaliation, and they are: inducing compliance, rebalancing and reaching a mutually 
satisfactory solution. In the light of these multiple purposes, I stated that the disagreements about 
the single purpose of retaliation are unnecessary (chapter three).  
 
Furthermore one may argue that the interpretation alone is not sufficient to support this 
stance; therefore I provided assessments of the design of the WTO treaty to support the multiple 
purposes arguments. The assessments of the WTO treaty design have offered two primary 
conclusions: firstly, the bilateral nature of the WTO dispute settlement and retaliation 
entitlements provides the Members with the possibility of agreeing on other forms of settlement. 
Secondly, even though the WTO entitlements are basically protected by a property rule (high 
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preference for compliance), the WTO provides a lower level of back-up enforcement mechanism 
(non-punitive sanctions). This lower level of enforcement mechanism is to accommodate 
purposes additional to inducing compliance (chapter four).  
 
With regard to the multiple purposes, I have identified the purpose of retaliation inducing 
a mutually agreeable solution in the EC – Hormones dispute. The United States would terminate 
the retaliatory measures not because of the removal of inconsistent measures by the European 
Union, but because both states have agreed upon a mutually satisfactory settlement. I argued that 
this purpose (reaching a mutually agreeable solution) is the best-alternative-option when the 
purpose of inducing compliance is not attainable (chapter five).   
 
To conclude, in several disputes retaliation may not induce compliance; it may 
nevertheless induce changes in the behaviour of the violator state as is evidenced by the parties 
seeking and pursuing other goals from retaliation such as a positive settlement through a 
mutually agreed solution. It is therefore concluded that even if it does not always induce 
compliance, WTO retaliation is effective in the light of its multiple purposes. 
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